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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Activities of Committee for Social Support to Servicemen

92UM1455A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Aug 92 p 7

[Article by Aleksandr Zhilin: "How to make a Farmer Out of an Officer"]

[Text] The establishment of the Committee for Social Support for Servicemen under the Ministry of Defense of the RF [Russian Federation] has planted hope, albeit small, in the hearts of officers and their families. After all, the army did not have an organization dealing directly and exclusively with the social problems of the people in shoulder boards.

These problems have now inundated the army and navy. A significant cut in the armed forces is not far off, and this will undoubtedly create difficulties, the overcoming of which will preserve the prestige of the Russian military and enhance its combat readiness.

Will the committee be able to resolve even a part of the problems facing the armed forces under these difficult circumstances?

"In the first place," Col Aleksandr Kondrashov said, "we are working on the construction of housing, the organization of farming operations, job placement for those released into the reserve and pension support for servicemen."

We have made attempts to turn officers into farmers in the past. Many people are aware of what became of them. Will this latest campaign not be doomed in advance to receive a lot of hype and meet with a silent, unpublicized end?

The situation today is such that an officer who has honorably served 25 years, traveled the entire nation during that time and lived with his family in barracks and communal apartments as a rule goes into retirement a pauper. The state is unable to settle up with him. The coffers are empty. Let him at least count on some land. Today around 50,000 servicemen being released into the reserve would like to set up farms and agricultural production operations if conditions are right. It is predicted that the number of those wanting to work in the countryside will increase in the immediate future. Given the growth of unemployment in the cities and the shortage of food, they can realistically hope to feed themselves only on their own land.

The committee has agreements in principle with the governing bodies of Moscow, Leningrad, Pskov, Novgorod, Tula and Voronezh oblasts to set up as many as 6,000 farms there, with 15-20 hectares of land assigned to each officer. Furthermore, arrangements have been made to provide the former officers with housing when they arrive on the kolkhoz or sovkhoz.

It is one thing to make arrangements, of course, but how are they to be implemented? The administrations of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes are adamant: not an inch of land to private parties! And so, despite the agreement with local authorities, each plot of land for the officers has to be won in battle, so to speak. Many kolkhoz chairman are trying to palm off unfertile land or land difficult to cultivate.

The absence of a law on land is a factor, of course. Without one all of us—not just the reserve officers—are simply doomed to confrontation with the officials. This is precisely why committee chairman Aleksandr Temerko advanced the idea of conducting a referendum on the transfer of land to the private possession of servicemen. A million signatures in the "pro" column are needed to get the ball rolling.

Financing is another problem. The state is not in a position adequately to subsidize military programs for the construction of housing or the establishment of farms. Extra-budgetary sources of funding are needed. One of the possibilities is the sale of military property and equipment. The committee chairman is striving for authorization to sell 9 billion dollars worth of military property and equipment, which would go into a special frozen and controlled account. A system would then be activated for applying the funds for the construction of apartment buildings in cities and separate homes for farmers in rural areas. Only one thing is needed to provide for the uninterrupted functioning of the entire system: resolution of the land issue. An officer should not go to officials with outstretched hand but should receive land by law. The lieutenant needs his native soil, as they say.

These initiatives are not being received with understanding, however, to put it mildly. Certain forces need a social eruption in the army right at this time. They would immediately paint it in reddish-brown hues and attempt to use the armed forces to overthrow the legal authorities. Luckily, this is understood in the government. An entire package of government documents will be issued in the near future focusing primarily on providing social protection for servicemen. Ye. Gaydar, B. Saltykov and A. Shokin are being very helpful to the committee. Not a single reasonable initiative has been rejected or disappeared into the corridors of power.

Something else is the problem. Inspections have shown that in those regions where former party apparatchiks are in power, there is out-and-out sabotage of government decisions and instructions. They are earning political capital from hardships which they themselves artificially create. Consider the results of the voting by the deputies on the transfer of land to private ownership at the latest congress. Who blocked the adoption of decisions? Former party bigwigs, prominent political workers and state officials. The congress will never resolve this issue. All hopes are therefore on a referendum.

The referendum is in the future. Right now, however, the Ministry of Defense and the committee are planning to begin building bungalow-type houses for the future farmers. That is, to demonstrate the essence and the superiority of their program with action and not with words. In addition, the government has issued a decree on assistance for servicemen in setting up farms. It essentially calls for allotting small plots of land and extending credit to the former military.

The government has already allocated around 2 billion rubles for this purpose. I know that this is not a large amount, but, you will agree, one has to start somewhere.

We also have the first results. Those officers who have requested help have received assistance in obtaining land, some equipment and credit. This is still not a system, of course, but at least things have started to move, albeit creakingly. I believe that more perceptible results will come about by the fall of this year.

'Voyennyye Znaniya' Chief Editor Interviewed

92UM1443B Moscow PATRIOT in Russian
No 35, Sep 92 (Signed to press 1 Sep 92) p 6

[Interview with Vladimir S. Sinyutin, chief editor, VOY-ENNYYE ZNANIYA, by PATRIOT correspondent A. Akishin: "Intention to Continue Serving the Reader"; place and date not given; first two paragraphs are PATRIOT introduction]

[Text] The periodical VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA is one of the oldest wide-circulation publications in the country. It has been in existence since 1925. Almost 200 million people have subscribed to it from its inception. The periodical's popularity derives from the high quality and timeliness of its articles and from its commitment to current issues and the readers.

The tasks set for 1993 and problems being experienced are discussed by Vladimir Sergeyevich Sinyutin, the chief editor of VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA.

[PATRIOT] Vladimir Sergeyevich, has there not been a decline in reader interest, seeing that there is a loss in readership for the second half of 1992? This seems to indicate some lessening of interest in military subjects. Constituting a barometer of readership are letters from readers. What does the mail tell you?

[Sinyutin] It is sad but true: For these six months, we have lost quite a number of subscribers. However, the problem is not peculiar to us; suffering similar trouble are other periodicals which in the past enjoyed a readership numbered in the millions.

Publication costs for 1992 have risen ten-fold, exceeding the income derived from subscriptions. In only the first quarter of this year, we became indebted to the printers and suppliers in the amount of about one million rubles. Even our printing of combined editions did not help to get us out of the economic bind. I would like to take this

opportunity to apologize to our readers for the changes necessitated by this turn of events. The measure was essential, unfortunately.

We have indeed lost many readers. However, the most dedicated and loyal among them undoubtedly are giving us support. What is surprising is that this includes not only persons working in civil defense, but young people, quite young, who look to our periodical for guidance. I shall prove my point by reading some excerpts from letters recently received by the editors.

"As a specialist working in the civil defense system, I appreciate the answers to many questions in which I have a deep interest in the coverage provided by VOY-ENNYYE ZNANIYA." This is from a letter written by Major General (Res.) D. Temirkhanov.

"It was two years ago that I started to work in a rural school as a military instructor; I now teach safety," writes S. Strelnikov from Saratov Oblast. "In this time, I have been subscribing to and reading VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA, which has provided me with a great deal of useful information. The magazine is the only source of material for teaching safety; there is none other."

We receive quite a stack of letters daily. This pleases us, and we respond to all of them, taking note of well-wishing, suggestions, and criticism. The reader is of central importance to us; we intend to remain loyal to him in the future.

[PATRIOT] To expand their readership, some publications are changing their style and even their format. This trend apparently pertains to some extent to VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA as well. What will the latter be like in 1993? What will the reader find that is new?

[Sinyutin] No, we are not striving for some kind of superpopularity. Our major effort is completely different: To offer tangible usefulness primarily to all who labor in the civil defense system; have an interest in history of military equipment; like the romance of the sea; and maintain an interest in raising their four-legged wards. However the requirements we face, our attempts at filling readers' requests, naturally compel us to reorganize ourselves—to a considerable extent, at that. For the interests of those who subscribe to the periodical serve as a beacon to us.

We have changed the structure of the periodical; the editions coming off the press this year will already reflect change. We have moved away from topics of a political nature. Since our cosponsor is the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Matters of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Cleanup After Major Calamities, the magazine's main thrust will be in the area of teaching the population to effect protection in this kind of situation. It should be realized that people's lives are often being affected by this kind of unusual situation. We will also deal with the subject of transportation. That is an area in which there are dangerous occurrences. Hence

our purpose of training people for this, with our provision of various practical information. In a word, civil defense matters are central in our mind. Incidentally, a survey of readers indicates that four out of five of the subscribers work in civil defense.

The following are examples of topics we will take up in our 1993 editions: public safety in emergency situations; work of the KChS [Emergency Situation Committee], personnel and services of civil defense of national economic facilities relative to prevention of industrial accidents and calamities, and to cleanup operations in the aftermath of the latter; and training of rescue personnel and emergency services. In this regard, there are things we can learn from developed countries. That is why we attach importance to informing the readers of Russia's State Emergency Situation Committee's participation in international cooperation in the area of the prevention and cleanup after emergency situations.

Presented on the pages of VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA are contributions made by heads of regional centers, the KChS, and civil defense personnel, and courses for oblasts, autonomous areas, cities, and rayons; and specialists working in scientific and other institutions and organizations; civil defense chiefs of Russian national economic facilities. The periodical's files already contain quite an amount of instruction material, articles on the best civil defense people, interviews with civil defense veterans, and information dealing with the experience gained in organizing and conducting civil defense in foreign countries. We will continue to supply complete answers to questions submitted by readers. In a word, what we will be providing will not be covered in other periodicals in the area of assistance to civil defense management agencies and to civil defense schools and the population.

We will also become involved in ecological matters.

The above of course does not mean that we intend to abandon topics dealing with routine activities and problems of the Russian OSTO [Defense Sports-Technical Organization]. On the contrary, we plan to expand to some extent our coverage of those topics. Thus, we are thinking of featuring the activities of OSTO rescue units, and their cooperation with civil defense personnel relative to cleanup operations in the aftermath of accidents, natural calamities, serious infectious diseases, etc.

Quite a number of articles will deal with OSTO activists, teachers of the classroom course "Principles of Safety," and with persons involved with dog breeding, Asian martial arts, self-defense preparation, crosswords, and quizzes.

We plan to continue printing articles on the history of military equipment, military history, military adventure stories, and the romance of the sea.

[PATRIOT] I can see from what you tell me that the periodical's coverage will undergo changes. The magazine will be different. In this connection, it is clear that the present title does not reflect the future goals and designs.

[Sinyutin] I agree. That is why we plan, in the first few months of 1993, to change the periodical's title to represent the new goals to be pursued by the editors. I wish that our readers would send in suggestions in this regard.

[PATRIOT] I must say that the journal's publication expenses have become simply astronomical. This is indicated by a look at the new subscription list for the last half of this year. The situation existing in the country obviously dictates that the subscription price be raised. So what is the rate for VOYENNYYE ZNANIYA for 1993?

[Sinyutin] The magazine's new price will discourage some people, of course. We do understand that not everyone can afford it, but a fair price would not be below 35 rubles.

We have had to effect severe economic measures: deep personnel cuts, reductions in staff travel and in other areas. Nonetheless, the periodical's price has risen to an unprecedented height. A subscription will cost 35 rubles for one month, 105 rubles for three months, and 210 rubles for six months. The publication number will remain unchanged: 20139. A subscription can be purchased at all communication agencies without restriction.

We will do our utmost to see that we publish the 12 issues per year.

[PATRIOT] Will a person be able to purchase a subscription if he resides in a country other than Russia, in one of the CIS countries?

[Sinyutin] I have no doubts about that. He can do so. However, in that case the rate would be less favorable. A person wishing to subscribe to our periodical will have to pay extra for postage and handling. The latter in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast comes to about 8 rubles.

Nonetheless, it is our hope that the true devotees of the journal, those persons who find it essential to their work, of whom there is quite a number, will not fail to enter their subscription.

Finance Ministry Criticizes Law on Aid to Servicemen

92UM1438A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Aleksandr Yegorov: "The Ministry of Finance Is Attempting to Torpedo the Bill on the Status of Servicemen"]

[Text]

But What Will the Parliament Say?

It seems that some officials are now pushing the patience of the Russian military man—abused, without a home, risking his life everyday and frequently dying—to the breaking point. This was the first thing to enter my mind when I read some mail from the RF [Russian Federation] Supreme Soviet's Committee for the Disabled, War

and Labor Veterans, and Social Protection for Servicemen and Their Families. Hundreds of letters were received from deputies, officers and military collectives, analytical comments, complaints and proposals were received from Russia's Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Security and Ministry of Internal Affairs and from a large number of other departments concerning the draft Law of the Russian Federation on the Status of and Social Guarantees for Servicemen, which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 17 July of this year. The vast majority of those who took part in the discussion of the draft law have been in favor of passing it as rapidly as possible at the session of the Supreme Soviet.

Here are several excerpts from letters and telegrams.

Lt Col Trofimov, unit commander:

"The servicemen in our unit feel that the law must be passed precisely in its present version, without devitalizing it."

People's Deputy Kondavayev from TO [Territorial District] 388:

"Servicemen in Eastern Siberia give the draft law (...), published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, a very high rating. There are fears, however, that the draft will be emasculated with amendments during its consideration."

Some of the letters also accuse the legislators of being overly cautious. Their authors feel that the servicemen deserve more benefits and privileges.

Neither of the two kinds of letters was the motivation for writing this article, however. The document which I have in mind is of an entirely different kind. It criticizes practically all the provisions of the bill pertaining to material support for servicemen. The document came out of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Finance.

The basic tone of this unambiguous letter, signed by Deputy Minister of Finance A. Astakhov, is set by expressions like these: "should be deleted," "no basis," "not supported" and so forth. In the "best" Soviet tradition they befog the simply but clearly stated articles in the bill. Examples?

Take the second and third paragraphs of Point 1 of Article 13. The Ministry of Finance feels that they should be worded as follows: "Rates of pay and allowances and other monetary benefits are set by the government of the Russian Federation."

One logically wonders what the Ministry of Finance is trying to avoid. Article 13, Point 1, in the bill states: "...official pay rates for the positions of junior officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and extended-duty personnel newly assigned to positions manned by these categories of military personnel may not be lower than five times the minimum wage of blue-and white-collar workers; and rates based on military rank, no less than half the rate for the position.

"Official rates for the positions of NCOs and first-term, lower-ranking personnel drafted into the military may not be less than half the minimum wage for blue-and white-collar workers."

The purpose of the editing is clear: to avoid specific commitments to the servicemen.

It is also proposed that points 3 and 4 of that article be amended. Amended in such a way, as we can see from a comparison of the proposed rendition with what the bill contains, that the category of first-term personnel serving under contract (and there will soon be such personnel) is "dropped" from the text entirely, and the term "pay and allowances [dovolstviye]" is replaced by the seemingly similar "monetary subsistence [soderzhaniye]." The effect of what would appear at first glance to be a cosmetic amendment is the exclusion from the total amount of rewards and financial assistance of the proportionate increments for length of service as an officer, increases for scientific titles and degrees, increases for parachute jumps, for diving work, and so forth.

"Due to the considerable increases in pay and allowances for servicemen which took effect on 1 June and 2 August 1992," Russia's Ministry of Finance also does not support the proposal to increase posting allowances to twice the amount of pay and allowances and to 50 percent of the pay and allowances for each family member. From the standpoint of the Ministry of Finance, Point 5 of Article 13 should read as follows: "When military personnel are transferred (...), posting allowances for family members who have actually moved to the new place of residence (...) are also paid according to the procedure and in amounts set by the government of the Russian Federation."

The "magical" and "ethereal" formulation "by the procedure and in amounts set by the government" is encountered on each of the six pages of Deputy Minister Astakhov's letter. Such formulations are used each time precisely worded provisions of the bill need to be neutralized. They appear with respect to the amount of insurance paid to the heirs in the case of the death of a serviceman (Article 17, Point 2) and the payment of one-time assistance to officers released into the reserve (Article 21, Point 4), for example. Furthermore, as though addressing scholarly dolts incapable of understanding the reasoning, Comrade Astakhov reiterates the following over and over: "These proposals will require considerable budgetary outlays, which it would appear impossible to find in view of Russia's extremely difficult economic situation and significant budget deficit."

It would appear that the Committee for the Disabled, War and Labor Veterans, and Social Protection for Servicemen and Their Families under the Russian Federation's Council of Ministers should either apologize to workers in the Ministry of Finance for the trouble caused by forcing them to make the expert assessment of the

"amateurish" bill or to reject these arguments and place their own onto the scale. There is no third choice, as they say. Do the lawmakers have their arguments?

Absolutely. The main one is that Russia needs the armed forces.

It is now well known that the military specialists are describing the present situation with respect to the manning of Russia's troops and naval forces as extremely alarming and dangerous. The shortage of men in many units and subunits has now just about reached 50 percent. The causes are not new: draft evasion (16,500 cases in 1991, or slightly less than 3 percent of the total draft) and massive deferments. Viktor Bushuyev, a specialist in the Subcommittee for Social Protection of Servicemen of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet, reports that more than 70 percent of all of Russia's citizens who have reached draft age cannot be drafted into the military service for one reason or another (compared to 47.9 percent in 1989).

In addition, the officer corps continues to be reduced, with tens of thousands (80,000 in 1991) of young lieutenants and captains leaving the army and navy. The reasons? The low level of pay and allowances, social uncertainty, lack of proper living conditions, the instability of the situation, and so forth.

One wonders what will become of the army in the near and particularly, the remote, future when the youth are rejecting it even now.

World experience has shown that it takes at least 10 years to convert from a new system of manning the military. We will need years to create not only the material conditions for the conversion, but the social conditions as well, and to alter the outlook of the youth, in whose mind the idea that "the army means lack of freedom, coercion and slave labor" is firmly fixed for a long time to come.

This is why we must not put off passage of the law. And we must certainly not turn it into a collection of crafty proposals. The law must be open and unambiguous so that the new lieutenant and the future professional soldier can read it and know what he can count on: how much money, what pay rate, what kind of leave, what kind of medical care if it becomes necessary and finally, what kind of respect he will enjoy in the society. This is very important. And I do not believe that the Ministry of Finance does not understand this just as well as we do. We can only pin our hopes on the Supreme Soviet, which will meet in the second half of September.

Col-Gen Madudov Discusses Changes in Military Education

92UM1437A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Sep 92 p 1, 2

[Interview with Col Gen Nikolay Grigoryevich Madudov, chief of the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Oleg Vladykin: "Military VUZs in a Period of Transition"]

[Text] We are entering the new academic year with a new Law on Education. What are the changes?

Russia's Supreme Soviet passed the Law on Education at the end of July. The very first article of the new document defines the basic principle: "The Russian Federation proclaims education a priority." Let us hope that this principle will soon be reflected in the documents defining the procedure and the actual training of specialists for the armed forces. For now, though, our correspondent has met with Col Gen N. Madudov, chief of the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutes of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense and asked him what is presently being done to bring the military training system into conformity with the law and how it will affect the work of the VUZs in the academic year just beginning.

[Madudov] In principle major changes were made in the system of military education last year. This was first of all a result of the fact that new training plans and programs went into effect which are to serve as the basis for resolving two urgent problems.

The first involves enhancing the fundamental orientation of education and at the same time increasing the practical focus of the VUZ training. There is no contradiction in this approach to the dual task. We will achieve the goal of giving a more fundamental focus to the training by establishing a unified scientific basis for the training in similar and related specialties. The practical aspect will be achieved by establishing more narrow specialization in the final phase of the training.

The second, no less important problem lies in making the military education more humanitarian. That is, enhancing the role of the humanities in the shaping of the modern officer's mentality and enhancing his general and professional military culture. I am not talking about formally increasing the number of hours spent on the humanities. The ideology has been removed from subjects with a social orientation, and we are now working to inject them with different substance more closely linked to real life. New and purely cultural disciplines are also being introduced. All of the military specialists trained by us will cover this program to approximately

the same extent, regardless of the specific field of specialization of the VUZ.

And then, it has become necessary in general to renew the entire concept of the development of education in the armed forces and revise the legal normative base of the higher military school. The foundation for this work has already been laid in the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions. A fundamentally new statute has been worked out for the state certification of graduates.

[Vladykov] And one should assume that it was prepared in accordance with the multilevel structure of higher education now established by law in Russia.

[Madudov] Naturally, since this structure was established back in the spring of this year by a decree of the Committee on the Higher School. There needs to be some explanation, however, in order to single out one important aspect. It is that the specific nature of military education which has always existed cannot be ignored in this case either.

The main feature and virtue of this decree lies in the fact that it does not rescind anything in the present system of higher professional education, but only supplements the latter. This suits us perfectly, because the preparation of specialists with diplomas during a training period of 5-6 years continues to be the cornerstone of the higher school.

I underscore this because the directors of certain military VUZs have not completely grasped the essence and the purpose of the multilevel educational structure and have begun submitting proposals that the preparation of students for bachelor's degrees be initiated immediately at military schools and academies. We do not find sufficient grounds for such an innovation, however.

[Vladykov] Are you saying that a bachelor's program does not fit into the existing system of the higher military school and cannot fundamentally benefit the latter?

[Madudov] Exactly that. In order to understand this one has to understand thoroughly what the multilevel structure is and why it is being introduced.

I would like to point out what levels have been established. The first is the incomplete higher education. Students who have studied two years but have not demonstrated an aptitude for further study will train for a year or a year and a half in a program of secondary vocational training. Simply put, they are just given a specialty so that they can earn a living. This is essentially a matter of "salvaging the screenings" of the higher school. It would be a pity simply to put onto the streets young people who have acquired some knowledge in certain basic subjects but do not have a profession.

The second level is the bachelor program. What does it consist of? After studying at least four years the recipients of bachelor's degrees will have acquired a fundamental education in very broad fields, each of which will embrace 10 or more of the present specialties. At the

same time, they will not be prepared to go directly into practical work in a specific occupation. In order to master a specialty the holder of a bachelor's degree will either have to continue studying at the VUZ or find a job and study on his own or perhaps acquire the necessary narrowly specialized knowledge and skills in the system of specialized courses.

Those holders of bachelor's degrees who demonstrate a capacity for independent creative work will be able to prepare themselves to earn a master's degree or a diploma as a specialist. And that is the third level of the higher education. As a rule, recipients of master's degrees will be trained by special appointment, individually and only as authorized by the Committee on the Higher School. This degree will be conferred upon holders of bachelor's degrees with a talent for scientific research who have studied an additional three or four years at a VUZ. This is also the way specialists with diplomas will be trained, with the difference that they will graduate after additional training for one to three years, ready to enter into practical work in production. The master's degree and the specialist's diploma are equally important, and only they provide the right to enter graduate school.

I am discussing the multilevel structure of higher education adopted in Russia in order to answer the question of what components of this system are completely applicable to the higher military school and which components we should not be hasty to adopt.

[Vladykov] If I have understood you, Nikolay Grigoryevich, the military VUZs will not produce holders of bachelor's degrees because, while providing a basic education, they will still not provide the graduates an actual specialty. If we take that route, the lieutenants could not be appointed to any positions in the army or navy without additional training and therefore, without considerable cost....

[Madudov] That is absolutely correct. The introduction of a bachelor's program would complicate the matter of replenishing the units with regular personnel since it would divert a lot of personnel and funds to the additional training of VUZ graduates. It would be better to prepare them properly at the schools. We do not intend to break up the existing system of military education, but we shall take from the new, multilevel structure that which we consider to be useful.

[Vladykov] And what might be useful?

[Madudov] I believe that the incomplete higher education can and should be used as an alternative for those who cannot quite handle the VUZ program and would withdraw. Following additional study in the program of a specialized secondary educational institution, they would be issued a certificate equal to the diploma from a secondary military school.

The composition of the education acquired at higher engineering command schools, engineering schools and military institutes with a five-year period of study in general meets the demands set for the training of specialists with diplomas. A partial adjustment to enhance its

fundamental focus and enlarge the humanitarian component of the education would not require a fundamental breakdown of an appropriate training process.

We could also turn out holders of master's degrees specially for working at scientific research institutions of the Ministry of Defense. The engineering departments of academies and a number of leading military schools have this capability. The main thing is to select for the master's program truly gifted cadets with a bent for research.

The higher command schools with a four-year period of study are the weakest link in the chain of military education. Officially, they provide that third level of higher education, but the makeup of the education does not meet the demands set for a higher school, and the level of preparation of their graduates does not correspond to that required for a diploma.

The main and most important task of the reform of military education stems from this: the need to eliminate the lag by the command schools. Their training period must be increased to five years, and the programs have to be totally revised. Unless these steps are taken the command schools could lose the right to issue diplomas of higher education in accordance with Russia's Law on Education. Right now, however, we are only at the beginning of the resolution of this extremely important problem. Extending the training period by a year will necessitate a significant enlargement of the field of study covered by the schools and will entail reequipping the educational facilities. It all ultimately hinges upon financial outlays.

[Vladykov] One last question. Are the role and the status of the military academies changing?

[Maduov] No. They will continue to serve as centers of training methods and science within the system of military education. Officially, the academies do not exceed that third level of higher education acquired by officers at the schools. They provide a fundamentally new specialty, however, which is essential for directing large military formations and for organizing the operations of the troops on an incomparably larger scale than any of them was prepared for as cadets. This hypothetical breakdown of education at academies and schools into higher military and specialized military education is purely a service-related, internal, departmental matter. There is no need to reject it, since it makes it possible precisely to differentiate the officers in their ability to assume one position or another. At the same time I want to say that with the conversion of command schools to a five-year training period, the training period for cadets at the academies must, of course, be reduced.

Conversation with 'Shadow Defense Minister' Recounted

92UM1443A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Sep 92 p 5

[Article by Colonel Aleksey Khorev (Ret), KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent: "Spare-Time Minister of Defense: Two Colonels in Russia's 'Shadow Government'"]

[Text] "Well, you certainly selected some chief of the general staff!" I said with some irony in speaking with Minister of Defense Vladimir Ivanovich Miloserdov.

"Actually, I had nothing to do with his selection," said the minister calmly. He then asked me a question: "What is there you find disappointing about him, since I believe that you have not even met him?"

"That is exactly the point: He disappoints me, even though I have not met him. I rang him, introduced myself, and then suggested that we get together. He then asked me about what we would discuss. I told him that the topic has to do with his new post. He then said gruffly and arrogantly: What business is that of yours?"

In my many years of working for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, I was often required to meet with ministers and their deputies, but on no occasion did anyone descend upon me with that kind of question: "What business is that of yours?" I always held the pleasant thought that newspaper work does indeed include involvement with anything having to do with all matters of the service and public significance. And the present press law does nothing to upset that long-held relationship. However, Konstantin Pavlovich Belkin obviously does not think that way. It appears that he believes the present-day democracy grants him wide permission, including questionable claims to the post of chief of the general staff. And newspapers are not to bother him. As the old gypsy in Pushkin's "Gypsies" would have it: "You want liberty, but only for yourself."

This may be a good place to digress from the story I started to tell in the middle and explain something for the reader's benefit. With the multitude of newspapers—especially tabloids—coming off the presses, I believe that few people have taken note of and remember a document recently published in the "RUSSKIYE VEDOMOSTI." It is entitled "Ukase of the Head of the Public Government of Russia Concerning the Formation of a Public Russian Government of Russia." Listed as members of this organization along with the head—Viktor Ivanovich Korchagin—were 10 men. The list included the following:

Minister of Defense: Vladimir Ivanovich Miloserdov, doctor of technical sciences, colonel.

Chief of Staff, Armed Forces: Konstantin Pavlovich Belkin, colonel.

The government is then directed to "proceed in the discharge of its duties."

In glancing over the list of names with associated military ranks, I honestly thought that one of our retired brothers was trying to have some fun. A retired person enjoying good health and not working certainly can become bored. So it made sense to me that what we have is some fellows who found something to do: They saw something associated with the "government," but figured that they wanted something more interesting than attending mere conferences. That is one way to do away with boredom.

I honestly must admit that I could not imagine that the "officials" would turn out to be cadre officers. This is something that has never been encountered in the annals of our regulations, ethics, officer ethics, or Army life. This must be something bordering on imposture. This is a situation where all one has to do is pin on a marshall's insignia and shoulder boards and make a show of himself. This is in the same class as a gift from the fairly famous Brumel, who declared himself to be regent to the Russian throne and went around awarding titles of prince and count to all whom he happened to like. (In answering the question of who endowed him with such authority, he asked the question: "Who gave Lenin the authority to foment the revolution?" So much for that.) Is this kind of game one only for officers? The point is, the Army after August of last year was depoliticized and departyized. Incidentally, the Russian Criminal Code includes Article 194, which deals with liability for illegal assumption of the rank or position of an official.

With the above running through my mind, I nevertheless decided to telephone the Main Personnel Directorate, at which time I learned, to my surprise, that both Miloserdov and Belkin are cadre officers. The former is serving in the Moscow area, holding a fairly high post in a research organization, while the latter is a senior officer in a general staff directorate. Miloserdov is 55 years of age; Belkin, 50. Both of them entered active duty as aviation technicians and worked for some time as secretaries in Komsomol organizations (Miloserdov apparently in free status); Belkin was so occupied for quite some time: five years. They graduated from military academies. Miloserdov subsequently took up a fairly specialized scientific line of work, while Belkin served a tour of duty as quality-control military representative, after which he entered the management apparatus. Both receive favorable efficiency ratings. Noteworthy here is that the service records of the two individuals contain nothing whatsoever qualifying them to hold positions on the high order of defense minister and general staff chief, posts which require the application of strategic thinking and considerable command experience. I brought up that point with both of them.

"But that is not really so. Can you understand that?" retorted Miloserdov. "You also could be a minister in your spare time if you so wished."

Belkin put it another way: "I was not asked for my concurrence, but the person who does the appointing must know what he is doing."

Belkin and I spent some time in our conversation in an argument that went nowhere. He at first attempted to convince me that it is not he who is specified in the "ukase" to assume the post of general staff chief but some unknown person possessing the same name. (The files of the Main Personnel Directorate do not bear this out.) He was speaking in that light before he met with me and his superiors: Lieutenant General V. Gorokhov and Colonel A. Degtev, who, incidentally, learned of Belkin's "promotion" from another source, not from him. I am aware that Article 4 of the Interior Service Regulations requires that the serviceman "report to his immediate superior any event concerning himself." That which happened with Belkin is hardly something which should pass unnoticed.

It turned out that Colonel Belkin was attempting to cover up the obvious. This conclusion when told to him in so many words struck a raw nerve. He commenced convincing me that he was considered to be some kind of "dissident" for his entire tour of duty, that he was never afraid to speak his mind to his superiors. This allegedly reached the point where he initiated an argument with the deputy of the minister himself, who threw him out of his office. He comes across as feeling especially proud of such occurrences, and I somehow believe that the latter were real, even though I feel that he is less than sincere in other ways.

Miloserdov was decidedly more forthright and open. For example, he did not hide the fact that he is a member of the Russian Party, which, although still not registered with the Ministry of Justice, has already carried out some political work. Miloserdov took part in its second congress. That congress passed the resolution forming the so-called "Russian Public Government for the Transitional Period," with Vladimir Ivanovich agreeing to accept the post of minister of defense.

Miloserdov gave me a copy of his party's draft program, which has been published in RUSSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, a publication put out by the same V. I. Korchagin. It turned out that the military section of the draft program was written by Miloserdov. Its main thrust is a call for an immediate halt in disarmament of the Army and discharging of officers, with the issue of disarmament and reduction of the Armed Forces to be submitted for general people's referendum.

It goes without saying that the above proposals are substantial. Any party possesses the right to submit them, of course. However, the point here is that Miloserdov, as a military man, was obligated to report his proposals by chain of command. It was also his right to submit a written request to his senior commander, up to and including the minister of defense (Article 110 of the Disciplinary Regulations), but he failed to do that.

In my talks with both Belkin and Miloserdov, we naturally touched on the subject of the contradiction existing between their behavior and the spirit of military discipline, but they failed to provide me with any convincing arguments. They are of course concerned with the "resurrection" of the Russian Army, but it seems to me that what they are doing tends to cause disintegration of the latter. In a situation where you have a military "understudy" show up with a legal defense minister in office, how much further can you stray—very far from one-man command?

In general, the participation of servicemen in any political movements of an antigovernmental nature is extremely improper. It may be said that this constitutes a severe form of political protest, one that alleges that the existing government is following a mistaken line, so let us send it into retirement and take over matters ourselves. This is generally a normal development in a democratic society. However, this is questionable in the case of servicemen, who take an oath of allegiance to the government. What kind of loyalty can this be, if the idea is to openly effect an overthrow, even one that is carried out by legal means? Also, this kind of situation calls to mind the saying about the hen that grazes at home, but lays her eggs at the neighbor's house.

Of course, if there is but one party in a country, and if it is the one in power, the army cannot join up with it, and this will not contradict the serviceman's position as far as he is concerned. In the case of a multiparty system, everything becomes more difficult.

Presently registered with the Ministry of Justice of Russia are more than a dozen parties. Well, just let us try to imagine that this "variegation" would exist in a regiment, rank, a firing chain. Each man would have his own party in mind, while everyone would have a common combat mission. Definitely, there was a good reason why the Russian General Mikhail Ivanovich Dragomirov, known for his wisdom, in his discussions with officers on this subject said the following:

"You may join any party you wish. However, do not do so while in uniform. One cannot at once serve both his sovereign and the latter's enemies."

Incidentally, the above idea has been debated by servicemen for quite some time. It has been set down in the recently published draft of the Russian Federation's Draft Law on the Status and Social Guarantees of Servicemen, in which it is stated flatly that servicemen are prohibited from joining political parties. This idea will strike many persons not only as questionable, but unacceptable as well. The same Konstantin Pavlovich Belkin, for example, considers it to be undemocratic. It at first glance may indeed appear to be so. Especially to those who have been in service for some time; those who, from their first exposure to political instruction to the last seminar on Marxist-Leninist training, took in other concepts of the role and place of the Army in the political system. The new conditions dictate adopting different

views. The law should take into account the new circumstances. This will have the specific effect of removing the present confusion regarding servicemen's participation in antigovernmental movements; it will render it—this participation—questionable not only from the standpoint of ethics, but from that of legality as well. As long as the law has nothing to say, the voice of ethics is unfortunately not heard by everyone.

"As soon as the draft becomes law," said Vladimir Ivanovich Miloserdov in response to my rendering of the above thoughts, "I of course intend to leave the party immediately."

It is too bad that he had not thought about the above previously.

It always beffited the serviceman to respect the law. This should be kept in mind by everyone entering the service. It will help in his avoiding disappointment if in the future he encounters some restrictions placed on his rights and liberties inherent in military service and governed by law. The present draft law on status sets down this situation in no uncertain terms.

There was a time—and this was not very long ago—when public opinion and the very spirit of our laws placed the same value upon a person's attitude toward his government and his attitude toward his motherland. You did not like your government? Well, this meant that you were not a patriot, that you should be sent somewhere, perhaps into exile. Today it is quite a different story. You support the government? How strange! If you attend antigovernmental rallies, that is all right. You are a patriot. This obviously is the public reaction to the dominance of many years relative to conformity, adaptability, and passive acceptance of prevailing views and absence of a personal point of view. We have made a wide swing from one extreme to the other.

Every Russian undoubtedly holds the Russian Party's concern for Russia's future close to his heart. Today even the blind can see that she lived for too long in the family of nations, living the life of the older uncomplaining sister, who would make sure her younger sisters had the best of clothing, while she herself would wear an old dress. That is one of the reasons she is going virtually nowhere. And she is deeply hurt to be in this kind of situation, listening to thankless and insulting shouting behind her back. That is so. Nonetheless, it is necessary to look ahead, not rearward. That is the thing to do. If this a case of "Russia for Russians only!", then where is everyone else to go from this land? And of what are these people guilty? What are the slogans urging us to do? Strive for peace, consolidation, or a fratricidal war?

Now we have politicians on the extreme left and the extreme right (those of extreme views always get together) all earnestly pledging from tribunes that they do not want any enmity or harmful differences between peoples. Nonetheless, each faction declares its views to be the true ones and the final word, while heaping verbal abuse on the other faction that is so mean that the only

thing that could be worse is an actual punch in the nose. Participation of the "man carrying a gun" in these cockfights is not only unbefitting to him; it is fraught with bloodshed.

'Space Forces' Unit Based in Crimea

924P0180A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian
5 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by V. Savchenko, correspondent: "Are 'Star Wars' in Store for Ukraine and Russia? It's a Complete Secret"]

[Text] The latest achievement of Soviet space technology is our unique, multiple-use spacecraft, which has been taking off and landing in the relatively deserted steppes of Kazakhstan. Everybody knows this. But what virtually nobody knows is that a backup landing strip for this extremely complex engineering complex has been set up and fitted out in the Crimea. A command-metering complex is also located there; and a division of "space force" military personnel has been stationed there. In general, there are various opinions as to the feasibility of deploying such space forces in the rich and pleasant Crimea. But, in any case, what kind of military-service branch would this be without its own base in that resort-type peninsula? It's not fair.

In short, the division established itself quietly and peacefully, and there were only a few people who knew about it. In general, the commanders of our "Star Wars" are not talked about and even less written about. Nor was this matter touched upon amid the passions which swirled around the dividing up of the army and the fleet. There would seem to have been no doubts evoked concerning the strategic purpose of this division, nor—therefore—about its being subordinate to Marshal Shaposhnikov's department. Furthermore, the Ukrainian leaders never mentioned the plans connected with the "Star Wars." But nowadays all that is behind us. A modest-sized division has a chance to shake things up even more than the problem of dividing the Black Sea Fleet.

According to a report from the press center of the "Crimea with Ukraine" Public Organization Committee, this division has taken an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people, and the blue-and-yellow flag has been ceremonially raised over the staff headquarters of the command-metering complex. Serving as examples were Colonel Gennadiy Samarin, the division's commander, and Colonel Valeriy Solovyev, the commander of the complex, who is also a member of the Crimean Supreme Soviet Presidium.

This step was brought about more by political considerations than by military feasibility. The fact of the matter is that the basic purpose or mission of the "space force" unit is anti-missile defense. This was supposed to cover the entire territory of the former USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Pact with an invisible "umbrella." There is no longer a USSR or

Warsaw Pact. But the "umbrella" remained. Now it does not exist either. In the specialists' opinion, an "umbrella" with holes in it is tantamount to having none at all. Within the present-day economic situation, Russia will hardly be able to find the funds for restructuring the entire system of anti-missile defense. And it would be utterly senseless or meaningless for Ukraine to acquire its own little piece of a "nuclear umbrella."

At the same time, however, the military people have not forgotten to remind us that the Western missiles are still aimed—just as they were previously—at Russia and at Ukraine.

But this is from the viewpoint of the military people. With regard to the political aspects, there is an utter lack of clarity on this matter. The possibility that Yeltsin and Kravchuk discussed this problem in Mukhalatka has not been ruled out; it is even possible that Bush has been kept posted and well-informed regarding it. In that case, of course, no serious complications are to be foreseen. Alas, there has not yet been any information on that score. At the press conference held in Mukhalatka we included this point in the list of questions submitted to the two presidents. But neither Yeltsin nor Kravchuk even touched upon it. And so we may more likely assume that the disintegration or collapse of the former USSR's anti-missile defense could lead to a new, upward spiral in the tension between Russia and Ukraine. "Star Wars" could become a reality in the Russian and Ukrainian staff headquarters and parliaments.

CIS:POLICY

Yeltsin Decree Expands Provision on Housing
92UM1453A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Sep 92 p 4

[Decree No. 956 of the President of the Russian Federation "On Expanding Decree No. 796 of the President of the Russian Federation of 21 July 1992 to Cover Servicemen on Active Military Duty in the System of the State Committee for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Mop-up Operations Following Natural Disasters"]

[Text] Moscow, The Kremlin, 26 Aug 92—Decree No. 796 of the President of the Russian Federation of 21 July 1992 "On Additional Measures for Financing the Construction of and Acquiring Housing for Servicemen" is expanded to cover servicemen on active military duty in the system of the State for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Mop-up Operations Following Natural Disasters.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation

B. Yeltsin,

Strategic Problems Under Arms Control Treaties

924P0177A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 28 Aug 92 p 4

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, director of the Arms Monitoring Center: "Russia's Strategic Dilemmas: Notes Prior to the Parliamentary Hearings"]

[Text] So, the big debate is in the offing. For the first time not for show (so that all be as in the American Capitol, it is said) but entirely in earnest.

In the not-too-distant future the new treaty on a radical reduction in strategic offensive arms (SOA) will be put to the verdict of parliament and public. It is being completed on the basis of the Framework Agreement of Presidents Yeltsin and Bush of this June. And even now it is evoking in Russia very varied and very strong feelings. There can be no doubt that the opposition is preparing to give great battle and will be fully armed with figures, facts, and calculations, with which it is being furnished from "primary sources." The debate is, in fact, already gathering pace, and the treaty's opponents are maintaining that it hurts us unilaterally and undermines strategic parity. But the treaty provides for a reduction to equal ceilings of 3,000-3,500 warheads by the years 2000-2003. For the first time in a quarter-century of negotiations the United States has agreed here to count warheads on heavy bombers not in accordance with artificially understated factors but in accordance with their actual armament. This means that it is to reduce from the present actual level more than 10,000 warheads, we, approximately 7,000. Also for the first time Washington will limit its principal component of strategic offensive arms—the warheads of the sea-launched missile force—to a level of 1,700-1,750 warheads, which is three times less than the present level and two times less than that planned in accordance with the July 1991 treaty.

The supporters of the treaty frequently argue that it is time, finally, to cast aside the archaic concept of parity, although it is this which the Framework Agreement does not abolish, it simply establishes it at a lower level. They say in addition that there are sufficient forces for deterrence as it is. But this depends on the kind of missions and under what conditions the strategic offensive arms are capable of accomplishing to ensure deterrence. The strategic forces must correspond to the set assignments in terms of manning level, structure, and specifications.

It is these questions which contain the hidden essence of the disagreements between the opponents and supporters of the treaty. Continuing to gloss over it would be the same as playing a game on different boards and according to different rules. This would engender in society mutual misunderstanding and intolerance and prevent politicians adopting rational decisions both at the negotiations and in respect to military organizational development.

A key point of the new agreement is not only and not so much the overall ceiling of 3,000-3,500 warheads as the ban on ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. The ground-based missiles have traditionally constituted the support of the Soviet strategic forces and their operational plans. The multiple-warhead ICBM's account for more than 60 percent of our SOA in terms of warheads (with the United States, less than 15 percent).

The ban in 10 years' time on this type of arms confronts Moscow with a difficult dilemma. One version is to deploy 1,000 and more single (that is, with one warhead) ground-based missiles (there are now approximately 300 such new ICBM's) in order to preserve for this component of the triad if only 50 percent of the warheads within the overall ceiling of 3,000-3,500. An alternative is to add only 200-400 single-warhead missiles and thereby fundamentally break with the traditional SOA structure inasmuch as the proportion of the ground-based component would then be reduced from 60 to 15-20 percent.

The first path would require great expenditure, particularly if for survivability purposes the ICBM's were deployed on mobile launchers, not in launch silos. And this in parallel with the elimination of approximately 750 (6,000 warheads) MIRV'd missiles, including 1,500 ICBM's of the latest models. In the forecast economic situation such costs could prove prohibitive.

The second version would sharply impinge on the interests of the leading arm of the armed forces—the strategic rocket forces, which are responsible only for ground-based ICBM's and which have always been predominant in the strategic triad. But it is not only a question of the departmental interests of the strategic rocket forces, although they perform an enormous role in the army. The leading role of silo-based multiple-warhead missiles with thousands of warheads is inseparably connected with a particular strategic philosophy and understanding of parity and the requirements of security and stability.

Specifically, the priority of the ICBM's is connected with the fact that what is understood by parity is approximate equivalence with the United States in the capacity for delivering both a devastating (counterforce) strike against the opponent's strategic forces and a strike against his administrative-industrial centers. The main operational concept here is an encounter or retaliatory-encounter strike, that is, a launch of the missiles before the enemy's warheads reach their target. Adjusted to this also is the warning and command and control and communications system. Otherwise, given modern target accuracy, even ICBM's in the most hardened silos would not survive, and the functioning of the command and control system in a nuclear situation would be altogether unpredictable. The parameters of retribution were set in thousands of warheads delivered to target (since as of the end of the 1970's there was no shortage of warheads with the deployment of MIRV'd systems).

The June Framework Agreement thoroughly undercuts these concepts and plans. You could not amass sufficient single-warhead missiles to raise in a single launch such a number of warheads. Mobile launchers are a two-edged sword also. Keeping them constantly on the move is costly and entails great wear and tear, but in stationary shelters they are even more vulnerable than in silos. In addition, mobile ICBM's are less adapted for a counter-strike, and their survivability comes from mobility, not rapid launch.

The proportion of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) will, according to the new treaty, grow with us from less than 30 to more than 50 percent in terms of warheads (if we opt for the full amount at the level of 1,700-1,750 warheads). We would not have to build new missiles or submarines, and of the available 59, over 30 of the old missile-firing submarines would be scrapped, and approximately 25 submarines would remain.

The main problems of the sea-launched missile force are the one-way and unreliable communications with the submerged boats and their vulnerability for the powerful ASW forces of the United States and its allies. For this reason the SLBM's have always performed a backup, as it were, and not entirely predictable role in Soviet operational plans.

Bombers occupy an even more modest place in our strategic forces and plans than the sea-launched missiles. Their modernization has practically ceased, and their future is greatly in doubt.

As far as the United States is concerned, in accordance with the agreement it has to cut a considerable number of missiles (including new ones like the Peacekeeper and the Trident 1), submarines, and bombers. It has wound down a whole number of programs unilaterally (see S. Rogov, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 31 July 1992). But the structure of its strategic offensive arms remains almost unchanged, as also its underlying strategic principles.

The Americans will keep 500 Minuteman-3 ICBM silos, leaving three warheads on each of them, and will complete the construction of 18 Ohio-class submarines with Trident missiles (which will have, it is true, according to the agreement, half the number of warheads which was planned originally). Approximately 100 bombers will be fitted with cruise missiles. In sum, the United States could have far fewer vulnerable forces and an appreciable advantage in the capacity for killing both military and industrial targets.

Obviously, the considerations expressed will prompt many of our specialists, from the strategic rocket forces particularly, to oppose the new agreement. Their opinion cannot be casually dismissed on the grounds that we and America no longer consider ourselves enemies. If we intend in principle to preserve strategic forces after the year 2000, a better mode of their existence than as survivable and reliably controlled retaliatory strike

potential has not yet been devised. The sole alternative is a first-strike potential, which we and the Americans have consciously abandoned.

And so the criteria of parity and sufficiency can and should be reconsidered in the light of the new political situation. For example, is equality in terms of counter-force potential necessary? After all, the capacity for destroying strategic forces on either side necessarily implies a preemptive strike and the equivalent vulnerability of these forces on the other side. A counterforce parity race would increase mutual first-strike possibilities and create a strong incentive to preempt an opponent in a crisis situation.

And, on the contrary, measures to enhance the survivability of one's own SOA would not create a threat to the other side and would at the same time objectively reduce its first-strike capacity. This would ensure stable mutual deterrence.

Further, does it make sense continuing, as in the tension years, to rely on the counterstrike concept? After all, the time of the missiles' approach to target is only 15-30 minutes. This leaves the president one or two minutes for the adoption of an apocalyptic decision on a nuclear launch—and this assuming that all warning and command and control systems work ideally. The counterstrike concept effectively deprives the political leadership of control over the most important conceivable act of state policy. What can be decided in two minutes, on the basis, what is more, of the unintelligible signals and reports of the operators? No more than is decided by a performing monkey when, at a light signal, he pulls on the lever.

The need for the highest automation and speed of command makes the president's control via the notorious "football" highly ornamental. Which was manifested at the time of the putsch last August (see V. Stepakov, Ye. Lisov, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 21 August 1992). This largely gives rise to the probability of an accidental nuclear war (see V. Belous, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 14 August 1992). In a crisis situation the danger of a nuclear strike by mistake increases in geometrical progression, particularly under the conditions of the emergence of new nuclear powers with ballistic missiles.

Whence the need for transition to the principle of a purely retaliatory strike in order that the president might adopt a carefully weighed decision, having evaluated the address of the sender and the consequences of the strike. Ensiloed MIRV'd missiles are too vulnerable to serve as the fulcrum of a new strategy, the rule: launch or lose, operates with them. For this reason a shift of emphasis to more survivable, even if less fast-acting, systems, like mobile ICBM's and SLBM's, would be necessary for us in any case.

Of course, large capital investments in a restructuring of the command and control systems and an increase in

their invulnerability and the dependability of communications with the mobile and underwater missile forces will be required. But the outlays here would be a direct contribution to one's own and general security with the highest rate of interest. In the form of the political leadership's actual control over nuclear decisions included.

It may be said that a purely retaliatory strike would require large effective forces, for without a counter-launch far fewer of them would survive. Yes, this is true. But perhaps the criteria of retribution have been unduly overstated since the times of nuclear abundance? A sober assessment of the realities of Hiroshima and Chernobyl testifies that unacceptable damage is gauged not in hundreds and thousands but rather in dozens of megatonnes. The more so when the parties do not have political reasons for conflict, and nor are such foreseen.

In this case the potential limited by the Framework Agreement would be sufficient in assurance of the survivability of the forces and their command and control systems for deterrence with interest. Supplementary measures at the negotiations on its completion should contribute to the same goals.

For example, it would be important to legalize the parties' unilateral initiatives and reach agreement on the centralized warehousing of the nuclear arms of bombers under mutual control. This component, which is the most effective for the United States and which threatens our mobile ICBM's, would be removed from the frame of the balance of combat-ready forces.

Abiding by the traditions of former treaties, a sublimit on the total number of ICBM's and SLBM's could be established—2,000, say. Moscow proposed such a ceiling on all forces at the start of the year, so let it apply to combat-ready (missile) weapons. Since a maximum number of warheads has been established for ICBM's (which equals one), why not do the same for SLBM's, four, for example. This would limit the number of warheads on alert status at sea and, consequently, the threat to mobile and ensiloed ICBM's and command and control centers.

Extended confidence-building measures in the sphere of the strategic forces and notification of exercises and other activity, up to and including the exchange of permanent representatives at bases, warehouses, and command and control centers, would be useful. Why not, if we are not intending to fight and are planning to create joint systems warning of a missile attack? It is time to provide politically binding guarantees of a winding down of ASW activity and to renounce submarine operations off the shores of another country. Monitoring this is difficult, but the probability of an encounter, as in the Barents Sea recently, would be a sufficient deterrent factor.

Inasmuch as the parameters of a retaliatory strike will have been radically lowered, we should be extremely cautious in approaching the idea even of limited ABM

defenses. Without the preservation of the ABM Treaty the entire logic of the reduction and restructuring of SOA and the revision of nuclear strategy could be undermined.

Finally, it is maintained that deep cuts are too costly. But even these outlays may be reduced. By reaching agreement, for example, on the possibility of reducing forces by way of the advance de-mating of the warheads from the missiles and their warehousing under mutual supervision. This, incidentally, would make it possible to rapidly "neutralize" missiles deployed outside of Russia.

And why is expenditure on disarmament and control altogether frequently viewed as "unproductive," for that matter? From the viewpoint of the end product—security—it is better for both parties to incur one-time expenditure on these measures than to invest money in arms which are intended never to be used, but merely replaced by increasingly new and more costly generations of them.

Results of Council of Defense Ministers' Meeting
92UM1453B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Sergey Parkhomenko: "There Is No Such Thing as Administrative Subordination in the Army..."]

[Text] The two-day meeting of the defense ministers of the CIS nations (with observers from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova) was wrapped up on Friday with the adoption of 14 documents governing various aspects of the functioning of the Commonwealth's Joint Armed Forces. A significant number of these agreements, however, still have to be submitted for ratification to the heads of CIS states at the 25 September meeting in Bishkek.

Among the documents, enumerated at the final press conference by Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, the "protocol notation" on "The Concept of Collective Security" has evoked the greatest interest. Only that part of the agreement "pertaining to conventional weapons," in Shaposhnikov's words, was initialed by the nine ministers. The "presidents' club" will have to reach final agreement on the status of the strategic forces.

Marshal Shaposhnikov announced to the reporters that he has serious grounds for hoping for a "reconciliation of positions of the nations possessing nuclear weapons."

Among the four CIS nuclear powers, however, there are at the present time at least three different positions on the status of the strategic weapons. Ukraine's concept is particularly rigid. It is, as we know, demanding that the strategic forces be transferred to "administrative subordination" of the countries in which they are located. "There is no such term in the military vocabulary," Marshal Shaposhnikov declared.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

New Combat Training Chief Interviewed

92UM1452A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 Sep 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Lt-Gen Anatoliy Andreyevich Golovnev, chief of the Main Combat Training Directorate, by Lt Col Anatoliy Dokuchayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Draft, Contract, and Combat Training"]

[Text] *Anatoliy Andreyevich Golovnev. Born in 1942 in the village of Medvedovka, Smolensk Oblast. He has been in the Army since 1959. After graduating from the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Supreme Soviet RSFSR in 1963, he served in various command and staff positions in the Far East, Ukraine, and the Western Group of Forces. He completed the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1973) and the Military Academy of the General Staff (1980). From the position of first deputy commander of the Moscow Military District in August 1992 he has been appointed chief of the Main Combat Training Directorate—deputy commander in chief of the Ground Forces. He is a lieutenant-general.*

[Dokuchayev] During more than 30 years of service, Anatoliy Andreyevich, you have been in all the basic command positions. What is your opinion about the level of professionalism of officers and junior specialists of our Ground Forces? It seems to me that they now are far from in the best form. Incidentally, this certainly applies not only to our "infantry." The Persian Gulf War showed that both officers and soldiers of army units of the coalition forces were not in the best form. And this is given the fact that the NATO soldier or officer (and troops from Europe, including Americans, played the main role) in a year participates, or at least participated in them as opposition, in 30 exercises and maneuvers. What does this say about the training of our motorized rifleman, tankman, artilleryman, antiaircraft gunner...

[Golovnev] I agree that a professional is one who knows how to fight and is reliable in combat. But I do not share the viewpoint of those who believe that our past and present system of training is no good at all. Much of what has been put into our combat training programs and courses is proving its worth.

As far as a comparison of the level of training in the armies of western countries is concerned, I do not think it favors them. In western armies, the basic training is done in subunits. The company or battalion is active more often in exercises. Commanders of this level acquire skills in organizing combat, just as our commanders do. I have had occasion to see Bundeswehr subunits in training combat—ours look much better. Many western experts also believe that Russian officers have solid skills in command and control of subunits in combat.

[Dokuchayev] I understand that you believe that the fighting efficiency of the troops will increase with manpower acquisition by contract?

[Golovnev] It will increase if we engage in combat training in a planned manner, and not in the future, but today. The person who only talks about the contract system and takes no practical steps to improve the training process simply does not approach this problem seriously. Why is this so? The Moscow Military District is now manned with warrant officers (they, as we know, serve under contract) at only a 57-percent level. It turns out that even here, at the center, there is a problem recruiting people under contract. You see, a soldier or noncommissioned officer [NCO] who concludes a contract must serve not only in the Moscow area but also in places where it is hot or cold, where the living conditions are extremely low, particularly for the families of servicemen (and soldiers and NCO's hired to serve under contract will be 20-40 years old, not 18-19, and will have families). That means that pay and allowances will have to be increased considerably. And where to get the housing—even simple dormitories? When the United States switched to an all-volunteer force after the Vietnam War, a special state program was developed and implemented. And the transition to new principles of manpower acquisition is not a one-year task for us.

We began professionalization of the army long ago. Take the percentage of professionals in units of the Air Force, Navy, Strategic Rocket Forces, communications... It is fairly high. The next aspect. We first need to determine what kind of a specialist we want to see and then decide whether we want to invite a person under contract for one position and draft a person for another position.

[Dokuchayev] That is all true, but the units now have shortages. The spring draft went poorly. And "volunteers" could help reinforce the subunits.

[Golovnev] As you know, only two major armies have volunteer enlistment—the United States and Great Britain. The FRG, France, and other NATO countries have a mixed principle of manpower acquisition. Unfortunately, the tested principle is giving us problems, we have not developed a new one, and therefore things reach the point of a paradox. At the Moscow Military District training center where they train artillerymen, they recently encountered such a dilemma—from among instructors, just as many soldiers and NCO's were discharged as were trained during the winter period. So, guess which is better—expose your own ranks or leave the combat artillery units on starvation rations?

I repeat, until a clear-cut program is adopted for manning the army and a legal and financial base is placed under everything, we do not have a moral right to accept "volunteers." It is better that we be accused of sluggishness, conservatism, and other mortal sins by pseudo-reformers who have seen soldier's labor only on the television. By hastily beginning to recruit soldiers and

NCO's under contract, without providing for their material, social, and daily needs, we ruin sensible ideas and push young people even farther away from the army.

[Dokuchayev] Anatoliy Andreyevich, let us get back to the question of the level of training. Let us imagine that today the order is given for some division to go to a staging area with the subsequent mission of executing a march and engaging the enemy. I do not think every division is capable of doing this...

[Golovnev] There are no grounds for such conclusions. I judge by the Moscow Military District, in units and large units of which I worked as recently as yesterday. No, the divisions are not manned properly. But if the order were to come down, they would move out to the staging area and, I hope, with all equipment and armament. Where there are shortages of driver-mechanics, officers will drive the vehicles. How much farther can the events develop? It will be necessary to bring units up to strength and conduct combat teamwork training of subunits. Only after this will they be ready to carry out assigned missions. Our commanders have such experience.

Now the leadership of the Ministry of Defense has taken the course of reducing the number of large units in the Ground Forces. But they will be manned to a full-strength level. There will be a dual benefit here. The problem of mobilization resources is becoming easier. It is also easier to organize combat training, especially to conduct tactical exercises.

[Dokuchayev] You said that our large units will be combat efficient after being brought up to strength. On what do you base such confidence if "full" divisional exercises have not been conducted for so long and the number of regimental exercises is small?

[Golovnev] Yes, the number of divisional tactical exercises in the Ground Forces has been reduced, and the number of regimental exercises is being reduced; a regiment will participate in them once in three years. But this is the general trend throughout the world—in most countries the intensity of combat training involving the massive operation of equipment and a large consumption of ammunition, fuel and lubricants, and other supplies is decreasing. They are being replaced by other forms of training and monitoring the level of training of subunits and units. We regularly conduct inspections, alerting subunits with the appropriate signals and assigning them surprise combat training missions. Battalions and artillery battalions are involved in command-post exercises conducted with regiments and divisions. Thus we check on the skills of officers in command and control of subunits.

On the one hand, we need to sound alarm: the limits on fuel and lubricants have been cut by one-third. How can you conduct and exercise? But on the other hand, the cost of one regimental tactical exercise with live firing (at existing prices) is 3-5 million rubles [R]. How can we not

think about cheaper and more efficient methods of training subunits and personnel and new approaches to this problem?

There is something in the arsenal of commanders and staffs. But much has to be incorporated into the training process. The Main Combat Training Directorate is now studying the experience of training specialists abroad and examining innovations and proposals of domestic scientists. We have begun to introduce new training equipment. The troops have received second-generation laser firing simulators (LISP)—"Besstrashiy," "Zorkiy," and "Radar," making it possible to simulate firing from tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and small arms, accomplish mutual "destruction" when conducting two-sided tactical exercises, and train crews in firing from regular-issue weapons.

Work has begun on a comprehensive automated system of tactical training of motorized rifle and tank battalions of the Ground Forces, about whose destiny we are forced once again to speak with concern. Without introduction of this system, all the advantages of two-sided exercises using LISP's are lost. It will make it possible to accomplish on a real-time basis the collection, processing, storage, and display of information about the location, status, and nature of actions of troops and staffs, and to objectively evaluate the ability of commanders to control troops in a situation most closely approximating actual combat, the effectiveness of employment of weapons by the sides, and so forth. The system is widely used at specialized U.S. and German training centers. But here in our country... Further financing of the development has been terminated to save money. But this is an unprofitable savings.

The introduction of fundamentally new sets of ground target equipment, in which it is proposed to use compressed air as the energy-bearer and to control it by radio, may be slowed down for the same reason at Russian ranges. Their use will not only make it cheaper to conduct tactical drills and exercises, but will also make it possible to create a complex target situation on unfamiliar terrain.

It is not only the shortage of funds that is making us look for more effective approaches in combat training. A radical reform is taking place in the Army and Navy. Thus, a question arose about the new structure of the Ground Forces; corps and brigades will appear... That means much will change in the training of subunits and units.

By the way, guideline documents for the summer training period untie the hands of commanders for demonstrating initiative. They make it possible to plan and conduct combat training taking into account the particular features of the region. The main thing is to make decisions that ensure a high end result.

[Dokuchayev] Anatoliy Andreyevich, the entire system of training specialists is being reformed, but what about

the administrative bodies? Will the Main Combat Training Directorate have the former structure?

[Golovnev] Why? The Main Combat Training Directorate is also changing. Now it has two departments instead of three—combined-arms and program-regulation departments, and also an organizational-planning office. The staff is being reduced by 80 percent. And in these conditions we must ensure that we come up with the necessary ideas to effectively supervise combat training and ensure effective control in the difficult phase of army reform.

[Dokuchayev] The staffs are being reduced, but in the Ground Forces the Main Directorate will remain, but the other services of the armed forces do not have main directorates. Is your directorate making claim to the role of a sort of training center of the Army and Navy? Or has it received this title by tradition—are you offended?

[Golovnev] I do not think it is a matter of anyone's tact. The logic of military organizational development suggests that the Armed Forces of Russia should have namely a Main Combat Training Directorate [MCTD]. The MCTD is involved not only in training combined-arms large units. It also develops drafts of field manuals, combined-arms regulations, and training programs for officers and warrant officers of various branches of troops and provides assistance to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, civil defense, and the Border Troops in organizing combat training. Two weeks ago, the command was received to draw up a program for training units for peacekeeping forces. It is hardly feasible to give such an assignment to aviators or seamen. Now programs are being worked on for training the specialists who serve under contract. The program-regulation department is the coordinating body. The Main Combat Training Directorate should also play its role in the sphere of control and in the sphere of cooperation with the armed services, branches of troops, and combat training bodies of the armies of the CIS countries.

2S19 Howitzer Performance Reviewed

92UM1391D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel Vitaliy Moroz under the rubric "Arsenal": "The 2S19: Fast Action, Accuracy and Might"]

[Text] Modern self-propelled howitzers and cannons, as opposed to the self-propelled artillery pieces of the World War II period, do not quantitatively supplement the tanks, but rather perform the same tasks as all the other ground artillery. They fire primarily from concealed firing positions, although they represent a formidable force in direct fire as well thanks to their strong armor and the might of their armaments.

Self-propelled artillery has noticeably crowded towed artillery in the armies of the developed countries. The

122mm 2S1 and the 152mm 2S3 self-propelled howitzers [SAU] that entered service at the beginning of the 1970s are the accustomed ones for our ground forces. Today we will acquaint the reader with a self-propelled howitzer that few have seen. This is the 152mm 2S19 howitzer. Whereas our artillery systems used to receive colorful code names such as Gvozdika, Akatsiya and Giatsint, the 2S19 has been hypothetically named the Msta. There is a river of that name flowing into the Ilmen.

The 2S19 self-propelled howitzer is able to perform any firing tasks within a radius of 24 kilometers—destroy enemy missile systems, artillery and mortar batteries, tanks, manpower, command posts and field fortifications. It can impede the advance of reserves and disrupt maneuvers with powerful surprise bombardments.


The running gear of the new howitzer is standardized with the T-80 and T-72 tanks. It has inherited from the tanks, along with the powerful armor, good off-road capability and has, like the tanks, equipment for under-water driving, built-in bulldozer equipment and smoke generating apparatus. The artillery piece is fitted with six hydraulic air shock absorbers that, in combination with conventional tank torsion bars, provide a smooth ride for the heavy vehicle and dampen the vibrations when firing.

The 2S19 SAU can use all types of standard ammunition intended for the 152mm D-20 towed gun-howitzer. It also employs powerful guided shells.

This artillery system, which entered service with the troops in 1989, was developed at the Uraltransmash Production Association under the leadership of SKB [Special Design Bureau] General Designer Yuriy Tomashov. It is manufactured by machine builders in the Bashkir city of Sterlitamak.

"Our artillery system," feels Deputy Chief Designer Mikhail Tretyakov of the manufacturing plant, "surpasses the American M-109A1 and A2 155mm self-propelled howitzers and the British and French self-propelled guns of the same caliber. It would undoubtedly defeat them in comparative field tests. No SAU in the world, for example, is able to fire 100 rounds an hour, as ours can. Because it has only the amount of ammunition that is contained in the inside battle stowage. Our howitzer is equipped with a mechanism to feed in shells from the ground. We were able to solve the problem of reducing the gas content of the battle compartment in firing more successfully than anyone else. Aside from an ejection device on the barrel, the removal (extraction) of spent shell cases outside and two filter/ventilation installations, a system for the airtight seal of the breech part of the howitzer after firing is used. There is also another specific feature of the new artillery piece—the possibility of loading the gun at any angle of elevation. That means that the howitzer will be irreplaceable in the mountains, where one can wage effective fire using direct laying at highly positioned targets."

Diagram of the crew locations in the 2S19 howitzer



Key:

1. hydraulic air shock absorber
2. driver
3. vertical laying mechanism
4. sight
5. commander
6. gunner
7. loader (shells)
8. loader (charges)
9. mechanized battle stowage
10. mechanism for feeding shells from ground
11. engine and transmission compartment

The chief merit of the 2S19 152mm self-propelled howitzer is a modern system of controlling gun laying. Firing data come in to special gear along a wire communications channel or by radio, and the automatic devices take over from there. The training of the gun by angle of elevation in the course of firing is corrected without human intervention. The gunner exercises control only for the precision of laying along the horizontal, and that duty has also been simplified to the maximum. It turns out that he can demonstrate his personal mastery to the full extent only in direct laying.

Tactical Performance Characteristics of the 2S19

Mass in combat position	42
Crew	5
—when firing from ground	7
Engine: V84A multiple-fuel diesel, horsepower	780
Range without refueling, km	500
Top speed, km/hr	60
Surmountable obstacles, meters:	
—ditch (width)	2.8
—wall (height)	0.5
—ford (depth)	1.5

Water obstacles (equipped with underwater driving apparatus), meters:

—distance	1,000
—depth	5
Time to convert from underwater to battle mode and back, minutes	1—2

Armaments:

2A64 howitzer	152mm caliber
Maximum firing range, meters	24,700
laying angles, degrees:	
horizontal	360
vertical	- 4 + 68
rate of fire, rounds/min	7—8
maximum firing mode, rounds:	
over first hour	100
each subsequent	60
ammunition load, rounds	50
anti-aircraft armaments	NSVT 12.7mm machinegun

The trends for improving self-propelled artillery have been defined as strengthening its firepower, increasing its survivability, providing for the maximum automation of fire control, increasing mobility, standardizing

the assemblies and units to the utmost... All of this has been reflected in the domestic 2S19 152mm self-propelled howitzer.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Dispute Over Black Sea Facilities Viewed

92UM1442A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Sep 92 pp 1,3

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Aleksandr Pelts and Captain 3rd Rank Vladimir Yermolin: "The Black Sea Card' Is Being Played by Those Who Would Like to See a Quarrel Between Russia and Ukraine"]

[Text]

About the Incident Surrounding the Black Sea Naval Schools in Sevastopol

Despite the agreement achieved between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine on the establishment of "a period of transition" and "dual presidential management," the Black Sea Fleet has once again become the arena of political battles. This time the problem arose around two schools: the Black Sea Higher Naval School imeni P. Nakhimov and the Sevastopol Higher Naval Engineering School.

The are no other schools like these in the CIS. One of them, the SVVMIU [Sevastopol Higher naval Engineering School, prepares specialists for nuclear-powered submarines. Up to now there had never been any particular dispute over them. Not a part of the Black Sea Fleet, they have trained specialists for the Commonwealth states. A commission from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, headed by Colonel Vladimir Pilipchuk, recently arrived at the Black Sea school, however. As already reported in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, he brought an order from the minister of defense of Ukraine calling for the removal of Rear Admiral Vladimir Denisenkov, the present chief of the school, from his position and appointing a new chief.

The order was received at the school in no uncertain terms. The situation grew more tense by the hour and could actually have gone over the bounds of common sense. In addition to the commission from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, officers from other Sevastopol units and members of the Coordinating Council of the RF [Russian Federation] Officers' Assembly arrived at the school. At the committee's invitation, RF People's Deputy Sergey Shakhry, who was in the Crimea at that time, came to the school.

"As a result of some tense negotiations with representatives of both the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the school's command element," Shakhry informed KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, "we came to an agreement that the ultimate decision on the status of the ChVVMU [Black Sea Higher Naval School] and its chief would be made by the presidents of Ukraine and Russia. That agreement

was perhaps not the best, but under the circumstances it made it possible to relieve tensions and emerge from a difficult situation. Two orders were involved, after all: one from Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine, on the removal of the school's chief, the other from Army General Pavel Grachev, minister of defense of Russia, declaring the removal to be illegal.

Unfortunately, some of the mass media distorted the initial report on events at the school. The situation was depicted as though the Russian people's deputy had not just happened to be at the scene of the events but had arrived on a special mission.

Sergey Shakhry told our correspondent, however, that he had been in the Crimea for several days and had visited the graves of ancestors on his mother's side. He had learned of the tensions at the school from members of the Coordinating Council. Assuming that the situation could have unforeseen consequences, he went to the school without any hesitation.

We can see that the "period of transition" will not be as easy as it previously appeared. This is certainly indicated by the order on the removal of the school chief.

We asked Fleet Admiral Igor Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, to tell us how he regarded the events which surrounded the two higher naval schools with such turbulence. The admiral feels that the order resubordinating the two schools "was instigated by destructive forces in the republic." The very fact that the act was conceived and carried out indicates that its organizers needed a big scandal. Without any legal basis the representative of the Ukrainian side announced the replacement of Rear Admiral Vladimir Denisenkov, chief of the ChVVMU imeni P. Nakhimov, who has not taken the Ukrainian oath and is in no way under the jurisdiction of the republic's Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, it was done in an improper manner, in violation of regulations. Colonel Pilipchuk "removed" the rear admiral in the presence of the latter's subordinates, the school cadets. The speech by the envoy of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense also took the form of a challenge, which created agitation among the officers and cadets. A great effort was needed to restore order. Admiral Kasatonov stressed the fact that Sergey Shakhry, member of the Supreme Soviet of the RF, who was present, had done everything possible to calm passions.

"Right now," Igor Vladimirovich told us, "the situation at the schools is normal. The incident did alarm people, though."

The admiral stressed the fact that it was a matter only of "a few destructive forces" and not a change in the line taken by the Ukrainian side. Kasatonov feels that in general Ukraine has recently demonstrated a willingness to adhere to the letter and the spirit of the agreements signed by Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin at Mukhalatka.

We would like to add the following to what we have said. The incident did not simply occur for no reason, of course. It is obvious that these schools have no basic significance for Ukraine. They train specialists mainly for ships which Ukraine does not plan to acquire even in the future. To undertake a reshuffling of personnel here—particularly at the beginning of the training year—would be tantamount to paralyzing the training process. From the standpoint of common sense, there are simply no rational motives for this. From the standpoint of a political struggle (which frequently ignores common sense, as we know), however, the fuss surrounding the Black Sea Fleet probably came at an extremely good time for certain forces.

That wing of the RUKh which has recently been vigorously attacking President Vladimir Kravchuk for an alleged pro-Russian position is involved. The line has been drawn, however. How long can they fan the flames of "popular rage," stir up national feelings and once again toss the "Black Sea card," which had started to slip through the fingers of the RUKh forces, onto the table? While the package of proposals is being prepared in detail for the implementation of the "period of transition" (the target date for completion of the package is 1 October 1992), certain forces have an opportunity to "fish in troubled waters."

How is the fate of the Sevastopol higher naval schools to be decided? How do we preserve the elite of naval science and the traditionally strong teaching staffs at these schools? How do we protect the officers and cadets from anarchic meetings and political battles? Only the two top people in our two states, it seems, are in a position to answer all of these questions right now: Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin. Let us hope that the legal aspect of the issue will be decided by traditional compromise and that the policy of common sense will prevail.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

CIS Housing Chief Invites Firms to Bid on Housing Construction

92UM1391A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Aug 92 p 4

[Text of invitation: "Construction of Housing for Servicemen Being Withdrawn From the Western Group of Forces"]

[Text] The Housing Operations Chief Directorate of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS, Moscow, invites interested firms to take part in bids for the construction, delivery, installation and operational start-up of boiler and central heating points [TsTP] and gas-supply systems [GRP] for the three indicated garrisons as a unified contractor on "turnkey" terms. Financing is accomplished by the Federal Republic of Germany and is offered by the Bank Kreditanstadt für Wiederaufbau (KFB), Frankfurt-am-Main.

Data on Boilers, TsTP and GRP			
Garrison	Boiler capacity, MW	TsTP capacity, MW	GRP productivity, nm ³ (NTP)/hour
Alakurtti	86	14.5	—
Kasimovo	38	—	274
Chaykovskiy	106	—	910 and 10.310

Important conditions for qualification of competitors taking part in the bidding:

* annual sales of competitors (firm or consortium) over the last three years of not less than 20 million DM in the creation of analogous boiler, central heating points and gas-supply systems; in the event of the participation of consortiums, the annual sales of the leader should be no less than 10 million DM;

* confirmation of ability to pay and, in the event of receipt of the contract, submission of bank guarantee by a first-class banking institution (no less than 20 percent of the amount of the contract);

* experience in working abroad in the corresponding realm; and

* knowledge of the norms and regulations in effect on the territory of the CIS.

Both individual firms and consortiums can take part in the bidding. The leader, in the event of consortiums, should have experience in the creation of the corresponding systems (experience in deliveries and installation). The participation of suppliers from the CIS and firms from the new federal lands is desirable on the basis of subcontracts or as members of the consortiums.

Tender documents may be obtained at the Housing Construction consulting consortium (CWU) at the address General Karbyshev Boulevard, Building 10, 123154, Moscow, telephone 946 80 26, fax 943 00 37, telex 911 553 CWU SU starting 1 Sep 92 by submission of a transfer of the amount of 3,000 DM to account No. 220-2307650, bank code 70070010, Deutsche Bank AO, München, addressed to CWU, Moscow with the notation "Tender documents: boilers, TsTP and gas-supply systems."

Interested firms should report by telex or fax before 25 Aug 92 on their intention to obtain the tender documents at the aforementioned address.

The deadline for the submission of proposals is 5 Oct 92 before 12:00 noon to CWU at the aforementioned address.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Mercenary Interviewed on Experience in Dneister War Zone

92UM1429A St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMENYA
in Russian 14 Aug 92 p 2

[Interview with a mercenary from the Dneister war zone by Ilya Desyaterik: "Confession of a Mercenary-Soldiers' Club Member: A Sniper Receives 400 Rubles per Hour"]

[Text] Who are they—Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans who have set out for the Dneister Region to stand on different sides of the front with weapons? What motivated them, what were they looking for and what did they find?

That is what I wanted to understand while going to meet one of the volunteers who recently returned from the Dneister Region.

[Desyaterik] Why did you become a mercenary?

[Mercenary] If I speak seriously, for professional practice and to establish contacts. We have clubs of fishermen, hunters, and sailors... But here, imagine—a mercenary soldiers' club. The Caucasus is inaccessible at the present time and there are very few people there with whom it would be worthwhile to establish contact.

[Desyaterik] Well and the ideological motives?

[Mercenary] I personally don't have any.

[Desyaterik] And what about your comrades in arms?

[Mercenary] In general, there were quite a few people, up to 60%, who had come there based on ideological considerations. Everyone watched the television news coverage where they showed Cossacks who were rushing about on a breastwork, murdered children, crying wives, and the ruins... Plus the propaganda... Naturally, the appropriate sentiment arose among the people. There was one very interesting personality there: a 47-year-old Moscow resident, a candidate of sciences, and head of a laboratory. He recalled that he was a naval infantryman in 1965 and that he had come to the Dneister Region... on leave. People of his circle go south, to Sochi, to relax but he arrived on leave to fight a bit. But then again, the majority were rapidly imbued with practical considerations. Many of them were immediately attracted by the possibility to immediately carry away a weapon which you can obtain in the Dneister Region by spitting once but which costs 150,000 rubles in Russia.

[Desyaterik] You call yourself a volunteer but I am accustomed to thinking that a volunteer is a person who does something for the sake of an idea, but the word "mercenary" is more appropriate for people like you...

[Mercenary] I don't have anything against the word "mercenary", but you shouldn't consider me to be one. If I had gone to the other side of the Dneister, and there are

plenty of Russian lads there, then I would have been a mercenary because there my sniper-colleague receives R400 per hour plus a bonus for those killed and we have R7,000 per month plus R75 per day for being on the front line. What kind of mercenaries are we? Well the "ideological" ones, they also burned more than everyone else.

[Desyaterik] Why?

[Mercenary] Because the Dneister Region is a splinter group of a "sovdep" [Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies] of a most evil sect. At the time, clashes were being aggressively conducted, people were needed and they even paid them as they promised. When it became clear that Moldova and Romania would not go further, they stopped clothing, arming and paying. So those who came to the Dneister Region "based on their heart's calling" were doubly deceived.

[Desyaterik] What did the volunteers do, what was their work?

[Mercenary] We performed duty, just like the local guard units, Cossacks and local popular, untrained volunteer force, and prevented enemy attempts to cross the established border. I specifically served at the Kitskanskiy bridgehead.

[Desyaterik] How was the duty organized?

[Mercenary] Well you would have to ask about that. I already said that the Dneister Region is a splinter group of a "sovdep" [Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies] of a most evil sect. Since I am a sniper by specialty, the first thing I did was to ask the chief of staff of my territorial rescue detachment (TSO) how matters stood with sniper rifles. He responded: "I have two sniper rifles in the detachment but I don't know where they are." The two grenade launchers that had been issued to us did not work—the piles [boyki] were broken and our price—a recoilless gun had a burned out induction coil and thus was simply a piece of metal. During the first two nights, we lost three men killed and two seriously wounded. But then again, two of the killed and both wounded turned out to be victims of friendly fire from one of the volunteers. The constant callousness during the verification of documents resulted in that. The documents of those who had been killed turned out to be forged but that was discovered only during the repeat verification. But how much work was required to bury the lads and to come up with the compensation promised to their relatives—R100,000!...

[Desyaterik] What feelings did you experience toward the enemy?

[Mercenary] Really just annoyance: I wanted to sleep and he (the enemy) was firing after equal intervals of time. In general, no one needs this war. The prosperous country and fertile land—it's time to gather the harvest but people are engaged in nonsense.

[Desyaterik] Obviously, someone nevertheless needs it, they have paid people along both sides of the front.

[Mercenary] The contract with me was concluded on behalf of the PMR [Dneister Moldovan Republic] government by the commander of an independent militarized TSO detachment. However, having received the contract in my hands when I left, I discovered that there was neither the appropriate signature nor stamp on it. You can only guess about the sources of financing for the war.

[Desyaterik] How did relations develop with the local population?

[Mercenary] Evenly in general: the grandmothers cried when they caught sight of us, they gave us free drinks at the local cafe, but the local young people... It happened that they turned out to be our enemies in various "bandit formations", the so-called "third forces".

[Desyaterik] Why did you leave?

[Mercenary] Well, first of all, as I already said, they stopped paying us and the fact that all volunteers are subject to being charged as international terrorists in accordance with RSFSR Criminal Code Article 74 became one of the important reasons. Without having the appropriate legal status, we wielded weapons from which people were killed on the territory of a foreign state. The contracts that we signed were "useless scraps of paper."

[Desyaterik] Well, what's next?

[Mercenary] I do not intend to quit this type of activity and I will look for work.

[Desyaterik] Where?

[Mercenary] Most probably abroad. Some of my comrades are attracted by the French Foreign Legion. I am waiting for now and I am gathering information.

[Desyaterik] Why precisely abroad?

[Mercenary] Because there is already no place to go in our country—everything has ended in the Dneister Region and in Ossetia, too, they will definitely "kill" you in Armenia in Karabakh and the Armenians will not pay. Nothing has begun and it can't on the border with the Baltic States...

Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Sign Military Cooperation Accord

92UM1391B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Aug 92 p 1

[Unattributed report under the rubric "By Telegraph Line": "A Protocol of Intent Has Been Signed on the Interaction of the Military of Kyrgyzia and Uzbekistan"]

[Text] A protocol of intent on military collaboration was signed today by Uzbekistan Minister of Defense Lieutenant-General R. Akhmedov and a representative of the State Committee for Defense Affairs of Kyrgyzstan, Major-General Dzh. Umetaliyev. The document envisages a coordination of efforts by the military agencies of the two states on problems of the vital activity of the armed forces and the devising of mechanisms for the development of friendly relations. The protocol does not contradict the agreements on military issues of the CIS.

Conflict Over Naval Schools

92UM1454A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Sep 92
Morning edition p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA's Viktor Litovkin: "A New Conflict in Sevastopol, This Time Over Naval Schools"]

[Text] A new conflict is brewing in Sevastopol, capital of the Black Sea Fleet, this time over the fate of two higher naval schools: the Sevastopol Engineering School and the Black Sea School imeni Nakhimov.

The cause of the conflict was the arrival of a commission from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine at the fleet's main base, which began resubordinating the naval VUZs to the Ukrainian command element, and the order issued by the minister of defense of Ukraine removing Rear Adm Vladimir Denisenkov, who did not take the Ukrainian oath, from his position as chief of the ChVVMU [Black Sea Higher Naval School].

Meetings have been held in Sevastopol, on the grounds of both schools, in one of which Sergey Shakhray, deputy of the Russian parliament, took part. There have been protests, and press conferences have been held by Admiral Igor Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and Valentin Pilipchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian commission and chief of the Directorate for Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

Kasatonov announced that the Ukrainians were violating the Yalta agreements reached by the presidents on a moratorium on unilateral actions in the fleet. Pilipchuk stated that the schools are an internal problem of Ukraine and that the Yalta agreements have nothing to do with it.

Then just what is the problem all about? The military experts stress the fact that the main factor is carefully concealed behind the outer facade of events. It is that both schools are unique in their training programs. The Sevastopol school prepares engineers for the nuclear power plants on military ships; the Black Sea school trains engineers for the strategic missile systems, that is, for those military systems which Ukraine has officially rejected, accepting international commitments to that effect.

The experts maintain that the resubordination of the two schools in Sevastopol is a step toward the violation of these commitments, and on the other hand it imposes a

drastic limitation upon Russia's capability for training missile specialists for strategic submarines of the Northern and Pacific fleets.

What is the way out of the situation? It is not so simple. The matters of training and advanced training of military personnel in the corresponding specialties and the reorientation of the higher military educational institutions can clearly not be resolved in a day or a month. Something else is also clear, however. Both sides must possess political wisdom, deliberativeness and the ability patiently to observe the agreements reached and not provoke one another in a way to arouse passions.

Laaneots' Claims in Interview with Finnish Paper Decreed

*PM1009104392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Sep 92 p 3*

[Russian Federation Defense Ministry Press Center report: "With Regard to an Article in a Finnish Newspaper. Groundless Accusations Instead of Constructive Dialogue"]

[Text] The Finnish newspaper HELSINGIN SANOMAT recently carried an interview with A. Laaneots, chief of the Estonian Armed Forces General Staff. His statements contain a number of crude attacks on Russian servicemen serving on Estonian territory. In particular, A. Laaneots declared totally groundlessly that the Russian Army is supposedly "robbing" Estonia, pursuing "scorched-earth tactics" on this republic's territory, and removing or destroying "all property of any value." Laaneots maintains that "all army property of the former USSR on Estonia's territory belongs to this country." Trying to justify cases of armed attacks on the Russian Army's military installations, the chief of general staff declared, citing "relevant decisions by the Estonian parliament," that these actions "pursued the aim of saving property from removal or destruction."

In this connection it seems necessary to declare that the question of ownership of property of the Armed Forces of the former USSR cannot be resolved by means of unilateral actions, still less violent actions, which pose a real threat to people's lives. Meanwhile, dozens of cases of attacks on Russian servicemen and military installations, including armed attacks, as well as other unlawful actions against servicemen of the Northwest Group of Forces and members of their families, were recorded in Estonia during the first half of this year alone. At the same time, not only Russian servicemen, but even their children are subjected to insults and beatings. It is perfectly obvious that all this has nothing to do with a civilized way of settling problems.

It is known that a political decision to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of the Baltic states, including Estonia, has been adopted. The specific timing and procedure for the withdrawal and also all property questions are the subject of the current talks. The leadership of the Russian Armed Forces is ready for a

constructive dialogue, with maximum regard for the interests of all the sides. However, it is logical to expect such readiness from our partners too.

The aforementioned statements by the Estonian military leader can hardly be deemed constructive or conducive to the creation of a favorable atmosphere at the talks between the Russian and Estonian state delegations on questions of the Russian troop withdrawal.

Review of August Combat Actions in Karabakh

*92UM1466A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Sep 92 p 2*

[Report by Pavel Felgengauer under the rubric "Armed Conflicts": "Positional Battles in Karabakh: A Summary of Combat Operations in August"]

[Text] Reconnaissance in force conducted at the end of July, which brought a small Armenian force to the approaches to Mardakert, was an overall success. Major Azerbaijani forces were drawn away from Armenia's Krasnosal'skiy Rayon and most importantly, away from the Lachin "corridor." At mid-month the Azerbaijani army went over to a counteroffensive in Northern Karabakh, and by the end of the month almost all of the territory recaptured by the "Karabakh self-defense forces" had been lost. This is not surprising, however, in view of the superiority of Azerbaijan's armed forces in that area. During the evening of 19 August Armenian detachments were driven out of the strategic area of a dam at the Sarsangskaya GES [Hydroelectric Power Plant]. Neither side succeeded in achieving a decisive breakthrough in the fighting on the Karabakh front, however.

The fighting became positional almost everywhere, and consequently the role of aircraft and heavy artillery has increased. The balance on the front is forcing the sides to seek new possibilities for inflicting as much damage as possible upon one another. This inevitably leads to a "war on cities," as occurred during the 10-year positional war between Iran and Iraq. The combat capabilities of the sides are limited at this time, however, and neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan possesses ballistic missiles for now. These systems will inevitably soon show up, though. Either the warring republics will "get hold of" the famous Scud missiles, of which there are more than just a single thousand in the territory of the former USSR, or else they will produce something similar themselves (there is no common system for the entire CIS for preventing the departure of missile technology and specialists).

The Scud system (and particularly Scud clones) can strike only at "sites," of course, but that is all that is required for a "war on cities." Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have areas populated heavily enough for aimed fire to do enormous damage.

The first such operations were noted in August: successful operations by Azerbaijani aircraft against Stepanakert. Su-25 attack aircraft were used in the raids, which are specialized aircraft designed basically for supporting troops right on the battlefield and not for bombing cities in the rear area. The skills of the pilots which Azerbaijan has managed to hire are apparently inadequate for operating in proximity to their own troops with a jeweler's precision, however. The Azerbaijani troops continue to attack without air support, and the randomly recruited men in randomly assembled aircraft are killing women, children and old people in the Rear area.

The Russian Air Force and Ministry of Defense maintain that Su-25s were not transferred to Azerbaijan, that only one aircraft was stolen and it was shot down. Armenian sources maintain that Karabakh is being bombed by nothing other than Su-25s, however. These reports were recently confirmed by Rakhim Gaziyev, minister of defense of Azerbaijan, who told journalists recently that he had obtained Su-25s from the Russian army.

The Armenian side was unable to prepare for the aerial "war on cities" in good time. Almost the entire civilian population of Karabakh was concentrated in Stepanakert after fleeing the battle zone, and even poorly aimed bombing by Azerbaijani aircraft resulted in heavy losses. During the last week in August, however, the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh began dispersing the population in the rural area, so the bombings should be less effective. In addition, PVO [air defense] weapons brought in from Armenia have shot down at least one Azerbaijani aircraft, and the pilot (a Ukrainian) was taken prisoner.

Something like a balance has once again been established. The military capability of both Armenia and Azerbaijan depends mainly upon the quantity of weapons turned over to them ("privatized") from the former Soviet army, which was stationed on the territories of both republics. This source is already drying up, though.

The 4th Army, which was deployed on the territory of Azerbaijan, will be disbanded as of 1 September. Of the Russian troops only the 104th Airborne Division is left there, at Gandja. Of the former 7th Army in Armenia only a motorized rifle division is left, at Gumry (formerly Leninakan). Apparently the 7th Army is also soon to be disbanded.

Now they will have to acquire weapons from other countries or produce the weapons themselves, which will require a lot of time and money. For now there is a balance, albeit an extremely unstable one, on the fronts. Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia has "digested" the enormous stocks of weapons and ammunition which they inherited from the USSR. They still have weapons to toss into the battle in the vain hope of achieving a "decisive" victory this year yet.

The unstable military balance led to an equally unstable truce in Alma-Ata on 27 August. The fighting continued during the first days of September, although somehow hesitantly. This is due particularly to the fact that the course of the combat operations is being greatly influenced by the internal political situations in both nations. The proponents of a military solution to the problem are fairly numerous in both Baku and Yerevan. Somehow or other, however, combat operations have almost come to a halt on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan (unlike Nagorno-Karabakh itself). So that should there be a "decisive" ground engagement this fall, that is where it will be. A "victory," (even a limited one) in a battle at Agdam, Stepanakert or Lachin would be the best trump in the internal political struggle for power.

UKRAINE

Morozov Calls on Newspaper to Expose Corruption, Objectively Report Development of Armed Forces

92UM1337A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
10 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor Shvyrev, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent: "The Ukrainian Minister of Defense to the Editors of NARODNAYA ARMIYA"]

[Text] On 8 July 1992, a meeting was held between the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov, journalists and co-workers from the editorial staff and publishing house of the newspaper NARODNAYA GAZETA. The day before he had signed documents which set the staffs and the regulation on the editorial staff and the publishing house.

Let us say frankly that this moment has long been awaited in the collective. Being the central body of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense since October of last year, the NARODNAYA ARMIYA workers had lived and worked according to the staffing of a district paper, and here this was at a reduced level. But now clarity and certainty have been found. But certainly the main thing is that as of this day we on a legitimate basis are incorporated in the structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces which are being now established.

Having congratulated the collective of the editorial staff and the publishing house on this event, Konstantin Morozov said:

"I am very pleased to meet the journalists and co-workers from the editorial staff although with many of those sitting in this auditorium I have already met repeatedly and had conversations. I hope that this will merely help us to work productively, and to find our way more quickly and easily in the tasks which confront us at present and in the future."

The status given the newspaper, the minister of defense went on to point out, places an enormous responsibility on the collective and primarily on its journalists for an objective and complete treatment of the processes occurring in Ukraine and its Armed Forces. As for the latter, in their organizational development we have gone through, so to speak, the stage of struggle for the quantitative component of the Army. Now there is the task of achieving substantial progress in improving the qualitative indicators both in the sphere of troop command and control and in the military personnel. Neither thing can be accomplished with a single sweep. We must have painstaking, balanced and thoroughly thought out work in all its areas and directions. The Ministry of Defense and the Main Staff have the right to count on the fact that NARODNAYA ARMIYA will not remain on the sidelines from the problems confronting us but will focus its attention on the questions which the times and life have brought to the forefront. Here the journalists must show competence, high professionalism and the ability at times behind a particular fact to spot a problem and by their vivid words and profound reasoning draw the attention of the broad public as well as the highest leaders.

It is praiseworthy that in your work of recruiting and placing the co-workers, preference has been given to those journalists who are not only totally loyal to Ukraine and its people (and of course, this is important), but also possess a sufficiently profound knowledge of things and high professionalism. Incidentally, precisely this principle is being followed in the manning of the Armed Forces. Here there should be no other approach. And particularly so in a publication. Certainly you as no one else have the opportunity literally every day to come into contact with the readers and influence them by words. The mood of the people, their attitude toward surrounding reality will depend upon just what these words are, who has said them and how, and what sense is invested in them.

For this reason undoubtedly it is correct that in the collective, without hesitation, they have moved away from the journalist officers who in their moral and professional qualities have not met the demands of the Bylaws and the Regulation of the Editorial Staff, and have not accepted the changes which have occurred in our life. It is certainly no secret that such persons at one time were found on the editorial staff. Some by patronage, other by friendship and others... Incidentally this is already a matter of the past. However, this still does not mean that the fundamentally discredited practice of recruiting journalistic personnel is about to die out. In no way. Just in recent months, the editor-in-chief and the members of the editorial staff have repeatedly spoken with rather influential persons who petitioned for their near or distant relatives. Certainly others are endeavoring to place their wards in a similar manner. I hope, the minister stressed, that you in the future will take a decision on each journalist only after he has worked on the editorial staff and only on a competitive basis. There is not and cannot be any other way.

In returning to the problems which presently exist in the Armed Forces, the minister of defense pointed out that many shortcomings in our units and subunits had been inherited from the Army of the former Union. I have in mind the improper relations, "hazing," the abuse of official position, avoiding orders for military service, the stealing of motor transport and the theft of weapons... Undoubtedly work is being carried out to eradicate the negative phenomena and everything that impedes the successful solution to the pending problems. However, this has not yet produced the desired results always and everywhere. This is explained by the absence of proper supervision over the personnel, by the fact that far from each person who has been entrusted with the training and educating of subordinates shows a desire and tenacity in establishing proper order, in studying the personal qualities of the men and preventing actions and deviations away from the requirement of the orders, regulations and the military oath.

Along with the long-extant failings of Army life, recently such infractions are being felt more and more often such as absence without leave, theft and the illegal sale (bypassing the commercial center) of military equipment and property. We must particularly mention the following phenomenon. Our Armed Forces, as is known, are presently being manned by Ukrainian citizens exclusively. Seemingly the service of a Donetsk resident in the Kharkov area, and conversely, a Kharkov resident in the Donetsk area should not be burdened by such a factor as distance from home. Unfortunately it happens that both are displeased. Don't you see, they argue, that we can carry out our military duty not some 100-200 kilometers from our place of residence, but rather in our home village, in our own garden. And what is characteristic of this, often the parents push their sons into taking such a step. They feel that if their kid is right at hand, both they and he will be calmer. Life, though, and there are many examples of this, convinces one of the reverse. Many of those who were able to bring their son closer to home at present have either shipped him off to a remote garrison in order that he not go absent without leave or intend to send him farther away from the parental nest.

What is the point of all this? Of course it is not to accuse the journalists that they are not raising the given problems in their articles. The newspaper has devoted to these problems precisely a number of materials which are thorough in content and striking in form. However, if one takes the theme of the articles as a whole, they lack periodicity and timeliness.

Another comment. Undoubtedly, it is a good thing that the newspaper has published all the laws of the Ukrainian Supreme Council on military questions. But in order that the commanders have a good understanding of these, they must periodically go back to them. Certainly it is not a question of republishing them again, but rather using the most important provisions in materials and in articles on answers to reader letters. The following example shows that we must do this.

I was phoned by the commander of one of the districts and he complained that at present there is no law which would deal harshly with those who are constantly AWOL. I, naturally, was surprised and asked: "Don't we have a Law on Universal Military Obligation and Military Service?" "Of course, we do, and I have a copy of it in front of me on my desk." "Then," I said, "please find Article 42, Point 2 and read." There it clearly states that "a serviceman in regular service who leaves his place of service without leave or does not report promptly for service at the date stipulated in the orders, without valid reasons for this, does not have the time absent in the troop unit counted in his period of service."

As they say, any commentary is superfluous.

The minister of defense went on to urge the journalists to be bolder in bringing out the flaws of our Army life including the instances of the stealing of military property, the employment of the personnel for building dachas and garages, the illegal sale of motor vehicle equipment, the absence of proper accounting for the equipment and so forth. And here he particularly stressed that in preparing the materials on these questions, in no instance should the journalist fall back on a position of nit-picking or portray the desired as the actual. It is essential to write justly, soundly and place all dots over the "i." Only then will the articles, publications and satire be beneficial and rescue those who have fallen from the straight and narrow, who, with the appearance of the enticing ruble, has lost the honor of an officer and the high title of a citizen of independent Ukraine. To keep silent about all this means to indulge the persons who by their unworthy conduct and acquisitiveness cause, in addition to the material harm, great moral harm to the Armed Forces.

The attention of the participants of the meeting was also drawn to a constructive, balanced approach to assessing the events and phenomena occurring in our state and its army so as not to excite the readers with flippant approaches to understanding the various vital questions and to correctly place the accents in the materials which back up the views of our scientists and theorists on the large-scale problems concerning both the Armed Forces as well as our state. As confirmation of this, the minister of defense referred to the article "The Plan for Ukrainian National Security" (8 July 1992) which voiced the idea of an external threat to Ukraine in a not completely accurate manner.

There was a thorough discussion of the Ukrainian Navy, the situation in the Dniester Region, the housing problem, the dates and possibilities of the editorial collective to convert to publishing a certain part of the newspaper run in Ukrainian.

Then Konstantin Petrovich answered questions from the journalists. In particular, he was asked: when and in what manner will the question be settled of transferring the property of the former Soviet Army to the property of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense? The minister of

defense said that he had forwarded a document to the government and after the approval of this, all the facilities and buildings used by the military would be transferred to our ownership.

A positive solution to the given question would substantially broaden our opportunities and first of all in the interests of modernizing the printing equipment and obtaining a sound profit in relation to our still not so large income and accumulation. A request was made of the minister in further discussing the important problem for us, and that was to provide help and support in implementing the designated plan. Konstantin Morozov stated that the question would be settled upon the presentation of the required figures by the editor-in-chief.

There was also a discussion of the fact that one-half of the current officer personnel on the editorial staff is without housing. And some of them for 4 or 5 years now have been squeezed into corners or have paid exorbitant rents. The most alarming is that over the previous year not a single journalist received new housing. If the NARODNAYA ARMIYA personnel is provided with apartments at this rate, then some will move into them in the next century. Will they be working that long? The minister of defense took the given information into consideration.

Later he became acquainted with the printing facilities of the Military Printing Office of the Ministry of Defense where NARODNAYA ARMIYA is printed.

In conclusion, Konstantin Morozov pointed out that the mood in the collective is a professional one, the situation is creative, the relations between people are kind and respectful and he voiced the confidence that NARODNAYA ARMIYA would in the future contribute actively to strengthening the independence of Ukraine, to creating its Armed Forces and to increasing their combat and mobilizational readiness.

Morozov Meets with Odessa Officer Assembly to Discuss 'Social Protection'

92UM1366E Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
30 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service Chief Major Aleksandr Kluban: "On the Path to Unity: An Odessa Military District Officers' Assembly Occurred on 28 June. Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov Participated in its Work"]

[Text] OdVO [Odessa Military District] officers gathered at their assembly to discuss the issues associated with building the Ukrainian Armed Forces, military reform, and social protection of servicemen and their family members in the complicated political and socio-economic situation. The representatives of the officer corps assembled not only to talk about the problems which make your head spin today, but to outline ways to

solve them. And, as many of the meeting's participants stated, a permanently functioning organ—the Officers' Assembly—which would promote strengthening combat readiness of units and subunits, discipline, one-man command, and the prestige of commanders and would defend the rights, honor, and dignity of officers is needed to do this.

While delivering a report, Odessa Military District Commander Lieutenant-General Vitaliy Radetskiy focused attention on the role and place of the Officers' Assemblies in supporting the building of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and social protection of servicemen, he outlined the series of tasks which this collective organ must carry out in the education of officer cadres, revival of the glorious traditions, and a feeling of high patriotism and national self-consciousness that undoubtedly affects the professional training of servicemen.

In the speeches of the assembly's participants, concern was sensed with those numerous problems that the young army of independent Ukraine urgently faces today. They are military reform which is being set into motion, providing housing to servicemen, monetary salaries with rapidly rising prices, uncertainty in the prospects of service as a result of the impending reduction of the Armed Forces and other questions that require answers. Incidentally, they were also heard in the speeches of the generals and officers in the form of specific proposals that are affecting the life and activities of the military district's troops.

Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov's speech clarified many issues. Colonel-General Morozov precisely and lucidly set forth the military department's position on a whole series of problems, the most important of which is the social protection of servicemen and their family members. The Minister of Defense directed attention to the efforts undertaken by the President of Ukraine, the Supreme Soviet, the Government and the Ministry of Defense to provide servicemen with everything necessary for a normal solution of the responsible tasks assigned to the Armed Forces.

Despite the extremely difficult conditions and that difficult path that we have covered while creating our Armed Forces, Colonel-General Morozov authoritatively stated that today Ukraine already has its own Armed Forces. But now we must struggle for their quality and so that they can reliably defend the young state's integrity and sovereignty and be the guarantor of the inviolability of our borders. And there is a large field of activity for the newly created organ—the Officers' Assembly—in this issue.

"The district's officers are displaying a great deal of interest in finding the optimal solution for the application of collective reason, energy and practical experience," stressed the minister of defense. "And I support those servicemen who suggest the unification of the efforts of officers who are serving in the Armed Forces,

surrounding unified goals and the solution of unified tasks. Today as never before, it is very important for us to unite all healthy forces in order to create a favorable and calm atmosphere in military collectives where a spirit of military comradeship, honor and dignity should reign and we should be able to implement our concept of military structural development and create an army of a new type, without those deficiencies and problems that were left to us as a legacy from the Armed Forces of the former USSR."

At the time when sessions in sections were occurring at which Ukrainian Ministry of Defense representatives were present, Colonel-General Morozov conducted a reception for servicemen on personal issues. Each visitor with his misfortunes and problems attempted to find assistance and support from the Minister of Defense and found them. Each person who turned to him with a question received an exhaustive answer. And orders were immediately issued to the representatives of the appropriate services.

Representatives of the mass media who were accredited to the Odessa Military District Officers' Assembly were also provided their share of attention. A small press conference was organized for them during which Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov answered questions that interested them.

"Konstantin Petrovich," the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent asked the minister of defense, "you said in a statement on television that right now a situation of clear opposition has developed with a great probability of the outbreak of conflicts with the use of weapons. Doesn't that mean that Odessa Military District Troops could be employed against the Black Sea Fleet in the event of adequate operations and the raising of the St. Andrew's Flag? And second—KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's official investigation that was conducted by me established that an interceptor aircraft took off from Belbek airfield 12 seconds after a Black Sea Fleet aircraft took off. I'd like to ask: why?"

"No, that does not mean that Odessa Military District Troops could be in those operations which you talked about. I was analyzing that situation in my statement. That opposition and delay with a solution of issues compels officers to act from one side or the other and to extend a hand to each other. I have in mind the barrage fire that was opened from the ship "Razitelnyy" along the course of the ship SKR-112. That fact put the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense very much on guard and a new impetus was given to the negotiations already on the second day. We will take all steps so that such activities are not repeated and so that matters are not reduced to the use of arms..."

"Later, as soon as we learned that SKR-122 had set course for Odessa, having in mind that it is Ukrainian territory and a Ukrainian port, I immediately demanded that the Black Sea Fleet commander cease the pursuit and actions to prevent the ship from leaving. In order to

provide the possibility for the crew to safely reach the port of Odessa and to later investigate what had occurred with a jointly created commission. This demand was not properly carried out and the ships continued to pursue the SKR. You know that. Based upon Admiral Larionov's suggestion to send up a B-12 aircraft, I made the following decision: I authorized the aircraft to take off to establish communications with the ship but not to enter the area near the ship. No other aircraft whatsoever, either based on commands or based on my authorization, took off. I learned about the SU-27 from the press and I am looking into that right now. You will know who made that decision."

"Odessa Oblast Radio. Konstantin Petrovich, nearly a month ago you gave an interview in Bolgrad with regard to the future of the air assault division. At that time, a working group was created. I have learned that approximately 50 percent of the officers and warrant officers decided to remain and serve in Ukraine and the remainder—in Russia. What news can you tell me today?"

"As you already know, that decision has been made. General of the Army Grachev and I agreed to that. The work occurred for two-three weeks. Some of the officers and warrant officers have finally determined their positions. As of today, the question on the division of military equipment and vehicles remains unresolved. This is the Russian side's new proposal. Ukraine has not proposed viewing the issue in that way. Therefore, it has not been finally resolved and has been postponed for a certain time. However, Ukraine's fundamental position remains unchanged. I am ready to repeat to you everything which I spoke about in Bolgrad."

"ITAR-TASS. What do you think, why wasn't the Ukrainian Minister of Defense's order carried out on stopping the pursuit of the escort vessel?"

"You yourself know the answer. This occurred because the subordination of the fleet has still not been determined. The fleet remains at an intermediate point between the spheres of influence of the two Ministries of Defense. On the one hand, Ukraine's right and the guarantee of that right is the law of Ukraine from the point of view of citizenship and the need to resolve the issue as quickly as possible for the people so that they are not in that undefined state. But, on the other hand, there is the Black Sea Fleet command authority's pressure on the Black Sea Fleet to preserve it united on the territory of Ukraine. All of that can occur only under conditions of specific decisions of the state delegations."

"VECHERNYAYA ODESSA. How do you assess that fact that Ukrainian troops are not participating in quelling the conflicts in the Dniester Republic."

"On the Dniester Republic. Ukraine is one of the first states that is conducting intensive work to maintain peace in the region on a political level. You know the Ukrainian President's statement and his position that were expressed at the meeting of the CIS Heads of State. The fact that Ukraine is not directly present in that

region, I can explain by the fact that the process of making a decision in Tashkent coincided with that period when we were forming a battalion to send to Sarajevo. As you know, that battalion was formed on the territory of Odessa Military District. Today at 6 a.m. it arrived and began to move to the location to carry out its mission. Ukraine participated in the Tashkent Meeting and is adopting all of those provisions that were examined and adopted there. The only thing that is not providing the possibility to immediately carry out the decision is that the Law of Ukraine on the Armed Forces states that the employment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to carry out tasks not associated with the defense of its own Homeland is the prerogative exclusively of the Supreme Soviet. This work is being conducted in the Ministry of Defense and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet will make a decision."

"Ostankino' Television. What compromises did you have in mind in the IZVESTIYA interview when you were talking about the work of the interparliamentary commission on negotiations on the future of the Black Sea Fleet?"

"I had in mind the following compromises. First of all, the sides' understanding that they need to resolve this problem while proceeding from the juridical position of an independent state. If this position is understood and if both sides proceed based on it, then compromises are possible which could be directed at a mutual rendering of assistance to each other in the creation on the Black Sea of separate Ukrainian and Russian fleets. If that position is determined by the two delegations, we are ready to introduce as many proposals as necessary to render assistance to the Russian side for the temporary use of our resources, bases and support systems under treaty terms. But matters have not yet reached that stage. Because the former position is not being accepted. The state delegations are working on that right now."

Morozov on Strategic, Military Policy

92UN2028A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
22 Aug 92 p 6, 27 Aug 92 p 6

[Article by Colonel General K. Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine: "Preserve Peace and Stability in the Region"]

[22 Aug 92 p 6]

[Text] In a few more years historians will begin evaluating the early nineties as one of the most tumultuous and significant periods in modern history. It is true, the last world empire has collapsed and disintegrated with new and free countries rising on its fragments, the independence and self-esteem of which radically altered the palette of the world political map.

Events in the republics of the former USSR exerted their influence on countries of the former socialist camp, and on all of Europe as a whole, as well. Confronting the

latter with the resolution of highly complicated problems. The ruin of imperial psychology and the freedom of countries and people to achieve self-determination that followed, despite the undoubtedly positive nature of this process, brought about arguments concerning "division of property." On the whole they were inevitable under the conditions of certain economic hardships and instability. In some countries, however, they are proceeding along a more or less civilized channel. In some others they have led to fierce internecine friction and bloodletting. Out of local ones these conflicts are developing with increasing frequency into a major general European problem generating common alarm and apprehension. Apprehensions are all the more substantiated because in a number of European countries territorial claims aimed at neighbors are heard with growing frequency from the extreme radicals.

Perhaps it is not worth viewing these extremist voices in such a dramatic light. After all there are responsible governments conducting a responsible policy... But the inevitable crisis of a period involving establishment of a new social system is fraught with social explosions. This means internal instability which is inevitably followed by external instability. Historical experience teaches that the most radically attuned politicians come to power on the wave of popular indignation. Therefore the chances of these new "radicals," who are actively speculating in national patriotic feelings of their fellow citizens, are not so ridiculous...

Therefore the only restraining factor preventing a new attempt to "refashion" Europe objectively consists of the Helsinki accords on the inviolability of postwar borders.

The danger, however, consists of the fact that local conflicts are inevitably accompanied by the threat of intervention by third countries. It is specifically such facts that undermine the very basis of the Helsinki process which may lead to truly unpredictable consequences.

Geographically Ukraine is situated at the very heart of Europe and cannot fail to take these circumstances into consideration all the more since tension along the southeastern borders, brought about by the conflict in the Dniester region, continues to persist. Its difficult lessons specifically prove once again to the entire world that the only acceptable way of resolving crisis situations is through diplomacy, through political compromises. The state, however, must have its own army capable of defending its soil.

The Ministry of Defense, actively implementing the military policy of the state, from the first days of the creation of the army, at its level promotes specifically such a resolution of the questions.

The legal right of Ukraine to have its own armed forces was determined back on 16 July 1990 in the declaration on the state sovereignty of Ukraine. Later a new package of laws was adopted which created the legal basis for the building of a local army. No one should have any

doubt—we approached this highly important task using the civilized way. Even having the legal base, created by the Supreme Council of Ukraine, we undertook the practical realization of the ukase of the president "On armed forces of Ukraine" of 12 December 1991, only after heads of the CIS countries signed an agreement in Minsk one of whose points determined the right of every state to have its own armed forces.

There is no doubt that such steps by Ukraine could not help but promote consolidation of its authority in Europe and in the world community. In addition to that all of our actions in the area of establishing ties with military agencies of other countries correspond strictly with points in our military doctrine. Even though that document is in the stage of final elaboration, its main principles remain firm.

Our doctrine bears a strictly defensive character, which determines progress in the building of the armed forces of Ukraine according to the principle of defensive sufficiency. Ukraine does not see any state as its potential enemy and has no territorial claims against any of them

This position received the support and understanding of our European neighbors. For them the military policy of Ukraine is understandable and open. This is all the more important in view of the fact that military doctrine is regional and not strategic, that is it is aimed primarily at the preservation of peace and stability in the region and among both states in the immediate proximity and in Europe as a whole. Such an approach bears real fruit. Thanks to its efforts of Ukraine, for instance, in the search for political methods of resolving the Dniester region crisis are proving to be fruitful.

It is necessary to dispel certain conjectures and false rumors which appeared after Ukraine declared that it will be the guarantor of a free expression of the people's will in the Dniester region in case of voluntary unification of sovereign Moldova with Romania. After all, in principle we are rejecting the method of compulsion in resolution of such problems. I am compelled to mention this because sometimes it is possible to hear the following viewpoint: is it worthwhile for Ukraine to reform and cut back its armed forces so radically if it is specifically the army of Ukraine which is the only one that could serve as the restraining factor in the region? It has already been proven, however, that no army can serve as such a factor.

A powerful group with an offensive orientation was inherited by us from the army of the former USSR, whose possibilities clearly exceed the defensive sufficiency of our country. It is specifically for that reason, in accordance with the Paris and Vienna accords, that we will be reducing this group. Moreover, this is already being done.

Structurally the armed forces of Ukraine will exist not in the form of military districts. Operational commands are being created on their basis.

The number of personnel and the amount of armament and equipment will suit the demands of the interstate agreement on conventional forces in Europe. The Paris document and its Tashkent protocol, which determines maximum armament levels for countries on the territory of the European portion of the former USSR, were ratified by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 1 July. By the way, several weeks ago we declared to countries—participants of CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], that Ukraine is undertaking practical measures to reduce armaments being limited by the agreement. (To be continued).

[27 Aug 92 p 6]

[Text] France, USA, and Germany have already sent their experts to Ukraine to monitor fulfillment of the agreement on conventional forces in Europe. This process will continue inasmuch as modification and reform of our armed forces suits both the national interests of Ukraine and those of Europe as a whole as well. After all only political methods are acceptable for resolving problems and disputes within the framework of the CSCE, a membership in which Ukraine prizes and values very highly.

To me it is very important to underscore specifically this since I was repeatedly convinced that despite the overall attitude of goodwill toward an independent Ukraine, our western colleagues and partners retain some concern about the size of our military grouping.

Indicatively this concern began manifesting itself from the very start of the building of the armed forces of Ukraine. I recall that in January of this year I met with Mister Reginald Bartholomew, the assistant secretary of state of the USA. He noted our diplomatic approach and tact in the resolution of various issues with the government of Russia, but at the same time stated the following in approximately this way—"A red light" went on when you declared the size of your armed forces at 400,000 - 500,000, then headlines appeared in the newspapers to the effect that Ukraine wants to have a large fleet in the Black Sea. In response to the concern of my interlocutor I once again tried to develop the thesis about defensive sufficiency yet another time as convincingly as possible.

The prolonged resolution of the question concerning the Black Sea Fleet, of course, is producing particular interest among the military and the politicians of many countries.

At present, after determination of the political direction followed in its resolution, many problems still remain. The task of the Ministry of Defense consists of working out a position with regard to all principles so as to submit them for study at the political level.

The goal remains unchanged: utilization of the transitional period for creation of independent Ukrainian naval forces.

Their tasks are determined exclusively by state defensive interests while their composition will be determined by Ukraine proceeding from the principle of defensive sufficiency.

The right of an independent state not to have troop formations on its territory not subordinated to the state must be realized in resolving the question concerning the fleet, just as the one concerning administrative subordination of strategic forces to Ukraine.

In such a situation it would be naive to engage in self-accounting. But it is necessary to arrange everything in its proper place once and for all. Yes, the size of our armed forces, after their reformation, will be smaller than now. But we cannot reduce the army in a matter of hours. Since, in reducing the army and involuntarily altering the fate of people who took an oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine, and who are truly devoted to them, we would find ourselves at the very least in an ambiguous position. We cannot deceive people. That is why a radical reduction is possible only after we ensure the social protection of every discharged officer. I have in mind provision of housing, assistance with retraining in a civilian specialty, job placement, and numerous other aspects. At present only those with housing and the right to a pension are being discharged from the army.

I will say more, it is specifically such an approach which prevents the occurrence of another sphere of social tension, threatening to disrupt the political stability which Ukraine prizes so much and which to a great extent determines the reality of our plans, yes, and the stability of Europe as a whole as well.

Everything connected with nuclear weapons undoubtedly attracts the most intense attention of our European, and not just European, partners. I had extensive talks with members of the NATO Secretariat, a group of U. S. senators, and military delegations of France and Germany, as well as with many very high officials from various countries and we returned most frequently specifically to this topic, the discussion of which, I must say, did not cause any difficulties.

After all the position of Ukraine is simple and understandable, it is recorded in state acts and it is systematically implemented by the president of Ukraine. We are striving for a nuclear-free status and are taking practical steps in that direction. Tactical nuclear weapons taken out of Ukraine are being destroyed under our control. Strategic weapons are next. We are counting on help from Russia and other countries in their complete dismantling and destruction but for that purpose it is necessary to overcome certain difficulties of a strictly organizational nature. The Lisbon Protocol permitted us to slightly postpone the declared deadlines for liquidation of strategic nuclear weapons—up to seven years. Until that time Ukraine belongs to the command of the Commonwealth strategic forces. The purpose is to preserve unified and reliable control over utilization and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. We will remain

faithful to the agreements reached in Alma-Ata until the end, until the moment when the last missile ceases to exist.

Our decision concerning the administrative subordination of large and small strategic force units deployed on the territory of Ukraine to the Ministry of Defense produced a certain misunderstanding with regard to this question. It created a storm of indignation among our Russian colleagues. But it is understandable that we were simply obligated to eliminate the ambiguity in the position of the personnel while guaranteeing social protection for each serviceman in accordance with the constitution and laws of his state. Secondly, such a step merely reinforced our confidence that funds, the property of the people, would be protected. This was also a step along the path leading to realization of the right of Ukraine to exercise control over the nonutilization of nuclear weapons from its territory.

We are successors to the former USSR in the fulfillment of START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty]. The Lisbon Protocol recognized Ukraine as one of the equal partners in this treaty. No talk about "violation of parity" will change our position—all nuclear arms moved off the territory of Ukraine will be destroyed and under international control which will make it possible to guarantee its nonutilization in the future in the interests of some state. This position occupied by us remains firm and unchangeable which is understood and supported both by specialists in nuclear disarmament and by the entire international community as a whole.

I am sometimes asked—how do you reconcile the proclaimed Ukrainian course toward a nonbloc state with our numerous contacts with military agencies of other countries? This is a sufficiently interesting issue to warrant a more detailed examination.

First of all the realities are such that Ukraine does not enter into any one bloc. We do not participate in the CIS Combined Armed Forces, while our participation in the Strategic Command is a forced measure that is temporary, which I have already discussed. Secondly the nonbloc status is not a hindrance to the establishment of sufficiently broad bilateral military contacts or even participation in certain structures of military blocs. World practice confirms that.

For instance, we have already signed agreements on links between ministries of defense of Ukraine and Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

In a talk with Manfred Werner, general secretary of NATO, I became convinced of the usefulness and even necessity of diversified contacts with the North Atlantic bloc. Which, by the way, found a brilliant confirmation at the April meeting of ministers of defense in Brussels. There it was possible to clarify many positions. We have common problems and interests. In this context the participation of Ukraine is justified in the North Atlantic Council on Cooperation, which we joined in March of this year.

A trip to the USA and especially the meetings with Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney proved to be highly useful. An understanding was reached with regard to a great number of issues, and prospects for cooperation were outlined, including the sphere of mutual training of specialists, which is already finding practical embodiment.

We continue to seek and expand contacts with military agencies of other countries. Agreements will be signed in the near future on ties with military agencies of Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania. There are agreements on development of relations with military colleagues in Belarus, Russia, France and other countries. Because, over there, where there is mutual understanding between the military and politicians, it is easier to reach an agreement.

In this connection a phrase comes to mind which was uttered during our meeting with Mr. Vogel, a member of the FRG Bundestag. "I used to be a soldier 47 years ago," he stated, "for two years I took part in that great war. Yesterday I laid flowers on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Millions of those who had fallen would have been pleased that we returned to peaceful relations."

Mutual understanding is coming about among formerly irreconcilable sides such as the veterans of once battling armies, and good relations are growing stronger between states feeling responsible for the preservation of peace for humanity.

Our Ukraine is joining the world process as such a state. Already by its first anniversary it has practically demonstrated its adherence to the best ideals of mankind: peace, democracy, cooperation, social justice, and assurance of human rights.

We, who are called upon to guard these ideals, are obligated to do everything in order for people in our country to work for the good of the nation, for the authority of Ukraine to grow from year to year in the eyes of the world community and freedom and prosperity to be increasingly secured in it with every new anniversary of the independent and democratic homeland.

Kasatonov Accusations of Planned 'Provocations' Refuted

92UM1366B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
31 Jul 92 p 1

[Ukrainian Border Troops Press Service Release: "Contrary to Common Sense: Ukrainian Border Troops Press Service Release"]

[Text] At a 22 July 1992 press conference at Red Banner Black Sea Fleet Headquarters, Fleet Commander I. Kasatonov stated that the Ukrainian Border Troops had

been notified beforehand "about the impending operation-provocation" with SKR- 112 that was completing an unauthorized departure from Donuzlav and transfer to Odessa.

That statement is nothing other than an obvious lie and attempt to confuse society. The so-called fabricated "sensation" does not have anything in common with reality.

The Ukrainian Border Troops command authorities were informed of the fact of SKR- 112's unauthorized departure from the port of Donuzlav from the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet operational service at 9:35. State Committee for Ukrainian State Border Defense Matters Chairman-Ukrainian Border Troops Commander Colonel-General V. Gubenko immediately took the initiative and contacted the Black Sea Fleet command authorities to ascertain the situation that developed and suggested to Red Banner Black Sea Fleet Chief of Staff Vice Admiral G. Gurinov to refrain from the use of extreme measures (by that time, it was already known that Black Sea Fleet ships had used weapons against SKR-112) until the facts and causes of SKR-112's departure had been clarified, to which Vice Admiral G. Gurinov stated that he would take exhaustive steps to stop the ship.

As a result, the Border Troops began to act in accordance with the requirements of the Law "On the State Border of Ukraine" and official orders. Three border escort vessels were immediately brought to readiness when the combat alarm sounded. However, contrary to common sense, at 10:10, our naval squadrons were disconnected from the fleet coastal surveillance post single loudspeaker communications system and they were also disconnected from telephonic communications through the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet Headquarters Switchboard 40 minutes later.

Under those conditions and with the situation unclear, the decision was made to send border escort vessels from Odessa and Balaklava to search for SKR-112.

And at 13:40, border guards detected SKR-112, under the State Flag of Ukraine, and the three Red Banner Black Sea Fleet ships that were pursuing it, 54 miles northwest of Mys Tarkhankut. Our vessels' attempts to establish contact with SKR-112 via UHF communications and through visual means were unsuccessful. At 14:00, after establishing voice communications, we managed to ascertain from the captain of SKR- 112 that the ship was sailing to the port of Odessa.

To prevent any incidents whatsoever between SKR-112 and the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet ships at the Odessa port open roadstead and to conduct an investigation, the captain of SKR-112 was authorized to set anchor near the outer walls of the port's Potapovskiy Breakwater alongside the Ukrainian Border Troops Odessa Brigade Vessels that are based there. At 19:00, SKR-112 was moored at the port and was placed under guard.

Conclusions that the "hijackers' use of previously prepared documents on communications while conducting negotiations with border defense ships" that were made in Admiral I. Kasatonov's protest create the impression that the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet command authorities do not control the situation in the fleet and are attempting to transfer responsibility for the unauthorized departure of combat ship SKR-112 from themselves to others or to create conditions for similar actions of fleet personnel.

Officers' Union Chairman Scores Military Corruption

92UM1380A Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian
18 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Grigoriy Omelchenko, chairman of the Officers' Union of Ukraine, militia colonel, and candidate of jurisprudence: "What Did the General Snatch?"]

[Text] One of the greatest dangers that is a realistic threat to the young independent state and the development of democracy in Ukraine is the nearly all-pervasive corruption and Mafia-like presence in organs of power and management, bribery, abuses from top to bottom, and an unprecedented growth of organized crime. A special place in this anti-social environment belongs to the military nomenklatura Mafia. Corruption, striking the old organizational structures of the Soviet Army like a cancerous sore, is what independent Ukraine has inherited. The serious danger of corrupt and Mafia-like army organizations lies in the fact that these commanders and military leaders control weapons (and not just rifles!).

Yesterday they zealously supported the GKChP junta. Taking tanks out into the streets, they rushed the Central Television station as if it were an emulsion, and during an all-army holiday they defended the indivisibility of the USSR and its Armed Forces. Today, because generals' positions, stolen goods, and a place in the sun were all saved for them, they took an oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. And tomorrow, thanks to their skins having been saved for committing crimes against their own people, thanks to their privileges being preserved, as well as the dachas and houses that were built with soldiers' slave labor, and the illegally received apartments, automobiles, and other things that are in short supply, they can do anything they want, even including the use of armed force.

Only the politically blind or traitors to their own people can fail to see this!

Our newspaper has written more than once about the problem of fighting the Mafia and corruption in the military establishment. It is enough to remind readers of such articles as "Chechvatov in the Transbaykal Region," "The Toyota is on the Other Side of the Fence (7.02), "Is the Mafia in Power?" (13.03), "Godfathers With Shoulder Boards" (20.03), and "The Generals' Nest" (1.07).

Due to facts in these articles about criminal activities, criminal proceedings have begun, a series of investigations is being conducted, and a number of persons having high positions have been relieved of their duties and arrested. But the crust of corruption and changes in the Mafia organizations have startled the public so much that there is a demand for a quick surgical intervention.

Here are but a few new examples. The chief of the automotive service in the Odessa Military District, Colonel Yu. M. Sorokin, ignored Decree No. 28, dated December 31, 1991, from the President of Ukraine and Order No. 5, dated December 24, 1991, from the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, and illegally sold at a residual value automotive equipment to various organizations and private persons, resulting in a loss of over five million rubles to the state. Lieutenant General V.S. Belokhvost, deputy troop commander for rear services of the military district, Major General N.A. Lobanov, deputy commander for armament, Major General A.S. Maltsev, chief of the personnel directorate, and Major General A.S. Brynz, chief of medical services, all knew about the large illegal sale of equipment, but not only did they not stop this illegal activity, but using their official positions they acquired automobiles below the stated prices.

The Directorate for Counterintelligence of the Ukrainian Security Council and the Ukrainian Officers' Union established the facts of abuses of his official position for personal gain on the part of Major General A.A. Avdeyev, deputy chief of the Directorate for Rear Services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which resulted in a significant economic loss for Ukraine.

Thus, with Avdeyev's knowledge, and in violation of orders of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, a lease agreement that was not advantageous for Ukraine was signed in April of this year with the "Nefteservis" Industrial-Commercial Society, resulting in a 50 million ruble loss to the military economy.

In addition, upon expiration of the three-year lease, the "Nefteservis" Industrial-Commercial Society, in accordance with the signed agreement, is given the opportunity for free use of technological equipment that was transferred during the lease period, including buildings, and structures of military unit 42770 (Barkasovo Station, Mukachevskiy District, Transcarpathian Oblast). This became possible because representatives of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (with Avdeyev's participation) intentionally did not provide for payments for services to guard petroleum products, for use of electric power in pumping these products, for fire protection, for fulfilling technological operations, and for paying wages to service personnel. As a result, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is shorted by 4,292,200 rubles each month.

In April, Avdeyev's secret attempts to make contacts with representatives of foreign aviation companies were

revealed, wherein he proposed to provide personal services to them for establishing "favorable" conditions for a successful resolution to the problem of organizing a joint aviation enterprise.

Attempting to enlarge the area of his official influence with the goal of making a personal material gain, Avdeyev insisted that the Commercial Center of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense become a promoter of the "Universal Conversion" International Goods Exchange. As a result, the Commercial Center lost its capability to independently resolve tasks given to it and to use profits received from sales of military equipment solely for the needs of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (the first priority being housing construction).

The information given to the Minister of Defense allows one to ascertain that the facts surrounding Major General G. Avdeyev's abuses of his official position (violations of financial discipline, illegal distributions of passenger automobiles, housing, etc.) and his negative character traits (rudeness, lack of discretion, incompetence) were present before, but no appropriate legal or moral evaluation was made.

At the beginning of this year, Major General L.Ye. Utkin (at the time, temporarily fulfilling the duties of Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine for Armament) Contacted the "Torgovyy Dom 'VEMA'" firm (A.M. Novik, President) with a request to provide a "GAZ-31-04" automobile for Minister of Defense K.P. Morozov. The management of the firm made a decision to give this automobile to the Minister of Defense without charge. The representative of the Ministry of Defense received the "GAZ-31-04" automobile and delivered it to the ministry property. The "Torgovyy Dom 'VEMA'" made an agreement with Generals Utkin and Avdeyev to have a special ceremony for transferring the automobile officially to the minister and invite the media. This entire "operation" was being conducted without the minister's knowledge. But when K.P. Morozov found out about the "event" being prepared, he demanded that the automobile be fully paid for or returned to the firm. However, the various backstage generals' deals on the parts of Utkin and Avdeyev on the one hand and the "VEMA-Torgovyy Dom" on the other, with the purpose of discrediting the Minister of Defense by "presenting" him with the "Volga," continued for a long time, but in vain.

The media reported on the mercenary and other abuses and violations by the Kiev generals' group (Generals Chechevatz, Sharikov, Osokhin, Kurdakov, Boriskin, Avdeyev, Utkin, Frolov, and others) and the cases discussed at various levels of government. By presidential decree, Lieutenant General Sharikov, presidential aide, was dismissed from his position. He was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. It is rumored that he will be transferred to Moscow as the Ukrainian representative for military issues (the former party nomenklatura does not abandon "its own" when they are in trouble). Colonel General Chechevatz is

now commanding the Far Eastern Military District. For how long? Time will tell (the Ukrainian prosecutor's office is preparing a criminal case about his role). The rest of the generals are continuing to serve.

As before, the Crimean generals and the leadership of the Black Sea fleet, headed by Admiral I.V. Kasatonov, are flourishing. It is enough to visit these warm spots in order to become convinced how quickly the dachas and houses are being built for the generals and admirals. This is especially so in the vicinity of the village of Lyubimovka, not far from Belbek. Construction materials are even delivered by helicopter. Soldiers and sailors are the builders. "The dacha nest," as this place is called by the residents, is growing not by the day, but by the hour. They even have Kiev "birds" there, dressed in uniform striped trousers.

And here is how the presidential decree and the order of the Minister of Defense, mentioned above, are carried out by Admiral I. Kasatonov, commander-in-chief of the Black Sea Fleet. Colonel V. Bortnikov, Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Department of the Russian Ministry of Security for the Naval Forces of the South of Russia (this already exists!), sent a report to the Admiral in which he wrote: **"With the goal of appropriately concluding functional responsibilities by the operational staff of the Department, request Your permission to obtain the following equipment according to the Equipment Table: 1. UAZ-469. 2. Truck (Ural, GAZ-66, ZIL). 3. Patrol boat. 4. Coverings with disks for the GAZ-3102."**

The report was registered on June 30, 1992, Entry No. 997, and has the stamp of the automotive and armored tank service of the Black Sea Fleet on it.

The same day, Kasatonov sent a generous resolution to the appropriate responsible party: **"To the Commander, Automotive and Tank Service: 1. Permission granted. 2. Report on the order."** And the signature: **"Kasatonov"**. Date: **"June 30, 1992."** Of the Ukrainian property requested by the Russian special service, only the patrol boat was excluded. But this is compensated for by three new "UAZ-469"s which, according to the instructions given by chiefs one rank lower, should have been given over to Russian counter-intelligence prior to July 5, 1992.

Time will tell how the President and the Prosecutor of Ukraine will react to all this.

K. Morozov, Ukrainian Minister of Defense, in his Order No. 110, dated June 24, 1992, "On Measures to Root Out Abuses by Officials of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Holding Responsible Positions" pointed out that "these kinds of shameful acts not only result in a large material loss to our young sovereign state, but also cause

considerable harm to the interests of building the Ukrainian Armed Forces, undermine people's trust in social justice and the Law, and make a black mark on the prestige of the entire officer corps of the Ukrainian Armed Forces."

With the goal of rooting out different kinds of abuses by using their official positions, K. Morozov ordered that "in cases where facts show mercenary abuses of official positions, a report will be sent immediately through channels all the way to the Minister of Defense, and an administrative investigation will be conducted that will provide evidential material to law enforcement organs."

"Those found guilty of abuses stemming from their official positions will be immediately removed and evidential material will be presented on them for their transfer to the reserves."

At their meeting, the Secretariat of the Officers' Union of Ukraine made a decision to give their full support and aid to K.P. Morozov, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, and to Major General A.S. Ignatenko, his Deputy for Personnel, for rooting out corruption and abuses in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and to begin a decisive and uncompromising struggle against the military Mafia.

Military Educational Institutions Created in Ukraine

92UM1427A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Kaushanskiy: "New Military VUZs in Ukraine"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has approved the military education reform concept. As we all know, 34 military VUZs [higher educational institutions], the number of which is currently being significantly reduced, were located on the territory of the state until recently. Just what are they proposing to have in the future? The decree states that the Ukrainian Armed Forces Academy will open in Kiev and a military university will open in Kharkov to train highly-qualified specialists. And what is more a military humanitarian institute will throw open its door in Kiev, a ground forces institute—in Odessa, and a naval institute—in Sevastopol.

They have decided to create military lycées with increased military-physical training which will already accept lads on 1 September 1992 based on Kiev's Suvorov School and a Lvov specialized boarding school. Similar educational institutions will open in Sumy, Kharkov, Donetsk, Simferopol, Chernigov, and Zhitomir. In the near future, they also plan to create a Ministry of Defense joint institute and also military construction and military engineering departments, and a military medical section under certain civilian VUZs.

Spetsnaz Units Take Ukrainian Oath

92UM1367 Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian, Ukrainian 30 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent Pavel Goshko: "Ranks Formed!—The Young Spetsnaz Soldiers Have Sworn Loyalty to the People of Ukraine"]

[Text] *These days thousands of young men are becoming soldiers of independent Ukraine. They have arrived from various corners of our sovereign state to serve in the brigade of special-purpose [Spetsnaz] troops commanded by Colonel Pavel Alekseyevich Davidyuk, former metallurgists and machine builders, growers of crops and miners... They are all Ukrainians, and almost every one has secondary or special secondary education.*

The recruits still have not forgotten the solemn day when their near and dear ones, comrades at work or study, were seen off to the martial labors: handshakes, innumerable parting words.

But the conscripts scarcely realized clearly then what it means to value the honor of a soldier in the armed forces of Ukraine. And only by putting on the military uniform, taking the oath of loyalty to their own people and taking up arms did they begin to realize fully the lofty responsibility to protect the sovereign state.

They Serve in Izyaslav

Encircled with a ribbon of fences, a military Spetsnaz unit is located in the area of Izyaslav, a city on the Goryn River (a tributary of the Pripyat), which divides it into two parts—the old city and the new. There have been human settlements on the territory of the modern rayon center for a very long time. There are differences of opinion among scholars, however, pertaining to the appearance of Izyaslav itself. Some historians feel that its emergence is connected with the activity of Prince Vladimir when he, splitting off one of the largest Slavic settlements at the time on the Goryn River at the end of the 10th century for the rule of his son Izyaslav, made it the center of an allotment named Izyaslavl, that is, belonging to Izyaslav.

Archaeologist M.K. Karger confirms that Izyaslav was founded by Prince Izyaslav Mstislavovich sometime in the second half of the 12th century along the flow of the Guski River not far from the modern settlement of Gorodishche (Shepetovskiy Rayon). The Tatars destroyed that settlement in 1241, and it was not rebuilt. In the opinion of M.K. Karger, a new populated area had already been built on the Goryn River at the end of the 13th century. Documents have recorded different names for it at various times—Izyaslavl (13th century) and Zaslavl, Zaslavl and Izyaslav (14th—20th centuries).

The 15th—16th centuries were anxious and not peaceful. The Tatars fell upon the Volyn every 10—20 years. Tatar attacks on Izyaslav were recorded in 1491, along with battles under the city walls between Polish troops and Tatars in 1534 and 1577.

The Red Army began the battle to liberate the Podolia region in the summer of 1920. The battles for Izyaslav were led by the brigade of G.I. Kotovskiy. The renowned brigade commander wrote about the details of the liberation of the city thus: "Having given the horses a rest, we fell upon the city of Izyaslav at night, and after a pitched battle we drove the enemy from the new city. The enemy retreated to the left bank, blowing up the city behind him... The pursuit was impossible to continue, as the enemy settled into his fortresses." Izyaslav was finally liberated in the second half of November 1920.

Nikolay Ostrovskiy worked as the secretary of the Izyaslavskiy Rayon Committee from January to November 1924. The Izyaslav residents honor the memory of the writer. An ardent Ostrovskiy-Korchagin stands at the center of the modern city, the building in which the writer lived and worked has been preserved and a secondary school has been given his name.

Severe tests fell to the lot of Izyaslav during the Great Patriotic War. The city was occupied by the Hitlerites on 5 Jul 41. They destroyed about 16,000 peaceful inhabitants of the city and adjoining villages, and shipped about 1,200 young men and women to Germany. The fascists created a concentration camp for prisoners of war on the outskirts of Izyaslav.

The brutality of the Hitlerites, however, did not shake the courage of the people and their unbounded faith in victory over the enemy. Battles started in February of 1944 for the liberation of Izyaslav that were a shining example of the close interaction of the army and partisan detachments.

Today the Izyaslav where the Spetsnaz troops are servicing is a cultural and industrial center of Khmelnitskiy Oblast.

We Can Bear Any Cause

I visited the brigade on the day that the young soldiers were taking the sacred oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. I felt true pride for the people who treasure the fact that they have occasion to serve in a city with a rich combat and labor history.

The brigade had been drawn up since the designated early morning time in drill formation on the parade ground. The young soldiers looked with emotion at the unit colors, covered with the unfading glory of those who had honored the collective with valiant military service during the days of peace.

An excursion into the past: The brigade was formed up in December of 1962. It took part in the Dnieper field maneuvers literally five years later at full strength. Six groups operated in the "enemy" rear and uncovered 25 important targets of the hypothetical enemy. Officers V. Sevostyanov, Ye. Pikhovkin and V. Vorobyev, Sergeant A. Detchuk and Privates 1st Class V. Melnichuk and I. Varchuk, among others, distinguished themselves therein. The collective was awarded the Commemorative Banner of the Military Council of the PrikVO [Carpathian Military District] that same year for high marks in combat training and strong military discipline.

The Dunay operation conducted on the territory of Czechoslovakia, along with the Vesna-75, Zapad-81, Dozor-86 and Osen-88 exercises, have been genuine tests of the maturity of the personnel.

And now in the ringing silence resounded the command, "Brigade, attention!"

The hand of the brigade commander flew to his temple. "Begin taking of military oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine!"

The sharp lines of the sacred oath sounded in strict and solemn fashion: "I, Shevchenko Sergiy Pavlovych, enter into military service and solemnly swear to the people of Ukraine always to be loyal and faithful to them, conscientiously and honestly fulfill my soldier's duties and the orders of commanders, steadfastly observe the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, preserve state and military secrecy..."

Private Sergey Shevchenko takes the oath. He is from the village of Novaya Pokrovka in Chuguevskiy Rayon of Kharkov Oblast. Before the army he completed eight years of school and professional-technical schooling. He was working at a plant. He had dreamed of serving in the assault forces.

Company commander Captain Aleksandr Kotenko commands, "Form ranks!"

"Ranks formed!"—there is in the voice of Private Sergey Shevchenko, as all the rest of his compatriots who took the oath today, a readiness to serve independent Ukraine conscientiously. The recruits have already been able to realize the profound sense and strictness of army procedure, and have gained their first skills in handling combat weapons. The unit commander, Colonel Pavel Davidyuk, addresses the Spetsnaz troops: "Soldiers! On this unforgettable day, with weapon in hand and before your fellow servicemen, commanders, relatives and representatives of the local authorities, you have taken the military oath and solemnly sworn loyalty to independent Ukraine. Henceforth you have become its full-fledged protectors. I congratulate the young soldiers on taking the oath, and all the personnel on the new reinforcements! Master your combat specialties diligently! Vigilantly and reliably protect the peaceful labor of your people. Multiply the honored traditions of the unit everywhere and in everything!"

Excursion into the past: The 3rd Battalion, which carried out combat operations on the territory of Afghanistan, occupies a special place in the annals of the military affairs of the brigade's collective. It was formed up in 1985 in the city of Izyaslav. It began combat operations to cover the state border of the Republic of Afghanistan with Pakistan.

Servicemen of the subunit were caught by the shoulder-fired Stinger air-defense missile system and the Oerlikon automatic anti-aircraft gun for the first time in 1987.

The Spetsnaz troops carried out 650 combat missions, 473 reconnaissance sorties and organized 645 ambushes and 4 raids over the three years they were in Afghanistan. More than 700 officers, warrant officers, NCOs and enlisted men of the battalion received decorations and medals for courage and valor displayed therein.

The group of Senior Lieutenant O. Onishchuk engaged a group of mujahedin numbering about 200 men on 31 Oct 87. Junior Sergeant R. Sidorenko and Privates O. Ivanov, I. Moskalenko, E. Salakhiyev, Ya. Muradov and A. Furman died in that battle with weapons in hand.

Reconnaissance officer Onishchuk and Junior Sergeant Islamov, having fired all their ammunition and not wanting to surrender to the enemy, blew themselves up with grenades, destroying thirteen mujahedin at the same time.

The subordinates of Captain Ya. Goroshko were sent to aid the group of Senior Lieutenant Onishchuk. The situation proved to be extremely grave. The battle repeatedly turned into hand-to-hand combat. The victory went to the Spetsnaz troops.

The order of Hero of the Soviet Union for courage and valor displayed in the performance of their internationalist duty was conferred upon Captain (today Major) Ya. Goroshko, Senior Lieutenant O. Onishchuk (posthumously) and Junior Sergeant Yu. Islamov (posthumously).

Today 47 officers and warrant officers who had passed through the combat cauldron of Afghanistan are serving in the brigade. An absolute majority of them set an example in the training and indoctrination of subordinates, transfer combat experience to their comrades in service and take active part in military-patriotic indoctrination of the young. Officers Kirillov, Yershov, Karpenko, Mazur, Prokin, Strizh, Matsyuk, Kozharskiy, Nazarov, Miklashevskiy, Manyshev, Shebyrev, Timoshchuk, Ostanets, Yastrebov and Krutnikov and Warrant Officers Temezhinskiy, Oleynik, Kuka and Litovchenko, among others, have earned the respect of the collective for their martial labors.

The National Anthem, "Ukraine Has Not Yet Died," was sounding. The soldiers passed before the podium in precisely marked steps. Ahead of them lies intensive combat training and everyday military labor. And the reconnaissance troops of the special-purpose forces, however harsh the tests on their difficult army path, are filled with determination to bear them with honor and to justify with their model service the lofty trust that has been placed in them by the people of Ukraine.

Spot-interviews with the young soldiers:

Private Dmitriy Rozhkov. Native of Dnepropetrovsk. Completed eight years of school and SPTU [agricultural professional-technical school]. Has dreamed of serving in the marines: "The commonality of the tasks we are facing and a passionate desire to multiply the honored

traditions of our predecessors have been cultivated in us young soldiers since the first days of our arrival in the army."

Private Sergey Chumank—son of a steel founder. He himself worked at the Azovstal Combine: "I am glad that I will be serving in an honored unit. They have received us warmly. One feels that it is a friendly collective here. We have already been to the brigade museum and gotten familiar with its traditions. I am convinced that it is not all that simple to become a good soldier. You have to learn a great deal. I will try."

Private Sergey Antonyuk is from Zhitomir. He has special sentiments. And how! His mother Larisa Valentinovna and his sisters Olya and Liza came to the ceremony with him. Here is what he said: "I had to start my service, it seemed, with small details—learning how to make up the bed and march properly. Now I understand that this is important and essential to the soldier. Our squad commander, Sergeant Yakovlev, tells and shows everything in detail. Older comrades often come to help."

Private Andrey Pisarnik, after the tenth grade, studied at the Kiev Technological Institute of the Food Industry: "Of course, a great deal is new to us today. The platoon commander advised us in a conversation 'energetically copy everything that you are taught at the classes...' That is what I will do. I felt the sturdiness of the soldier's formation, where we walk shoulder to shoulder."

Private Aleksandr Malyshko from the town of Mironovskiy in Donetsk Oblast comes from a working family. And it is not important that distance separates father and son, and that there is now a difference in the types of activity. The elder works at a plant, the younger is a soldier. They are nonetheless in the same formation, at the same line, since they are fulfilling a common task. The former, having walked the roads of the soldier for three years, is now creating and multiplying the wealth of sovereign Ukraine. The latter, having undergone labor tempering along with his father Vasiliy Grigoryevich at the plant, will as of today be protecting the labor of the father and standing on guard for peace: "We young soldiers have already been told more than once by the commanders why we must fulfill orders and instructions strictly in the army," says Private Aleksandr Malyshko. "We have been studying the provisions of the draft regulations for the armed forces of Ukraine. Their sense coincides with the instructions of our parents—be honest and disciplined, and obey the commanders in everything..."

A Reliable Generation

The unit command speaks in complimentary fashion of the new replacements.

Colonel Pavel Davidyuk, brigade commander: "Solid youth have come in. They are physically fit, literate and erudite. You could go through thick and thin with such people, as they say. But they have to be trained for it.

That means that it is a matter for the instructors. And they, I am sure, will not let us down."

Lieutenant-Colonel Vladimir Yermolenko, assistant commander of the unit for personnel work: "When young fellows come into the service, they look at the army with lively eyes filled with curiosity. But the service, as is well known, the more so in the Spetsnaz troops, requires excellent health, endurance and the ability to adapt to a harsh existence. And it is not that easy to hit it off with one's fellow servicemen by nature.

"The time that has passed since their arrival in the unit has shown that the young soldiers are growing confidently into their new situation. And we understand for our part that the soldier's heart must be kindled, and then it becomes stronger than iron."

Lieutenant-Colonel Pavel Solovyev, chief of staff of the brigade: "I am especially impressed by the fact that the new recruits have an understanding attitude toward the necessity of creating our own armed forces in the Ukraine. In conversations each of them absolutely expressed his desire to serve as befits a soldier of sovereign Ukraine. And that is of no small importance..."

Brief information. One hundred percent of the personnel in the unit are Ukrainian and speak their native tongue. All of the officers have higher education, and six of them have completed military academies.

The collective completed the past training year with an overall evaluation of "good." There were 10,054 parachute jumps made, including eight hundred and sixteen from AN-12 aircraft and two hundred and seventeen at night, for the first time in the twenty-two years of existence of the brigade.

The companies of Captain S. Akim, the platoons of Captain G. Gontar and Senior Lieutenants S. Proshin and I. Tsarilnik and Lieutenant N. Shermanov and the squads of Sergeants A. Bokov, A. Mizev, S. Smirnov and V. Lapshin, among others, were excellent.

The author of these lines talked with many of the parents who came to their sons' holiday. They returned home with confidence that their children are under the reliable wing of skilled educators.

Independence Must Be Protected

Remarks of the representative of the President of Ukraine for Izyaslavskiy Rayon, Anton Ivanovich Tostanovskyy, and the head of the Izyaslavskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, Vasiliy Omelyanovich Trots.

The question of creating a Ukrainian Army is the cornerstone at the foundation of the independence of the state. Taking into account the experience of the historical development of Ukraine and the continuous aggression and occupation of Ukrainian lands, the young Ukrainian state must not, proceeding from humane principles, remain unarmed. But we also cannot reject

the possibility of the development of events in such a way that a totalitarian regime replaces the democratic order among our neighbors, and that some newly appeared "führer" says to his supporters: those Ukrainian lands there, rich in grain, sausage and sugar, go and take what you want...

The existence of an army is impossible without its ideology—the spiritual factor that unites the soldiers. The idea of the state independence of Ukraine and service to its people was that ideological factor for the riflemen of the Ukrainian Galician Army, the army of the UNR and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, while the slogan of the UPA—"Freedom to peoples, freedom is the people"—has become the final expression of that idea. Here is exactly the spring that must nourish the soul of the young fellows who have sworn their loyalty to the people of Ukraine today.

The holiday concluded with demonstration exercises by the Spetsnaz troops. It spilled over into a brilliant demonstration of the mastery, power, dexterity and boldness of the soldiers in the unit.

Crimea Military Commissar on Spring Call-Up

92UM1366F Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
30 Jul 92 p 1

[Interview with Republic of the Crimea Military Commissar Major-General Aleksandr Petrovich Volkov by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Nikitenko, under the rubric: "On the Draft Results": "Republic of the Crimea Military Commissar Major-General Aleksandr Petrovich Volkov: 'Crimea Will not Remain in Debt'"]

[Text] Few people in Crimea's republic military commissariat counted on this year's spring draft being successful. There were quite a few reasons for doubt. The political struggle surrounding the peninsula's independence, the republic Supreme Soviet's rather well-known decision, and then the moratorium on it, the hullabaloo surrounding the story with General Kuznetsov—all of that left its special imprint on the course of the draft. And despite that, the military commissariat fulfilled 100.7 of the quota. How did it manage to achieve that?

That's what our conversation with Republic of Crimea Military Commissar Major-General A. Volkov was about.

[Nikitenko] Aleksandr Petrovich, previously they would have called this the experience of military commissariat work under extreme conditions. But how do you yourself assess that success?

[Volkov] Maybe it is early to talk about experience but the conditions actually turned out to be specific and we had to find a solution. We found it together. All the more so that everyone who wasn't lazy heated up the passions surrounding the draft. Some newspapers, first of all

KRIMSKAYA PRAVDA, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, and the RDK [Republic Movement of Crimea] had their say and demanded that Crimea residents serve only in Crimea. We also didn't get by without picketing of the induction center. Veterans participated in the picketing who it turned out did not have either sons or grandsons leaving for service in the army. You can easily guess what brought them there.

[Nikitenko] What did the picketers demand?

[Volkov] I already said that, to leave the draftees in the Crimea. Furthermore, a rumor was circulating that many conscripts would be sent to serve in Western Ukraine. They asserted that there the attitude toward Crimean residents was not the best.

[Nikitenko] How did the military commissariat react?

[Volkov] Here we need to take into account that we primarily sent the Russian-speaking population. Therefore, we enlisted the support of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense that no one would end up serving in the western oblasts of Ukraine. And that's how it was. Section Second Chief Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Ivanovich Ivantsov and I had the opportunity to talk to many people about that. We even talked to the press.

[Nikitenko] If you can, please tell me more about that moment.

[Volkov] Many parents were worried about where we would send their children. In order to calm them, we resorted to that step. We published information of a unique type of order in the mass media: how many conscripts we would send and to which oblasts of Ukraine we would send them.

[Nikitenko] Did that eliminate the tension?

[Volkov] Not entirely. I had to speak on local television twice more. And still on the eve of dispatching the first conscripts, the Republic Movement of Crimea called me and said: "We will picket the draft". In response, I proposed that we meet and talk about everything. They agreed, indeed, they expressed the fear that there would not be places for everyone. The meeting turned out to be useful but the RDK leaders did not reject their idea. The picketing occurred but did not produce results. A clergyman blessed the conscripts for service. I will frankly say that his parting words played a larger role than the many appeals.

[Nikitenko] Aleksandr Petrovich, but where did they send the Crimean residents to serve?

[Volkov] One in four is serving in the Black Sea Fleet, 52 percent are in Odessa Military District. Some of the young men of Tatar nationality are serving in construction units. They will erect homes for settlers. Thus, there will be a "Tatar" stroybat [construction battalion] in the Crimea. It's possible that it will help to solve the housing problem for returning Tatars...

[Nikitenko] The problem of "refuseniks" and those who are evading service always worried military commissariats of all levels. Did you manage to solve it?

[Volkov] Unfortunately, no. I am not certain that anyone could in general manage to do that today. The fact is that conscripts' liability for failure to appear has been reduced. Matters are worse for us in the port cities, like Kerch, Yalta, and Simferopol's Kievskiy Rayon.

[Nikitenko] What is the cause of that alarming trend?

[Volkov] First of all—the unwillingness to serve outside the Crimea. Second, isn't it strange—the negative impact of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers and the parents themselves. Based on the results of the spring draft, 143 people did not appear at the induction center without valid reasons. If the law enforcement organs took a more decisive position, that number would certainly be less. Now we are sending lads to serve in the Ukrainian Army.

[Nikitenko] Did many conscripts express a desire to end up in the Black Sea Fleet?

[Volkov] There were more who desired to do that in the initial period of the draft. But after the Presidential Decree appeared on the new terms of service in the navy, the number significantly declined. We sent a total of more than 1,000 men to the Black Sea Fleet. But there were still more who desired to serve there.

[Nikitenko] Did the local authorities and republic people's deputies assist the military commissariat's work?

[Volkov] I want to say some kind words to Crimean Council of Ministers Representative and Conscription Commission Chairman Tatyana Aleksandrovna Krasikova. It would seem that a woman, who is far removed from military matters, could not render substantial assistance. But she disproved that opinion. She attended every conscription commission session, delved into all of the details, and was no less worried than we were that the draft might be disrupted. Those people who did not allocate transportation on time to ship out the new recruits caught hell from her. For this, we are filled with deep respect for her.

Unfortunately, far from everyone acted that way. While speaking recently at a Crimean Supreme Soviet session on the results of the draft, I had to frankly state that not a single republic people's deputy visited the induction center or spoke to the draftees, although, as you understand me, there was an urgent need to do that.

[Nikitenko] But anyway, you managed to surmount, let's put it this way, the public sentiment associated with the draft. Did the mass media assist or impede you in this?

[Volkov] Some impeded and others, on the contrary, assisted. I already said that we reported in some newspapers that the draftees would serve in the central oblasts of Ukraine and we cited the specific number. And suddenly FLAG RODINY stated, using the words of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers appeal: "They will send

Crimea residents to serve in Western Ukraine and on contaminated territory". It was a good thing that I was in Sevastopol on that day. I immediately rushed to the editorial office. My appearance there caused astonishment. The editor frankly admitted—you are the first military commissar who has visited us without an invitation. However, they still published an interview with an explanation of where the draftees would serve.

At that time, KRIMSKAYA PRAVDA poured oil into the fire when it published that Crimea residents were allegedly deserting from the army. In fact, everything was far from what their Correspondent Lebedev had written. We determined that later. But that is a subject for another conversation.

[Nikitenko] So, do you have any "deserters" or not?

[Volkov] Why not? There are some. We are not alone in that regard. But you know what trend I have noted while talking with them? The majority are returning to serve in the Crimea. Well, quite recently I had the opportunity to talk with two young soldiers who are from Alushta. "Why," I asked, "did you run away? Did anyone beat you?" "No," they answered in one voice, "We want to serve at home." I have to explain to these lads that home for them today is all of Ukraine. Although I will frankly say that soldiers from these lads frequently turn out to be good-for-nothing. I know that from my own experience and already by local standards. Many of them think that everything they do will go unpunished. Of course, it cannot continue that way.

[Nikitenko] Maybe, weakened health is the cause of that psychological unpreparedness!

[Volkov] Of course, that also has an impact. Judge for yourself, as of today 10 percent of the conscripts are recognized as unsuitable for military service. The number of those who are discovered as having a psychological illness is increasing. In a word, our emerging socio-psychological service has quite a bit of work to do. I would like for our doctors to have more modern diagnostic equipment.

But the socio-political situation in which future soldiers live and are educated is no less important. Here, for example is this fact. Young men from rural locations, where there is no incitement of political passions, more willingly go to serve in the army. That is how things stand in Pervomayskiy, Razdolinskiy, Chernomorskiy, and Sudakskiy rayons. And, on the contrary, the picture is frequently different in the major cities. Here is what still concerns me about that. As you know, the Crimea is a special region, a resort area. Therefore its possible that recently more young men have become parasites here. After graduating from school, some young men prefer to conduct a beach-carousing life style instead of finding a job. It is easy to guess what kind of education they are receiving. Of course, they are not enticed by army service. And nevertheless, we have to work with all of these categories of conscripts.

[Nikitenko] Hasn't the number of those who are willing to enter military schools been reduced as a result of that?

[Volkov] No, not here. The best trained young men are entering the schools. We have fulfilled 150 percent of the quota determined by the Ministry of Defense. Many young men have expressed a desire to enter Simferopol Higher Military Construction School.

[Nikitenko] Aleksandr Petrovich, We have just to thank you for the informative conversation and to express the hope that the success achieved by the military commissariat was not random.

[Volkov] Thank you.

PVO Commander Discusses Possible Fusion With Air Force

92UM1366C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
31 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Gorenko: "Responsible for the Sky: Today the Ukrainian Armed Forces Aviation and PVO Are Equally Responsible. However, the Service Commanders Have Different Views on the Organization of Defense of the Airspace"]

[Text] The Ukrainian PVO [Air Defense] Troops Commander and Military Council conducted a press conference for republic newspaper journalists. Before it began, the newspapermen were shown a PVO command post: representatives of the press, guests who had never previously been there, were in a unique building filled with the most modern electronic equipment. It made an enormous impression! Imagine: we saw with our own eyes the movement of aircraft over all of Europe on an enormous screen...

During the press conference, the issue of the possible merger of the PVO troops and aviation into a single service of the Armed Forces was specifically discussed. Today, we can assume that conversations on that theme are being constantly conducted and with a great deal of concern both among aviators and among PVO Troops personnel. Because the parties are insisting on fundamentally different approaches to the organization of the defense of Ukraine's airspace...

Carpathian Military District 14th Air Army Commander Major-General V. Antonets sent his proposals on planning the defense of Ukraine to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense and State Security Issues. The Supreme Soviet Commission sent the proposals to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for conclusions. They were made, including by the PVO Troops command authorities. We will discuss that below. But for now—the essence of the aviators' proposals.

It consists of repelling possible aggression based on three variations. The aviators suggest that the enemy can initiate combat operations, **first of all**, suddenly, while

conducting an offensive air operation to inflict maximum losses on the aircraft formation, missile troops, and PVO; **second**, a definite concealed period of preparation with the deployment of highly-mobile formations of ground forces units can precede the initiation of combat operations; and, **third**, a period for involving the armed forces of interested states in an internal military conflict can precede the initiation of large-scale combat operations.

As is apparent from the proposals, the aviation command authorities propose, regardless of the variation for the initiation of a war, that **aviation will play the primary role in conducting strikes against the enemy**. The PVO Troops must reliably carry out their main task—to cover the troops, facilities and territory of the state.

The proposals substantiate the thought that **fighter aviation must invariably be part of the aviation formation as an element of the air defense troops and will provide "cover and support of ground troops and, the main thing, combat operations of strike aviation in the air but it has been transferred to the PVO** (emphasis mine—N.G.).

The thought has also been expressed that the "planning of a defensive air operation and the organization of combat operations must be carried out under the leadership of the air defense troops commander with all air forces, rocket forces, and PVO troops subordinate to him".

The assumption is reduced to the fact that the air defense troops must organizationally consist of four air corps, that is, all aviation, even including the aviation that is in the PVO Troops today, must be concentrated in command hands alone.

As far as I could judge from Ukrainian PVO Troops Commander Lieutenant-General Lopatin's response at the press conference, the PVO command authorities do not entirely agree with the aviators' proposals. They have their own view on organizing the defense of the airspace. It is remarkable that the "Kontseptsiya oborony i stroitelstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Ukrayny" [The Ukrainian Armed Forces Defense and Structural Development Concept], that has been approved by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, in the section which states which services the Ukrainian Armed Forces will have, states: **The Airspace Defense Troops and not the Air Defense Troops** as the aviators interpret it.

On just what do the PVO leadership and the aviators disagree?

You can judge that based on the document that was sent under Ukrainian PVO Troops Commander Lieutenant-General M. Lopatin's signature to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and to the chairman of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Permanent Commission on Defense and State Security Issues. The document is the point of view

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of the PVO Troops command authority on Major-General Antonov's views that were set forth in the proposals that were sent to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Commission.

The document which, in my view, you can call the concept for building the defense of Ukrainian airspace, stressed that "**blind copying of the structures of the West and the United States**" is present in the aviators' proposals which "**at the present time is not suitable for Ukraine and is a big mistake**". Since "**the airborne enemy for the NATO countries and Ukraine are fundamentally different in composition and combat capabilities and the United States practically does not have an airborne enemy**".

The concept provides a response to the proposed variations of the initiation of war based on the aviators views and, correspondingly, the assessment of their proposals for building Ukraine's air defense. Specifically, the following was stated as a fundamental objection:

"Three possible variations for unleashing war are examined in General V. Antonets' proposals and variations for repelling aggression are planned based upon them in which aviation will play the decisive role, in the author's opinion. But he did not consider the following.

"Knowing the combat capabilities of modern air and sea-based offensive weapons, can we hope that the enemy will deploy his strike formations within range of our weapons. The experience of recent wars confirms that the attacking side prefers to operate from remote areas when possible where opposition is minimal.

"No one has longed for bayonet charges for a long time now. Therefore, we can say with certainty that the initiation of any aggression will be concluded not in a ground attack, like in the past, but in an air electronic-weapons invasion along the entire depth of the territory of the state. Ground formations and assault forces will be introduced into engagements only after superiority has been won in the air.

"Under this method of initiating a war, the first attack will rain down not on ground formations but on the forces that are designated to combat air attack weapons (the PVO Troops, Air Force Fighter Aviation, and Naval PVO).

"It is these forces that must assume the responsibility for repelling the first surprise attack of the airborne enemy for the sake of an organized initiation of combat operations and the war on the whole. There is no alternative to it. No other armed forces services men and equipment can carry out these tasks."

The concept also provides an assessment of other variations for the initiation of war based on the aviators' views. For example, it states that another variation for the initiation of war is entirely possible. This is a war that has been unleashed by a coalition of states as it was in Iraq as long as the military-political situation in the

world continues to remain unstable and changeable. A military crisis can arise suddenly, like an avalanche, and unpredictably. In that case, the role of strike aviation to disrupt aggression in the initial period of war can generally be excluded since the targets can be beyond the range of our weapons. And in that case, repelling aircraft and remotely piloted vehicle strikes will become a priority task of the defensive forces that combat the airborne enemy.

At the press conference, journalists, in their own circle, expressed a fear for the future existence of the PVO Troops in the event the aviators' proposals are adopted as the basis for organizing Ukraine's defensive airspace. In my view, the fears are not groundless. The experience of military history teaches us that the PVO is an independent service of the Armed Forces. PVO is the 4,500 aircraft that were shot down in Vietnam. It is also obvious that this service can exist without aviation. It is no less obvious that aviation, with the presence of several variations for the initiation of war, is actually not capable of carrying out all defense tasks. Let's add protection and cover of strategic targets on our territory which the PVO performs and it will become obvious that the merger of the two services of the Armed Forces, all the more hasty, is not in the interests of combat readiness.

The resolution of the issue is for the highest state and government leadership. We must hope that the leadership understands: the sky over Ukraine—is the same for all of us. And our aviation and our PVO must defend it, if necessary, without any division of service whatsoever based on departmental interests...

New Crimean Army Commander Designated

92UM1380A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 31 Jul 92 p 3

[News release from NEGA: "Crimea," under the rubric "NEGA Reports.]

[Text] The struggle of the Republican Movement of Crimea and other public organizations of the peninsula for restoring Major General Valeriy Kuznetsov to his position as commander of the 32nd Crimean Army Corps did not meet with success. Kuznetsov has been retired from military duty by order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine.

Major General Viktor Paliy has been designated commander of the 32nd Crimean Army Corps. In addition to the army corps, there are around ten military garrisons on the peninsula. In the past their commanders were subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the Odessa Military District. Now, by order of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Viktor Paliy has been appointed the senior military commander for Crimean garrisons. All commanders of garrisons of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Crimea will be subordinate to him. This was done, according to the press service of the Ukrainian

Ministry of Defense, with the goal of strengthening garrison duty, order, and organization in carrying out garrison functions.

Ukraine Accused of Papering Over Problems Connected with Formation of Army

*92UM1427B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 27 Aug 92 p 7*

[Article by Major Grigoriy Nesmyanovich: "An Apartment for an Officer, Kiev-Style"]

[Text] Imagine for a minute that you are an officer and you are serving in Timbuktu. And suddenly an unexpected and extremely rare opportunity appears for you to return to the Homeland, there where your parents live and where you yourself lived and studied at one time. Well, tell me, who would refuse that?

That is the first reason why the pack your suitcase sentiments situation is being spontaneously created for tens of thousands of officers (there are traditionally many Ukrainians among them) in units today.

There is another reason for the yearning for Ukraine: the promises of social guarantees that are sweet to the ear of the harassed "bums in uniform", on the one hand and, on the other hand—substantiated and unsubstantiated rumors on the closing of borders, deportations, etc.

Promises are like any other promises, but there is a reality that exists, no matter how much you brush it away.

From the report of the Assistant to the President of Ukraine for Military Issues Lieutenant-General B. Sharikov on behalf of the president:

At the beginning of 1992, housing had not been provided to 60,000 servicemen's families. Furthermore, another 20,000 who have been released into the reserve do not have housing.

The number of servicemen without apartments may reach 150,000 while considering the troop withdrawals from Germany and Poland, the Baltic states and the Transcaucasus, and the return of officers from Russia to Ukraine.

And here is an even fresher document:

From the report of Major-General D. Rudkovskiy, chief of capital construction and troop quartering, already on behalf of Lieutenant-General B. Sharikov:

An extremely difficult situation with the financing of work on construction of housing and supporting top-priority tasks for the social protection of servicemen in 1992 has developed at the present time at the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. The Ukrainian Ministry of the Economy has allocated 1.2 billion rubles to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for these purposes, capital investment in 1991 prices with a conversion coefficient

of 1.93 from 1984 prices. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense needs a total of R20 billion for financing as a result of the liberalization of prices for material-technical resources and suppliers demands... and also the increase of the coefficient based on 1984 prices by a factor of 20 to obtain current prices.

So, already right now the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense construction complex does not have the resources to cover expenditures to carry out the housing program.

City and oblast soviet ispolkoms [executive committees] require an immediate transfer of additional resources...

So, Kiev City Soviet... through its decision No 30 dated 15 January and its letter dated 16 March demanded the transfer of R1.2 billion within three days, which exceeds the capital investments allocated for these purposes by a factor of 16.4.

In the process, the Ministry of Defense is categorically warning ispolkoms about excluding construction from the plan...

Being in a difficult financial situation, military builders have been forced to turn to state and commercial banks to obtain credits at any, frequently one-sided, terms...

There are two factors here on which it is worthwhile to focus attention. Let's begin with the fact that right now all of the Ukrainian press is very attentively and passionately following each step in the infrastructure development of the Ukrainian Army. However, you can barely find that type of information in the newspapers. Television is also trying not to splash out the negative about the army (as it was six months ago). Moreover, a directly polar change of course has occurred. Well, by way of illustration, the subject of an assault company is in the news. Lads in camouflage uniforms demonstrate methods from tae kwon do and the ability to throw small sapper shovels at a target. Several months ago that subject would have been commented on approximately as follows: "The people of Ukraine have no guarantees that these shovels will not be used against unarmed women and the elderly..." Now everything is the reverse: "Ukraine can sleep peacefully—it has its own army and its own defenders."

It would be worthwhile for one quite nice female announcer from "Ukrainian Television News" to say a not quite smooth sentence about the naval officers who have deserted from the Black Sea Fleet in order to take the oath at Kreshchatika with pomp as it has long since disappeared from all programs.

The second factor: the situation with the construction of homes for the military is actually serious. The percentage of servicemen without apartments certainly exceeds all previously established records. It would seem that there is an entirely logical course: using diplomacy, stop or extend the process of the influx of officers from Russian military districts to Ukraine. That largely meets the interests of the Russian Army. But this is what the

Ukrainian Army's Chief Personnel Officer General Ignatenko says about that: "The CIS Unified Armed Forces military leadership, let's put it this way, says a lot but does little. Everyone knows that we signed a document on the procedures for exchanging officers between Ukraine and Russia at the highest level in Kiev on 2 May 1992... In accordance with the agreement, the Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate prepared lists and sent them to Moscow and to the appropriate military districts. One and a half months have passed. During that time, several hundred officers have come home but we are anticipating thousands... Let's take the Transcaucasus. Of the 3,000 officers who wanted to return to Ukraine, 214 men have returned... What is that but a conscious slowing of the process of creating the Ukrainian Army?"

Of course, the fact here is not that the problems of specific units and subunits are not entirely clear to General Ignatenko. As a military man, he can hardly not understand that we cannot process the requests of thousands of officers in an instant—which means to practically plunge into chaos dozens of companies and battalions and regimental and division services precisely in those hot spots where there is already enough foolishness and blood. Where is the wild resistance between the motley political groups and the army, no matter what you call it—the Russian or the "CIS" Army that is perhaps the only thing keeping us from civil war...

So, why bridle already harried military personnel, and why do we need to prompt them to hasty decisions?

Have you seen, Pan General (that is how a journalist addresses him in a cited interview), how Kiev greets those who dream of serving in Ukraine? In order to just call up the required service in the Ministry of Defense at the residence permit bureau, you need to stand in a line for about two hours. The requests from volunteers from other military districts are generally transferred to the stadium. Housing—and that is the main thing—will be desolate for the next five year plan and maybe the next two.

The supreme power is seeking a solution. So far, it hasn't thought up anything new. Having legislated a unique military budget even for the militaristically minded Soviet power, it recently officially announced a multi-million currency emission. Certainly a large percentage of this mass of money will go to cover the needs of the Ministry of Defense construction complex. Add soot to the army's and state's problems and the impending armed forces reductions. Already right now it is completely clear: many, very many, officers and warrant officers will soon sense the delights of a quite dubious policy.

BELARUS

Criminal Charges Brought Against Belarus Officers

924C2269B Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 22 Aug 92 Morning edition p 2

[Article by *IZVESTIYA* correspondent Mikhail Shiman-skiy: "For What Were the Guards Generals Punished?"]

[Text] Minsk—*IZVESTIYA* reports that criminal charges have been brought against the command staff of the 5th Tank Army, stationed in Belarus, for abuse of service position and theft of technical military equipment and other property.

Unfortunately, neither the Press Center of Belarus's Ministry of Defense nor the military prosecutor's office will say how much damage was done to the state and the armed forces by the corrupt group of officers, including higher command staff. The military department, it appears, is doing everything possible to keep from "airing its dirty linen in public." The affair is such a scandal that the entire republic is talking about it today. The 5th Tank Army (in which the corruption and theft of military property flourished) is famous and bears the Guards title. The case involves, among other things, the construction not just of dachas but of private villas for the generals. They were built by enlisted men using materials belonging to the military units. Military equipment and property were sold "on the side." Scarce products were stolen from army depots.

As a result Lt Gen S. Rumyantsev, 5th Army commander, Col V. Ivanitskiy, deputy commander for rear services of the 7th Tank Army, and others have been recommended for discharge into the reserve even before the investigation has ended.

In Belarus they say that the generals' uniforms have been taken to the cleaners. But are they being cleaned? Personally, I doubt it. My reason? That determined cover-up of figures and data on the damage done to the army and the state by the high-ranking military personnel.

Group Protests Loyalty Oath in Belarus

92UM1427C Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian 29 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by Valeriy Kovalov and Pavel Chernenko: "The Belarusian Army Will Swear to the Republic on 31 December but a Symbolic Oath Has Already Appeared"]

[Text] The Belarusian Council of Ministers has adopted a decree on the republic Armed Forces military oath. The government agreed with the Ministry of Defense proposal to administer the oath to the troops on 31 December 1992.

The military department has been tasked to develop the new text of the oath and the draft provision on the procedures to take it. The Council of Ministers proposed

that the questions about the approval of the text of the oath and administering it to all servicemen on 31 December be included on the agenda for the Belarusian parliament's fall session.

But forces have already appeared right now who are expressing their nonconcurrence with this decision. The Belarusian Servicemen's Association board, which is dissatisfied with the fact that the administration of the new oath will be delayed until the end of 1992, is among them. While attempting to influence the parliament's decision, the organization has planned to conduct a rally in Minsk on 8 September and to take a symbolic oath of allegiance to Belarus during the rally.

Actions of Servicemen's Union Seen as Unconstitutional

92UM1467A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Valeriy Kovalev and Pavel Chernenko: "Who Benefits From Inflaming Passions"]

[Text] The closer we come to 8 September, the day the radical Belarusian Servicemen's Union (abbreviated to BZV in the Belarusian language) has declared a holiday of military glory to commemorate the anniversary of the victory over the army... of Muscovy at Orsha in 1514, the more political passions are becoming inflamed. The servicemen's union intends to schedule the taking of their military oath on that day.

In connection with this the newspaper of the republic's Ministry of Defense, VO SLAVU RODINY, has published an article by Col L. Privalov, deputy chairman of the Commission for National Security of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus, in which the BZV's action is termed unconstitutional and anti-state. It has been reported to us at the press center of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus that the leadership of the military department agrees with this assessment.

Sadly, there are forces in Belarus which would like to drive a wedge between the two fraternal peoples. It is therefore highly important to assess the action for what it is.

BALTIC STATES

Deputy Defense Minister Views Current Problems
92UN2006A Riga RIGAS BALSS in Latvian
7 August p 8

[Interview with Colonel Dainis Turlais, Latvian Deputy Defense Minister, by Maris Kaspars: "Dainis Turlais: Intelligence, Elegance, Experience"]

[Text] Intelligence, elegance, experience and inexhaustible energy in the creation of the Latvian Republican armed forces. Measures taken by the Ministry of Defense lead us to the conclusion that this man embodies such

qualities as poise, speech, and an attitude toward his subordinates, which make it possible to call him a real officer and gentleman, a truly humane person. Apparently, the Latvian Army so far cannot aspire to have the status of a civilized armed forces. However, we realize that it is only a matter of time if our armed forces have commanders like Dainis Turlais.

A short reference: Colonel Dainis Turlais, the commander of Latvian Republican defense forces, was born in Madona, attended school in Trikata and graduated from the Valmiera Viestura high school. In 1969, he became a cadet in the Leningrad Higher Common Arms School. After graduation in 1973, he served in Moscow, where later he entered the Frunze Military Academy. Then he served in Germany, Afghanistan, and Transcarpathian region. He studied again, this time improving his education at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Since graduation from the academy, the Colonel's biography has been closely associated with Latvia and its restoration. He has always been interested in philosophy, logic, psychology and the profound analysis of events.

"Fate has always sent me to the center of the most important events, so-called "hot points". Immediately after graduation from the military school, I started my service in Moscow where I joined a special security brigade. It guarded the Defense Ministry, General Staff and Government objects. Later, I found myself in the center of current political events in both Germany and Afghanistan. We know that in Afghanistan, besides political events, there was also a war. I have visited many foreign countries and met with many high ranking military and state officials.

[Kaspars] Where were you at the time when national awakening started in Latvia?

[Turlais] In Afghanistan. It was there I began to receive the first news regarding political events in Latvia.

[Kaspars] What was the profile of your activity in Afghanistan?

[Turlais] I was the chief of operations of the 40th Army. Actually, the plan for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was developed under my leadership. However, I had to overcome many barriers for this plan not only to be adopted and approved by the Soviet government at that time, but also to be carried out. It is obvious that at that time my thoughts were mainly concentrated in this important area.

[Kaspars] Considering your high position in the army and certain political changes in Latvia, did you feel an unusual attitude toward you from your military colleagues?

[Turlais] During the entire period of my service, I have never concealed my nationality. When visiting foreign countries or participating in various international meetings, I pointed out on all registration forms that I am

from Latvia but not from the USSR. Perhaps some people didn't like it. Naturally, there were quite a number of cases when I had to encounter insults and humiliation. I am talking about the service in general. However, there was nothing like that in Afghanistan. A person was evaluated there first of all by his ability to perform his duties professionally. My principal task as the Chief of Operations was to plan and to carry out operations in order to avoid senseless killings of people and to decrease the number of victims as much as possible. Little by little I got recognition in which the problem of my nationality was insignificant. To tell the truth, this recognition came not from the authorities but from my subordinates, from those who had to endure the hardships of the war on their own shoulders. After returning from Afghanistan, I again had a chance to come upon a certain unbenevolent attitude. For example, when I submitted a letter requesting permission to be sent to the Military Academy of the General Staff, one higher army officer openly said: "You have got far enough and don't hope to go any further; you are a Latvian and Latvians should not be given power in the USSR army".

[Kaspars] How did you return?

[Turlais] After coming back from Afghanistan in February 1989, I spent my vacation in Latvia where I was able to establish necessary contacts. Then, real work toward the restoration of Latvian state independence began. When attending the Academy of the General Staff in Moscow, I had approached Mr. Peters. Cooperation with Latvia continued. At this particular time I have decided that I will live and work here.

[Kaspars] How did your immediate commanders react to your decision to return to your country? Was there someone who tried to talk you out of it?

[Turlais] No, there was no such conversation. My commanders knew me very well and they understood that this important decision was not accidental.

[Kaspars] Did you know what your position in our future army would be?

[Turlais] I didn't know that at the time I started to consider the problem of relocation. I knew only one thing, that I had to be in Latvia. During the period when Shaposhnikov's order regarding my discharge from the army was being prepared, my position and responsibilities became clear.

[Kaspars] Looking at your rank, which position is higher: in our army or in the former Soviet army?

(Otherwise serious conversation was for the first time interrupted by the Colonel's loud laughter.)

[Turlais] It depends...The Latvian army will never have 100,000 or more troops as did the 40th Army. Being a chief of operations, I had much more resources at my disposal than I have now. From the viewpoint of the

official position that corresponds with my responsibilities, I am holding a general's position as I did there. Speaking of the rank, my position here is higher. But the name is not the most important thing. We have to create a real army with real action potential. And only then can we talk about holding any kind of positions.

[Kaspars] Are you satisfied with your work for the benefit of your Republic?

[Turlais] There has never been any doubt in coming back to Latvia. Even if I had to cut hay instead of doing something else. However, the Republic can benefit much more if it uses my military knowledge and experience. I am doing a job about which I have a great deal of knowledge. My goal is to create the Latvian army. It gives me energy, strength and is a source of inexhaustible interest.

[Kaspars] Can we talk about some dark sides?

[Turlais] Sometimes I meet with people who are round-about and less frank. They act as if they doubt my loyalty to the Latvian Republic and even say that I "am sitting in the wrong chair". Sometimes I heard expressions which were similar to those used by Afghan mujaheddins. Another fact which I had to deal with when still serving in the Soviet Army, is also unpleasant. For instance, soldiers of the same ethnic origin usually stuck together and supported each other. It was different with the Latvian guys. They kept a distance from each other. A similar process can be observed here. Instead of being united and devoting all attention to defense, we are engaged in dividing. And we are dividing things which are not yet created. An army has to be like a monolith. Otherwise there is no army at all.

[Kaspars] Your army life has been and still is rather colorful. How does your family react to your official trips and frequent relocations?

[Turlais] It is rather painful to talk about it. It is needless to explain that my work regime doesn't leave time for attention necessary for a family. No married couple whatsoever can envy my family life. Afghanistan, Transcarpathian region, Germany, General Staff... All of this could not help but have a negative effect on my family, and it broke up. Thank God, I have met a person who understood me and I have a family again.

[Kaspars] Do you have children?

[Turlais] A son.

Thank you for the conversation

P.S. A great portion of our conversation was dedicated to the problems of the formation of the Latvian Army. Obviously, there are a tremendous number of problems. We will write about them after our future meetings with Colonel Turlais.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Republic Guard To Reach 2500 in 1993

92US0831A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 27 Aug 92 p 2

[Report by I.Khobotova (KazTAG): "The Republic Guard"]

[Text] With the discovery and achievement of independence in Kazakhstan, as—by the way—has also been the case in the other republics of the former Soviet Union, new cares and concerns have been added. The most important of these is guaranteeing sovereignty, protecting and defending the constitutional system, as well as the rights and liberties of the citizens—in short—all the vitally important interests of this republic. In order to carry this out, a republic guard has been created in Kazakhstan. Since it is a special military formation within the armed forces reserve, the guard is subordinate to the president of the republic, and the task of its direct leadership has been assigned to its commander.

In 1992 the number of guardsmen was estimated at about 1800 military-service personnel and 30 clerical personnel. In 1993 their strength was increased to 2500 and 50 respectively. Their formation and recruitment is carried out on a voluntary, contractual basis from among military-service personnel as well as from this republic's citizens who are subject to military obligations.

Let's hope that the emergence of the guard will also yield dividends on the moral and psychological level. The prestige of the army, which has deteriorated in recent times, must be restored—above all—by means of creating a new type of armed forces, service in which would become a truly sacred duty for young persons.

The republic guard is a multinational unit, like the republic itself. In just one battalion of the government bodyguard consisting of 254 persons there are 14 nationalities.

OTHER STATES, REPUBLICS

Buryatia Establishes Fines for Violation of Military 'Administration'

92UM1391C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Aug 92 p 1

[News report: "Violations of the Stipulated Procedure of Military Administration Will Have to Be Paid For"]

[Text] New, major fines—from five hundred to five thousand rubles—have been instituted in Buryatia. Strict administrative responsibility for violations of procedure of the military administration has been defined by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the republic. The failure of citizens to appear for call-up at a military commissariat without valid cause could cost a draftee or reservist a thousand rubles. An attempt to evade special assemblies by reservists could cost them five thousand.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

'PROTEK' Director Bazhanov Interviewed

92UM1450A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 8 Sep 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Mikhail Bazhanov, president of the Russian concern PROTEK, by Viktor Andriyanov and Vladimir Lagovskiy; place and date not given: "The Field of Miracles of Russian Industry: A Game in Which the Defense Workers Have Not Yet Had Their Move"]

[Text] The "red generals of industry," the "conservative director corps,"... These are the mildest epithets that are now being awarded directors of enterprises. The military-industrial complex is especially catching it. They are accused of no less than sabotage of reforms. They say the enterprises do not think about conversion and do not want to live in the new manner and produce competitive goods. On the contrary, they intentionally fill warehouses with military products no one needs. Then they submit bills to the state for billions.

"The government undertook reform of the economy without the reform and stabilization of industry," says our interviewee Mikhail Bazhanov, president of the Russian concern Breakthrough Technologies and Culture (PROTEK), to whom we addressed some of the reproaches. "What has been done? The little-understood and totally unsupported word 'conversion' has been put forth for review. 'Enemies' have been found who supposedly do not want to implement it. Meanwhile, there is a reshuffling with money and laws. Whoever is too lazy tries to sell raw materials and weapons for a post. Corruption in the apparatus reached nearly 100 percent—officials engaged in personal enrichment are no longer working for the state. Production is in collapse. Against this background, is it appropriate to accuse manufacturers of sabotage? Has someone tried to help them?"

[Andriyanov/Lagovskiy] But it was assumed that the military-industrial complex, possessing tremendous scientific and technological potential, would help itself.

[Bazhanov] To put it mildly, this is far from simple. At the beginning of the year, the chief of the General Staff, the chief of the Armament Directorate, and I tried: we sent a memorandum addressed to B.N. Yeltsin. We offered to lend the Ministry of Defense 14 billion rubles [R]. It was assumed that this money would be used to repurchase products produced in the fourth quarter of 1991 and pay for production in the first quarter of 1992. It was a real opportunity to sell this armament for export and earn R14 billion.

I repeat, to earn and not keep asking for it in the form of handouts from the West. This money would have been more than enough for everyone, including the military-industrial complex, to replace equipment. While our document was making its way through the chain of command, time passed. The Americans, British, and

French have grabbed the orders. Now, when the government has taken a little bit off the price, it will be difficult to "retake" 2-3 billion.

Another instance. We gave enterprises money, but with a condition that they spend it on wages for workers at defense plants. The departments of the Ministry of Industry proposed: let us use the allocated money ourselves. We will use it to obtain five times more credit, will renovate and restructure production, and ensure social support for the workers. And in 1983 we will return it all back in full. No, the leadership snapped back, it cannot be done.

[Andriyanov/Lagovskiy] In an interview, the President said that the military orders in 1992 are being cut back 68 percent compared to 1991. How has this affected the military-industrial complex?

[Bazhanov] This is a tragedy! The manufacturers were expecting roughly a 30-percent decrease. For the remaining 70 percent they ordered raw materials, supplies, and equipment, and went into debt. Now they have become bankrupt. The money for state orders has not been given and will not be given. For whom will industry work?

[Andriyanov/Lagovskiy] For the consumer, for us. You see, the military-industrial complex is still the main manufacturer of high-tech everyday goods—televisions, refrigerators, tape recorders, and the like.

[Bazhanov] Where is this consumer now? He has to be able to feed and clothe himself. Most cannot afford so-called durable goods. And it cannot be done any cheaper. Price formation, inexplicable from the standpoint of common sense, gives rise to an extreme cost of raw materials and supplies. Naturally, the producers of finished products are forced to cover their expenses. In the end, the price becomes so high that a person cannot, as much as he would like to, buy even an item he needs very much. And the plants, restructuring themselves on producing "peacetime" products, are forced to work for the warehouse. As a result, production stops.

[Andriyanov/Lagovskiy] And no matter where you look, there is a deadlock?

[Bazhanov] Deadlocks can be broken, if industry, as you say, finally gets its chance. At the current stage, our concern has developed a special tactic. We proposed to the government, to start with, about 30 nationwide programs. At the basis of them are high-technology developments which originated within the military-industrial complex. I would emphasize that these are not hypotheses, not ideas, but tried and tested technologies and models.

For example, there are unique electromagnetic generators which, by affecting planting material and plants, increase crop yield by an average of one-third. Believe me, this is "know-how" of world importance. We plan to

organize production of large-capacity buses with a fundamentally new engine—a free-piston engine. About 400 mm high, it runs on any fuel. We are proposing an original method of cooling without using freon and ammonia. At Urengoye, it has been possible to compress gas right at the well. For physicians, instruments have been created that make it possible to treat without medicine.

I would dare say that by implementing these high-technology programs there is a chance to assign a full work load to Russian industry and thus save it. This is our hope for revival and then a breakthrough.

...Concluding our interview with Bazhanov on an optimistic note, we made a short excursion around Mikhail Nikolayevich's office. A few of the concern's developments were on the shelves. "These are a few small things," Bazhanov said. Among the "small things" were products from powder plants: granulated feed, fertilizer, and seeds in a shell made of fertilizer(!). Some kind of clear plastic was shining brightly from the ends; it collects the sunlight and then directs it to any point necessary. The "envy of Patton" was modestly lying there—plates of copper and steel welded into one. Polymers tens of times stronger than steel, light as a feather, in imitation of marble and tile.

Our information. Mikhail Bazhanov. Age 55. Broad-specialty engineer. General. In the recent past worked at the General Staff and was chief of a special sector. Had the ability to enlist the aid of any inventions from any organization in the country. Was able to put together a unique data bank: revolutionary inventions, technologies, and projects. In 1991-1992 was chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for Conversion. Has been president of PROTEK since 1989.

The Russian concern Breakthrough Technologies and Culture. One of a few concerns created by enterprises themselves and not on the base of ministries and departments. Is subordinate, in Bazhanov's words, to God alone. It carries out all developments itself. Unites about 400 scientific centers and approximately 1,000 enterprises in the CIS and beyond its boundaries. Its circle of interests is 360 degrees: from energy and space to medicine, from consumer goods to agriculture.

Bazhanov is also the general director of the investment program board of directors of the Investment Fund created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation in June 1982. The goal is to sell projects developed by the concern and other organizations of Russia and the CIS. Russian and foreign banks, enterprises, and organizations cooperating with the fund and investing in the development of industry are granted large exemptions on profit tax.

Contact telephone numbers: 257-21-35; 257-25-15

Our recommendation. We offer the following simple thought to entrepreneurs in Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth and abroad: Sooner or later the

fuss will pass, and the time will come when it will be impossible to sell one another endlessly the same product that is collecting dust in the warehouse, as well as to speculate on oil and vodka. We will have to work normally. To do this, we must invest money not only in short-term programs but also in production and high technology, just like throughout the normal world. Do not be late, people! He who is late risks the future, and each has only one future. We await your phone calls and suggestions. In the near future, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA will open a special section—PRORYVNYYE TEKHNOLOGII [Breakthrough Technologies], in which the most interesting developments will be presented.

Izhevsk Officials Discuss Defense Industries' Plight

92UM1449A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Sep 92 pp 1, 4

[Article by Nikolay Belan: "The Izhevsk Gunsmiths"]

[Text] The Izh River with a manmade old pond divides the city of Izhevsk in half. At one time, they turned the waterwheels at the plant dam, and in their waters the local gunsmiths tempered steel that was incomparable. Another thing, they say... Incidentally, there is revenge of the number to these legends. So, the past and present are here, like the two banks of the Izh River, always side by side.

...The hooves champed in the mud. The drivers called out gutturally, frightening away the wild animals. Hundreds of carts loaded with household goods suddenly appeared in places uninhabited between the Kama and Vyatka. Factory-hands and serf peasants moved here one after the other with their families from the Urals and other areas of Russia—ordered here and also with the secret hope of finding a better lot. The year was 1760, and Count P.I. Shuvalov founded the Izhevsk Iron Works...

The roots of the traditions of the Izhevsk gunsmiths go back to those ancient times. Outside of contact with them, it is probably wrong to talk about the traditions of others which emerged here a half-century ago during the harsh war years. Then, the evacuated production facilities of the Tula Weapons Plant and the Podolsk Mechanical Plant arrived in Izhevsk in November-December 1941, and in July 1942, by decision of the GKO [State Defense Committee], the new Plant No 622 was created, known today as the Izhevsk Mechanical Plant—the largest enterprise not only in Udmurtiya but also in Russia.

From the huts of the war years—severe and gloomy, after which one of the halls of the plant museum is styled, we go with Emil Khadzhievich Mulyukov into the spacious shops, flooded in light. The automatic lines, machining complexes, multipurpose machine tools with numerical program control... The contrasts, of course, are striking. And not only, as they say, in the interior, in the technical equipment. The enterprise has gone from the flare pistols

of the Great Patriotic War to producing "small" missiles—antitank missiles and also Igla and Igla-I portable surface-to-air missile systems.

"The computer insides of these products are completely ours," explains Emil Khadzhiyevich.

He is the chief designer at the enterprise, and the pride that is felt in his words is understandable. Still, I ask:

"But how good are these insides? It is said that the Japanese, after visiting one of our plants, later said: Now we have seen that you have not simply lagged behind, but you have lagged behind us forever in electronics."

"Alas, we are inferior to them in the component base and compactness," answered Emil Khadzhiyevich. "But as far as the functions and reliability of our missiles are concerned, they are on the world level and have an advantage over many similar types of western models of weapons."

Emil Khadzhiyevich is a deep and interesting conversationalist. I admit that he won me over with his knowledge of production. Incidentally, this knowledge is quite understandable—his entire life is linked to the Izhevsk Mechanical Plant.

"My first acquaintance with the plant took place in 1960, when as a first-year student I went through practical training in shop 37 as a metalworker on barrel outlet," he said. "Officially I came to the plant in 1965 after graduating from the mechanical institute. I was assigned as an industrial engineer in shop 39. By specialty, I was a mechanical engineer for power plants. And here I have been keeping pace with the plant for more than 27 years already."

Incidentally, most of the plant workers have a similar fate that is closely linked to the Izhevsk Mechanical Plant.

Tulskiy Levsha became known because he shoed a steel flea made by English masters. The Izhevsk gunsmiths' glory is no less, but it is just that it is not advertised as much and primarily in our homeland. The Izhevsk workers are well-known abroad, particularly the specialists on missiles and sports and hunting rifles. In our country, their product is associated primarily with the Izh motorcycle. It is hard to say what the reason for this is: maybe Tula was lucky to have a writer like Leskov, and maybe all this is the fruits of the veil of super-secrecy which has been over the Izhevsk Plant until recently. Even the widely known Makarov pistol is a product of the plant, and far from everyone knows that.

"And the work on it continues," Mulyukov says. "Today, when there is 'omnivorousness' of weapons in the context of ammunition in the shop, we are switching it to the so-called NATO round, and it will be a 15-shot..."

A subject of special pride and concern, the heart of the Izhevsk Mechanical Plant is the manufacture of single- and double-barrel hunting rifles (with horizontal and vertical barrel design) for professional and amateur hunters; sports rifles and pistols; air rifles and pistols. So many of them have been and are produced here that even a cursory tale about all the interesting models would take up more than one newspaper page. Suffice it to say that based on about 25 base models, the Izhevsk workers produce more than 2,000 different modifications of sports and hunting rifles. They go to more than 30 countries of the world (80 percent of all export deliveries of these weapons are to the CIS), and they are well known and valued in England, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Finland, France, and so forth. They have won 12 gold medals and prestigious certificates at international exhibits in Paris, Zagreb, Leipzig, Plovdiv, Brno, and other cities.

"Here is one of these rifles which was demonstrated at Montreal," Mulyukov points out, opening a showcase of a plant collection.

The trim and engraving on the rifle are like music embodied in gold, platinum, and silver.

"This is the work of the founder of our engraving school, Leonard Basev," says Emil Khadzhiyevich. "We were offered \$100,000 for it in Montreal, but that was then, and today it is worth \$1.5 million."

The Izhevsk engraving art is distinctive; it has absorbed elements of decorative folk art and the experience of masters of domestic and western schools. The works of L. Basev, V. Baloborodov, and Yu. Kropochev are truly national treasures, the highest level of engraving.

"Many of them are scattered throughout the world," said Vladimir Nikiforovich Churakov, chief of the department of scientific, technical, and economic information. "First of all, our former leaders observed a tradition of presenting such weapons as gifts to heads of states when traveling abroad. Second, they themselves ordered gift copies for their own needs—both Krushchev and Brezhnev... That is why we were very happy when the year before last the Cabinet of Ministers made the decision to transfer part of Brezhnev's collection to our museum. We received more than 20 models."

There are hundreds of stories associated with each weapon, particularly the highly artistic ones. From "serious" stories, giving food for thought, to amusing ones. One such story was told to me by Churakov. Twenty-five years ago, the plant received an order from a woman in the Far East. She asked them to make a rifle and engrave her portrait on it. The order was filled, and they soon received a joyous letter from her: Thank you, she said, now my husband the hunter will never be apart from me."

"Does that mean anyone can send you an order?" I ask.

"Of course. We created the small enterprise 'Strela' for this; it will fulfill the order on a high level."

Much can be said about the Izhevsk engravers and the school of rifle mastery—the topic is inexhaustible. But at the plant they sense another benefit from it: it directly influences the forming of traditions of the Izhevsk workers. The high exactingness towards the manufacture of weapons, their technical and operational characteristics, and safety develops in workers a sense of responsibility for the plant's brand name and intolerance of shoddy work.

The plant has taken a course towards small series of one or another modification of weapons. They emerge in the experimental shop. Aleksandr Semenovich Urzhuitsev, deputy chief of the shop, showed us products and introduced us to people. At a machine tool, we talked with one of the designers of a new modification of a small-caliber IZh-60 rifle, Valeriy Cherepanov.

"This is still a prototype, it is being finished," he says. "We are thinking about a more powerful rifle than the IZh-60, with an increased bullet velocity."

"I am curious, how did the new weapon emerge?"

"It was prompted by an article in SOVETSKIY SPORT," says Valeriy. "It raised the issue that students need a new rifle for training in sports shooting; the IZh-38, which is being produced, is heavy and also does not satisfy a number of characteristics. Still, we are still a business and took on the job."

Here in the shop we also met a future designer, Mikhail Rzhepetskiy, a student in the final class. He is working on his own modification of an air rifle created on the base of an IZh-38—this is his graduation thesis. The Izhevsk Mechanical Institute where Mikhail studies long ago became a good source of personnel for the plant.

The Izhevsk Mechanical Plant is primarily a defense plant. Understandably, it also has felt all the sharpness, at times hastiness and rashness of the conversion processes which began three years ago for it. Before 1989, the "civilian" products—just over 31 percent of the total production—at the plant were sports and hunting weapons, engines for the Izh-Yupiter motorcycle, and a rear axle and cardan shaft for the Moskvich-412. In the last three years, the volume of "defense" products has decreased to 15.1 percent. How to use the available production potential, and it is huge, how to assign a full work load to the production capacities being freed, provide employment of all workers, not lose skilled personnel, and still maintain the social sphere? A designer search began. A program was developed for changing the profile of military production and increasing the output of civilian products. It is good there is a demand on the domestic market for sports and hunting weapons, the motorcycle engine, and the motor vehicle components being produced.

"We began thinking about increasing their output back before conversion, and had the corresponding capital investments," says Mulyukov. "We prepared both the programs and a new base. Now there are plans to produce a rear axle and cardan shaft for a new motor vehicle model, the IZh-2126 Orbita, and a building is being built for producing motorcycle engines."

But this does not eliminate all the problems. Where will, say, those same electronics specialists go? Thus, the plant has entered a new era of its existence. Production was set up for implantable, multiprogrammable electrocardiosstimulators and programming devices for them—the most complicated medical instruments, requiring a high decree of reliability and accuracy. The assembly line is manufacturing the Kompanyon family of household computers designed for organizing leisure, performing calculations, and teaching programming at home, and also for electronic children's games. Laser video record players are the object of pride of the Izhevsk masters. Even these types of products say a lot, for manufacturing computer equipment is an indicator of the creative potential and great capabilities of the enterprise. For those interested, I would add: the price of these types of products is comparatively low, and the reliability is the highest. All this is the result of the plant's available perfected modern technologies and powerful production base.

There is another innovation among the household equipment that is produced at the Izhevsk Mechanical Plant—the Yugdon general-purpose kitchen appliance. It has seven attachments and can operate as a meat grinder, juicer, vegetable slicer, coffee grinder, and so forth.

"We produce 3,000 kitchen centers each month, but we do not fully satisfy the consumer demand. That is how popular the Yugdon is," said Vladimir Rudakov, chief of the shop.

Before, his shop made missile weapons. Today, in addition to the Yugdon, it makes a few home computer components, transistorized switches and turn signal relays for cars, and hunting cartridges. There are plans to produce electric motors for household appliances...

"Has this shift in specialization affected the wages?" I ask.

"No, we receive a decent wage. Another problem concerns us—employment. Not to lose skilled personnel and to help people during hard times—this policy is being followed not only in the shop but throughout the plant."

At the Izhevsk Mechanical Plant, they have developed and introduced production processes for producing hybrid micro-assemblies on thick and thin films and a semiconductor technology for producing microcircuits. Highly sensitive transducers based on new physical principles have been developed. High-power industrial lasers and many other modern products are being produced, which we will talk about in the coming issues of the newspaper.

Yes, the military production facility in and of itself is conservative. For example, it reacts poorly to the breaking of economic ties, disruption of plan discipline on the part of partners, and so forth. At the same time, it is also reliable and the most reputable partner today. It has everything it needs for itself to develop and to cooperate and do business with foreign companies. The Izhevsk Mechanical Plant has the most progressive foundry production. The basic foundry process is steel casting of patterns for mass and series production. Powder metallurgy and casting from non-ferrous alloys by various methods have also been assimilated: die casting, permanent-mold casting, sand casting, and centrifugal casting. The tool production facility—another “plant within a plant”—nearly fulfills all the enterprise’s needs for cutting and auxiliary tools, gauges and attachments, molds and dies, and precision and high-precision attachments. It also fills orders for their manufacture for other enterprises. The Izhevsk Mechanical Plant has its

own vocational technical school, a personnel training system, and a powerful social base...

Still, what is the main thing for the Izhevsk Mechanical Plant?

“We always were and, first and foremost, remain gunsmiths,” I invariably heard in response to the question in the shops and in the plant offices.

I will admit, I did not expect to hear anything different.

Advertised Specifications of 9M114 Missile

*92UM1464A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in English
15 Sep 92 p 4*

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Advertisement: “State Enterprise Izhevskiy Machine Plant”]

[Text]


Государственное предприятие «Ижевский механический завод»

РАКЕТА 9М114

Предназначена для уничтожения современных танков и других бронеделей, а также малоразмерных наземных (ДОТ, ДЗОТ и др.) и низколетящих воздушных (вертолеты, малошторгостные - самолеты) целей.

9M114 MISSILE

This Missile destroys tanks and some other armored moving or targets as well as small-sized ground targets (long-term defensive systems, long-term ground defensive systems, etc.) and air low-flying targets (helicopters, low-speed aircrafts).



ТЕХНИЧЕСКАЯ ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКА:

Максимальная дальность управляемого полета, м	5000
Средняя скорость полета, м/с	350-400
Скорость вылета из трубы-контейнера, м/с	55
Калибр, мм	130
Длина, мм	1830
Масса с пусковой трубой-контейнером, кг	46,5
Бронепробиваемость под углом 60 град. от нормали к броне, мм	280
Система управления	полуавтоматическая, с защитой от ИК и радиокомах
Передача команд на ракету	по радиолинии
Время, необходимое для производства запуска ракеты (от момента нажатия на кнопку "Пуск" до начала движения ракеты), не более	1
Диапазон высот боевого применения ракеты, м	от 0 до 3000 над уровнем моря
Температурный диапазон, °C	+50
Технический ресурс, лет	10
Суммарная вероятность безотказной работы ракеты при хранении, транспортировке, стрельбе и регламентных проверках	0,98

SPECIFICATIONS

Maximum flying distance, m	5000
Mean flying speed m/s	350-400
Speed of flying out of container-tube, m/s	55
Caliber, mm	130
Length, mm	1830
Weight with launching container-tube, kg	46,5
Capability to puncture armor at 60, angle from a normal to armor	280
Control system	semi-automatic with IR and jamming protection
Command transmission	by radio link
Time required to launch missile (from pushing the "Launch" button to initial movement of missile), s, not over	1
Height range for combat use of missile, m	0-3000 above sea level
Temperature range, °C	50
Overhaul period, years	10
Total probability of missile trouble-free operation in storage, shipment, firing and scheduled checks	0,98

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MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

NATO Contingency Plans for CIS Intervention

924P0177B Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 1 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by correspondent Vladimir Peresada: "Time To Sound the Alarm: NATO Strategists Look Eastward"]

[Text] Brussels—At the session of the council of the North Atlantic alliance held last November in Rome I asked NATO General Secretary Manfred Woerner: "Does the alliance have any plan of action in the event of the loss in the USSR of centralized control over nuclear weapons?" Such a turn of events had not at that time been ruled out in the West, but the question was clearly not to the general secretary's liking. Frowning, he said: "I would not want to discuss hypothetical situations here."

Woerner's evasive answer merely reinforced my suspicion that there is such a plan. And that, despite the "new strategy" anticipating cooperation with the East which was adopted in Rome, the North Atlantic alliance could, generally, have special versions of a "response" to a dangerous, from the West's viewpoint, development of the situation in our country or behavior of the former principal enemy. This suspicion arose because the possibility of the existence of such versions is in fact part of the actual strategy of NATO.

It has so happened that, accredited to the Brussels headquarters of the alliance, I have of late attended almost all NATO sessions, which have discussed various stages of the elaboration of this strategy. Beginning with the foreign ministers' meeting in the Scottish village of Turnberry, at which the NATO "restructuring" was launched. The proposition concerning the disappearance of the former "Soviet threat" was heard for the first time there in June 1990, and there was talk of the need for a reconsideration in the light of this of the strategic concepts of the times of the "cold war" and for extending the "hand of cooperation" to the USSR and the East European countries. The session's summary document was particularly striking in that it consigned the "Soviet threat" to oblivion without any postulate in exchange.

What was the explanation for this? NATO had initially intended, I was told here, making an increase in trust shown toward us dependent primarily on the scale of the USSR's military potential. That is, tying the new strategy mainly to the task of the elimination of our advantages in arms, both nuclear and conventional, in the Western sector. This was a perfectly realistic approach based on an assessment of Gorbachev's European policy. His statements concerning an abandonment of the confrontation with the West were accompanied by practical steps which guaranteed with interest that the "Soviet threat" would rapidly lose its military aspect.

But several months later not a trace remained of the "Turnberry equability." There were two reasons, and they are interconnected. First, recognition of the fact

that there was no longer the constantly disquieting "eastern factor" on the continent called in question, if not the fate of NATO, then, at least, the expediency of its former "defense functions" in West Europe. There were in NATO circles many opponents of such a prospect feverishly seeking something with which the bloc might "occupy" itself together with the problem of disarmament. Second, in the process of the development of new doctrines the leadership of the alliance, although having taken account of Gorbachev's "guarantees," nonetheless proceeded primarily from the actual situation in East Europe, particularly in the USSR. And it was developing such that we were essentially ourselves presenting NATO with an alternative to the disappeared "Soviet threat."

In the summer of 1990 even the term "risk factor" had appeared in NATO's vocabulary. It was employed for the first time in a directive on the development of a new strategy, which was produced by the July top-level session of NATO in London. The Soviet Union was not at that time being identified separately, it was a question of, as a whole, "crisis situations in East Europe not without danger for the countries of the alliance." But subsequent events, primarily the rapid deterioration in the internal situation in the USSR, which was fraught with the danger of its disintegration into mutually hostile states and the fragmentation of its nuclear and other arsenals, forced the NATO strategists to dot the "i's." The declaration of the Rome session ranked with all certainty among the "risk factors" the Soviet Union, which, it was emphasized, "is experiencing a difficult political evolution" and "has, as before, here impressive military potential."

The Belovezha Pact on the liquidation of the USSR exceeded NATO analysts' most pessimistic forecasts. There should be no confusion as regards the alliance's position on this question, which our "democratic" press usually presents as unequivocally positive. Yes, in all documents of the "post-Belovezha" period NATO recognizes the new political reality in the former Soviet Union. This is understandable, for the collapse of a "communist," "deideologized," and even, had it been such, bourgeois-capitalist, but, in any event, strong state which had since the times of Peter even been a force to reckon with, is objectively favorable to the West, and not only the West. At the same time these same documents literally exude concern for Western countries' security in connection with the possible consequences of the disintegration of the USSR.

I do not doubt that the former "Soviet space" is now being seen in NATO as "risk factor" No. 1. This is not being said officially, but far more is being done than in any other area for the purpose of neutralizing the "post-Soviet unpleasantness." Colossal efforts were expended, for example, on preventing the appearance in the place of the USSR of several nuclear states (it is, clearly, not simply the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as such but also of a hope of narrowing the former scale of our "nuclear geography"); to prepare for operation under the new conditions of the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (acute unease in NATO was caused by the intentions of the former republics to have their own armies and, accordingly, by the fate of the arms' "ceilings" specified by the treaty at a time when the USSR was still in existence); to push us into the swift elimination of a considerable number of tactical nuclear weapons.

The last mission is particularly symptomatic. Who would have thought that NATO, primarily the United States, which had for years opposed similar Soviet proposals, would suddenly be fervent disarmers in this sphere. And would, in addition, promptly realize its own initiative advanced literally on the eve of the collapse of the USSR (it was announced recently that the American tactical nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery at NATO's disposal had been removed from Europe). But the explanation was quite simple. These weapons, from which the European part of the former Union is to be "freed in response," are the most dangerous from the viewpoint of loss of control over them.

But all these are the visible insurance measures, so to speak. There are others also—the special versions of a "response" whose possible existence was mentioned at the start. Quite recently REUTER "managed to get hold of" a confidential document prepared last December at the meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels, which discussed, in the main, the situation in East Europe. It provided neither more nor less for the possibility of "selective nuclear strikes in crisis zones." It is not hard to guess, I believe, to which zones reference is made. As is well known, there are in the east of the continent simply no territories other than the CIS, Russia, mainly, which have the necessary nuclear component for this.

It is significant that this document appeared immediately following the Belovezha decisions. Those among us who believe that on the bones of the USSR NATO is prepared to fraternize virtually with the new "democratic regimes," with Moscow particularly, should take this into consideration. As, equally, the fact that such reports are not "gotten hold of" just like that, publicized even less. This was undoubtedly an organized leak.

And does NATO's decision to put its structures, armed forces included, at the disposal of the CSCE for peace-keeping operations in Europe not put us on our guard? This decision also, incidentally, was adopted following the disintegration of the USSR, for there had previously been no serious basis for such (until most recently NATO had held aloof from the Yugoslav crisis). And it also, in my view, is in the category of special "response" measures. It is specified, it is true, that a request and mandate of the CSCE will be determining for such operations. But what of that? Under the conditions of constantly multiplying conflicts not susceptible of settlement, the Karabakh or Dniester conflicts, for example, it cannot be ruled out that there could be both a request and a mandate and that, instead of UN international forces, which have hitherto been sent to "flash points,"

there would ultimately be there forces of the North Atlantic alliance. Which, in fact, is already the case in a "sea version" off the shores of Yugoslavia. Without any authority on the part of the CSCE, what is more.

How are we to understand this? In the wake of the precedent in the Persian Gulf a new, even more provocative precedent is being set: The West's military-political organizations, NATO primarily, are arrogating to themselves the right to power "peace-keeping" functions in Europe.

And it is incomprehensible why the leaders of the CIS are remaining silent in this connection. Why is Moscow keeping quiet when the Balkans is a traditional sphere of Russian interests and Russian influence? Is it not clear that the naval operation in the Adriatic is also a trial balloon directed toward us: Will it be swallowed or not? Perhaps there were consultations with us in advance? Perhaps the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, to which all members of the CIS have been admitted, was convened? No, it was not. The newly baked partners were simply ignored.

The fact that other participants in the CSCE found themselves in the same situation is hardly any consolation. To judge by what is contemplated by NATO's strategic developments, we should be sounding the alarm loudest of all. And what is most important—we ourselves should be putting our own house in order as soon as possible, before it is too late.

SECURITY SERVICES

Border Troops Officer Refutes Charges of Slackness

92UM1366D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
31 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Ukrainian Border Troops Press Service Officer Senior Lieutenant Sergey Astakhov: "Why Is It So Biased? With Regard to a Series of Articles on the Border Troops in GOLOS UKRAINY and PRAVDA UKRAINY"]

[Text] Today, perhaps as never before, the Ukrainian Border Troops are in need of attention from the mass media and for journalists to write the true story about the new page in the history of the border and about the difficult missions being carried by the troops during the current turbulent time. Unfortunately, some articles have been quite superficial and the conclusions of the writers have been recklessly bold. So, N. Gorvat, author of the article "Kto bodaet nashu granitsu?" [Who Is Butting Our Border?] (GOLOS UKRAINY, 27 June) limited himself to just enumerating the cases of illegal border crossings during the last three years. He did not burden himself with an analysis of the causes of the border violations or with a demonstration of the border guards' actions. But on the other hand, S. Borisov entered the discussion in the article "Granitsa na

zamke?" [Is the Border Secured?] (PRAVDA UKRAINY, 17 June). He states that there is a "...Decree on strengthening the border (he has in mind the border with Moldova—S.A.), forces have been allocated, but the border still remains open". It would seem that, while coming to this conclusion, the author should have met with someone from the Border Troops command authority beforehand so that he would have had at his disposal complete information on that sector of the border. But, isn't it surprising that the most competent individual representing the Border Troops with whom the journalist spoke turned out to be... a lieutenant, who was an acting border post commander. In his article, Sergey Borisov also refers to the President of Ukraine's representative to Kodymskiy Rayon and to customs, militia and SBU [Ukrainian Security Service] workers, while forgetting about one thing—all of them only assist the border guards but are not responsible for the reliability of the protection of the border.

Let's leave the author's conclusions to his conscience. I would like to continue the conversation begun by S. Borisov, all the more so that I myself just returned from that sector of the state border. And having pushed aside the statistics obtained from the State Committee for Ukrainian State Border Protection Matters.

From the moment I began defending the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, that is, from 17 March 1992, border guards detained over 1,500 foreign citizens on that sector, primarily Romanians, who were attempting to illegally drive into Ukraine. During searches of the passengers and vehicles, we discovered several hundred assault rifles, machineguns, grenade launchers, pistols, hunting rifles, and also thousands of cartridges, hundreds of edged weapons and gas-powered weapons, and nearly one hundred hand grenades. Ten armed groups were detained. We prevented numerous attempts to massively export manufactured goods, foodstuffs, and raw material from the country, including strategic and other material assets. During the period indicated, nearly 1.5 million citizens and more than 500,000 vehicles were admitted across the border.

Everything enumerated—are only the bare figures of official accountability. But real people, sleepless people, who are full of the tense humdrum of the border existence, stand behind each case. And if you want, risk, there is a war going on just several kilometers from the border posts. How do our officers and soldiers perform their duties? Conscientiously and, I will not be afraid of this word, selflessly.

Selsoviet [rural soviet] Chairman V. Zelenin requested assistance in rendering harmless a group of unknown individuals who were terrorizing the local population

from Lieutenant Vladislav Ivankovich, chief of the border post in the village of Grebeniki of Velikomikhaylovskiy Rayon in Odessa Oblast. The officer and his "alert" team urgently drove to the village. Once there, the border guards learned that a certain Antyukhov, who didn't work anywhere, who had previously been incarcerated several times and who had attempted to violate the border, was maintaining contact with a criminal group.

Having caught sight of the soldiers near his home, Antyukhov decided to flee. The border guards set off after him and detained him. But the criminal offered armed resistance. First he wounded Private Vladimir Rybachok with a knife and then he went after Private Sergey Yatsenko who was forced to use his weapon and wounded Antyukhov...

On the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, servicemen live, while overcoming primitive living conditions, disruptions in food supplies, and the heavy physical workload. It is difficult to assume what S. Borisov expected to see on the border when he stated that it is not "secured". Maybe a border guard under every bush? Or a continuous barbed wire fence that separated relatives who live on both sides of the new border? So, there is no need of that. And the tasks that have been assigned to the border control detachments that have recently been formed here are somewhat different from the customary stereotypes that have become firmly established in the consciousness of many of our citizens. The reliability of the defense of the border hasn't been reduced because of this, and the statistics cited are a graphic example of that. Around the clock, border guards, along with militia and customs agents, conduct inspections at entry control points. Practically all roads are controlled by special mobile border detachments and close cooperation is maintained with local residents. National Guard soldiers and "Berkut" [golden eagle] special militia detachments are near the border. So, our people can be calm: the missions assigned in the Ukrainian Presidential Decree "On Measures for the Protection of the Ukrainian State Border with the Republic of Moldova" are being carried out. The border guards, jointly with the subunits that are assisting them, have ensured the protection and inviolability of the territory of our state.

It is always difficult to start from scratch, but all the more so to establish a new state border already under such extreme conditions. And believe me, those soldiers who are performing duty on the border right now, who eat their food under the open sky in the heat and rain, sleep in tents or in half-destroyed homes without windows or doors are worthy of our respect and admiration. They are not grumbling. Because there is this concept—duty. To the people and to the Homeland.

Desertion, Drunkenness Plague Border Troops
92UM1366A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
31 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Ukrainian Border Troops Press Service Chief Colonel Petr Medvid: "To Serve in Your Own Backyard... On the Tenderhearted Parents and Their Sons Who Have Set Out on the Path of a Gross Violation of Discipline"]

[Text] At the present time the Ukrainian Border Troops are experiencing one of the most responsible moments in their history. The formation and legal formulation of the borders of a sovereign state, the formation of division-sized and smaller units, and their manning exclusively by citizens of Ukraine are occurring.

We already know that the border troops have a special duty, that they have a special understanding of military duty that is inherent to them alone, and the highest reliability and personal responsibility for the security of the Fatherland. And they have a special discipline and it also helps them to endure any ordeals of border service.

A year to a year and a half ago we were witnesses to how a stubborn struggle was being conducted, beginning with the committees of soldiers' mothers to the parliament, for the return of our soldiers from the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and other regions of the former Union so that Ukrainian lads would perform their military service only on their native soil and only in the Ukrainian Armed forces.

It was at a time when fierce debates were occurring: where will our sons serve, and the boom of desertion had reached its highest point. Hundreds of servicemen who had broken through all of the cordons rushed to their hearths and homes. In justification—they had "patriotic" motives on their lips: "I want to defend the borders of Ukraine"!

But what can explain the flight of soldiers from military units today? They are deserting from Lvov Oblast to Kiev Oblast, from Chernovtsi to Dnepropetrovsk, and from the Transcaucasus to the Kharkov area. Young soldiers, who put on their shoulder boards just yesterday, and those soldiers who have two-three months left until their release into the reserve are deserting. What doesn't suit the soldier on his native soil? The climactic conditions are the same both here and there and the duty conditions, too. Yes and the situation today in the troops is different. Previously, only especially outstanding soldiers could visit their homes during two years of service as a form of incentive. Right now each serviceman is guaranteed 20 days leave. Servicemen also enjoy other benefits that have been provided by the Law "On Universal Military Obligation and Military Service". Incidentally, it is written in this Law that defense of Ukraine is a state duty of each of its citizens. And he must serve where the interests of the Homeland require him to. But, unfortunately, many servicemen forget about that and from the first days of their stay at a unit dash off requests

to their commanders to be transferred to duty near their homes. And often they desert before receiving a reply.

It is characteristic that their own parents incite them to take that step toward desertion and perjury. Yes, don't be surprised, it is the parents! They think that both the sons and the parents will be less worried if their sons are nearby. The mother of Private V. Trushin also uses those motives to justify her deed. Having arrived at the unit to see her son, she used deceptive measures to take him home and a week later sent a telegram to the commander telling him that her son would perform his duty at his place of residence in Donetsk Oblast. Of course, as human beings we can understand the parents: every mother wants her son to be near her. But who will defend the border at the mountainous border outpost in the Carpathians? Who will spend hours, until his eyes ache, gazing at a radar screen while defending our seashores? Who will risk his life, having blocked the path of an armed band on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border?

It is difficult to calculate the loss of combat readiness that is caused by those soldiers who try, from the first days of service, to move closer to home, under their parents' roof. And the father and mother will attempt to indulge their child not only with poppy seed pirozhki and with home-made sausage, but also with "Okovita" white lightning.

And here the second misfortune that has come tumbling down on the heads of commanders rises to its full height. Recently, cases of personnel drunkenness have become more frequent in troop units and subunits. Especially on days off and on holidays, when dozens of tenderhearted mothers and fathers, weighed down with shopping bags, steamer trunks and string bags, storm the entry control points with the demand that their sons be "handed over" to them for a day or two to sustain their physical strength. And they sustain them in such a way that many meetings with parents end with ordinary drinking bouts in the family circle. What's worse, the alcoholic beverages brought by the parents are later drunk in sentry boxes, on duty, and in various common areas and other secluded places. And these meetings with parents often end with gross violations of military discipline, incidents and crimes.

That is just what happened at Drogobychskiy Border Detachment when the father visited Private A. Kasyanov. On the birthday of his favorite son, he brought a whole liter of white lightning to the border detachment from the Crimea. The son hosted his friends at a party and he, along with them, beat up the young commander. But just the opposite occurred at their neighboring unit at "Chop" OKPP [separate border control post]. Privates A. Oginskiy and G. Galazhenko, having obtained alcoholic beverages from their parents, lavishly provided vodka to Junior Sergeant A. Mayorov...

After the meetings with their parents, Junior Sergeants Yu. Kondratyev and I. Oleynik, Privates N. Boychun,

Ye. Voloshin, O. Bondar, D. Logvinov, A. Bessarab and many others returned to the unit in a drunken state.

Commanders are also concerned by the frequently occurring cases of illegal activities of so-called "zemlyachki" [fellow countrymen] who arrive at entry control points and attempt to involve their acquaintances—junior controllers—in conspiracies to ship contraband goods across the border.

Of course, these and similar cases are not characteristic on the whole of the life and official military activities of the troops. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian lads faithfully serve their Homeland and vigilantly and reliably defend the state borders. Just this year, they have detained hundreds of border violators and have stopped numerous attempts to transport contraband and other cases of illegal activities of criminal elements on the state border.

These results could be higher if individual soldiers did not violate the requirements of the military oath which they swore to in front of their parents, commanders and military comrades.

As the results of the state of military discipline in the troops have shown during the first six months, illegal acts of personnel while accompanied and assisted by relatives and acquaintances have begun to acquire a dangerous trend. Cases of the use of alcoholic beverages, absence without leave and desertion from units, and not returning from short leaves have not been eradicated at individual garrisons.

At the present time the Ukrainian Border Guards command authorities have taken specific steps to prevent the numerous negative phenomena that have been enumerated and to strengthen order and order in the troops. This especially concerns subunits where tasks for the reliable defense of the state border are directly carried out. A comprehensive program to increase military discipline and to prevent "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts] and other violations in military collectives has been developed and sent to units. Now the matter is with the parents whose sons, with their help, have worked out dependent positions for them and who have disregard for the law for illegal acts.

Incidentally, when I was writing these lines, a report came in from the operations duty officer for the Ukrainian Border Troops: an hour ago, Private Roman Bloshinsky, who was drafted from Brovarov in Kiev Oblast, ran away from N-skiy border post.

Border Troops Officer on Problems of Service Along Tajik Border

924C2268A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 27 Aug 92 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Borisov, chief of staff of the Pyandzh sector border detachment, by Igor Rotar; place and date not given: "Soldiers Are Dying, Service Goes On; Will Russian Jurisdiction Help the Russian Border Troops?"]

[Text]

Tajikistan

On 20 August, President of Russia Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the transfer of border troops deployed on the territory of Tajikistan to the jurisdiction of Russia. The decree was announced to the troops the day before yesterday. The border troops, who were tired of living in a state of uncertainty, have been waiting impatiently for this. But will the new legal status bring real relief to the servicemen who have ended up in a foreign war?

The utopianism of the hope for a quick peace makes it possible to assume that the radius of combat operations in the border area rayons will be broadened—war will also roll to the presently calm sectors of the Tajik-Afghan boundary. Therefore, today, the mood of the officers of the hottest sector of the border—the Pyandzh sector—is very significant. Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Borisov, the chief of staff of the Pyandzh border detachment, answered the questions of a *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* correspondent.

[Rotar] So, you have a holiday?

[Borisov] Well, it is early to talk about a holiday, although the transfer of the troops to Russia's jurisdiction has been received by all servicemen with joy. It is another matter that it is still not clear whether the other demands of the officers will be satisfied: an increase in wages, social protection, and a transition to a contract form of service. I will cite at least one example. Today, many soldiers run away from the detachment at the first opportunity. A soldier who receives a good wage and who comes here voluntarily would never become a deserter.

[Rotar] Now the border troops will be manned by citizens of Russia, but will they want to go to remote Tajikistan?

[Borisov] There undoubtedly will be problems, and, in order to resolve them, it is necessary, as I said, to establish a contract system.

[Rotar] But what is needed to keep the officers?

[Borisov] A decent wage and social protection. Understand the mood of the serviceman who risks his life daily,

and, at the same time cannot count on completing service with either a good pension or an apartment!

[Rotar] Yes, people are dying. Junior Sergeant Aleksandr Degtyarenko died Sunday during the arrest of a trespasser.

[Borisov] This is a grave loss to us. But the border guards did not succumb to panic: Service on the border goes on as before.

[Rotar] But this kind of situation cannot go on forever. There is no hope for a quick peace in Tajikistan, and the political situation in neighboring Afghanistan is no easier. You have ended up between two fires.

[Borisov] Our situation depends on the kind of decision the leadership of Tajikistan and Russia come to: whether we will be left here to wait for a "Transcaucasus variant," or whether we will be pulled out in time.

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